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General Introduction and Outline of the Dissertation
During the last decade, DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) models based
on the work by Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), Smets and Wouters (2003) and
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) have become the workhorse theoretical
framework in the mainstream academic literature on monetary economics. The for-
mulation of forward-looking, rational economic agents and their intertemporal opti-
mization problems under general equilibrium represent the core of this new modeling
approach. However, this new theoretical framework has not remained unchallenged.
On the one hand, its limited capability to explain many “puzzles” observable in empir-
ical data has led a number of researchers, among them in particular Mankiw (2001),
Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) and Solow (2004), to raise serious doubts about the im-
plications for economic policy advice based on such models. On the other hand, the
assumed rationality of the economic agents – since the work by Lucas (1976) the cen-
tral feature of mainstream neoclassical economics – has also been relativized in recent
years. Indeed, recent research has highlighted the importance of learning, on the one
hand – where the rational expectations solution is only the extreme case to be fulfilled
in the long run – and of agent heterogeneity, on the other hand, for the behavior of the
economic agents and for the dynamics of the economy.
Alternatively, Chiarella and Flaschel (1996, 2000) have proposed a theoretical macroe-
conomic framework which provides a more descriptive framework for the study of the
macrodynamics of modern economies. This alternative framework is based on non-
clearing goods and labor markets (and therefore of under- or over-utilized labor and
capital stock), adaptively adjusting economic agents, and on the assumption that wages
and prices react only gradually to disequilibrium situations in both the goods and labor
markets. In addition, the inflation expectations are assumed there to be of cross-over
type in both wage and price inflation adjustment equations, permitting thus the model-
ing of not rational but instead model-consistent expectations concerning the wage-price
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dynamics in the economy.
This dissertation will follow this second theoretical approach or “modeling philosophy”.
Underlying all chapters of this dissertation will thus be the notion that the macroe-
conomy adjusts in a gradual manner to existing disequilibrium situations in the goods,
labor and financial markets. Since rational expectations and the resulting self-fulfilling
adjustment paths will not be the determinants of the dynamics of the economy, the
bounded rationality of the economic agents will be implicitly assumed.
Under this perspective, this dissertation will handle the role of gradual wage and price
inflation adjustments and monetary policy in currency unions and open economies
both theoretically and empirically. This dissertation consists of two parts: In Part I
the role of wage and price inflation adjustments and of labor market rigidities in closed
economies and monetary unions is analyzed. In contrast, in Part II the focus is set on
the interplay between nominal exchange rate fluctuations and the dynamics of wage
and price inflation in an open economy framework.
Throughout Part I, the dynamics of closed economies and currency unions such as
the European Monetary Union will be at the center of the empirical and theoretical
analysis. As it will be stressed in this part of the dissertation, the characteristics of
wage and price inflation are of central importance for the stability of closed economies,
and even more, for economies which are members of monetary unions. This is due to
the fact that with the entrance into a monetary union such as the EMU the participant
economies do not only lose their ability to conduct an independent monetary policy to
react to exogenous shocks. Additionally, due to the disappearance of country-specific
nominal exchange rates, their capability to correct internal and external imbalances
through real exchange rate adjustments is also significantly diminished. Due to this
twofold loss of flexibility to handle exogenous shocks, other macroeconomic channels
such as the mobility of the production factors and wage and price flexibility become
more important as macroeconomic stabilizing mechanisms. However, given the fact
that the degree of labor market mobility existing across the EMU Member States is
still quite low compared for example with the U.S. economy, the adjustment process
of these economies is likely to take place primarily through the dynamics of wage and
price inflation at the national level.
A central issue in the first part of this dissertation will be the explicit modeling of role
of labor market rigidity in the dynamics of wage and price inflation. This is due to the
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fact that the labor markets play a central role not only for the determination of wage
and price inflation, but also for the speed and extent of the transmission of monetary
policy impulses. Their importance will become particularly clear when the conduction
of monetary policy within a monetary union with asymmetric labor markets will be
investigated.
In Part II of this dissertation the interaction of nominal exchange rate fluctuations and
the gradual adjustment of wages and prices in an open economy will be analyzed. The
modeling of the nominal exchange dynamics, as well as its role in the dynamics of the
economy, will also concern non-standard situations: On the one hand, the consequences
of agents heterogeneity in the foreign exchange market for the macroeconomic stability
of two interacting open economies will be investigated. On the other hand, the effects
of currency and financial crises in emerging market economies with a high degree of
liability dollarization, and the role which the gradual adjustments of wages and prices
play in the recovery process following the breakdown in aggregate investment, will be
studied.
As it will be demonstrated, the characteristics of wage and price inflation dynamics, as
well as the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate, will be central for the macroeconomic
dynamics and stability of the system where the latter is not simply imposed by the
rational expectations assumption.
Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 will focus in more detail on the
dynamics of the national inflation rates of the euro area countries prior to and after
the introduction of the euro. By means of univariate and panel unit root tests, the
absolute and relative convergence of these time series will be investigated and different
“convergence groups”will be characterized. Beyond this, the main determinants for the
arise of inflation rate differentials in the euro area countries will be identified by means
of single-equation GMM and pooled TSLS estimations.
In Chapter 2 the baseline semi-structural macroeconomic model will be described and
its stability properties towards variations in the structural parameter values of the
model will be analyzed. Its empirical relevance will be demonstrated on the basis of
GMM estimations with time series of the U.S., Germany, UK, France and the Euro
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Area.
In Chapter 3 the theoretical model discussed in Chapter 2 will be modified in order
to analyze in an explicit manner the role of labor market rigidity for the dynamics of
output and inflation by means of the incorporation of a search and matching function.
After discussing the modified model, alternative monetary policy rules will be evaluated
concerning their efficiency in the control of different macroeconomic variables such as
wage and price inflation, as well as output and employment.
Chapter 4 will extend this new theoretical framework into a two-country model of a
monetary union. Within this new framework the design of optimal monetary policy in
a common currency area will be investigated. The issue of optimal country-weighting
in the loss function of the currency union’s central monetary authorities will be there
particularly addressed.
The determination of the nominal exchange rate under heterogenous expectations and
its role in the macroeconomic dynamics of two large economies will be the focus of the
analysis of Chapter 5. For this, a simple specification of the nominal exchange based on
the existence of chartists and fundamentalists in the foreign exchange market will be
incorporated into an open-economy two-country extension of the theoretical framework
discussed in Chapter 2.
The role of the nominal exchange rate for the stability of the economy is also the focus of
the analysis of Chapter 6, where the dynamics of the economy and the role of monetary
policy as well as of wage and price level adjustments in countries with a large share of
unhedged debt denominated in foreign currency are investigated.
Finally, this dissertation is closed with the summarization of its main findings and the
discussion of possible future research directions.
Part I
Gradual Wage-Price Adjustments and Monetary Policy in
Closed Economies and Monetary Unions

1. Inflation Rate Differentials and Business Cycles
Fluctuations in the Euro Area
1.1 Introduction
With the culmination of the monetary unification process by the Member States of
the European Monetary Union (EMU) represented by the abolition of their national
currencies and the adoption of the euro, the degree of wage and price flexibility at the
national level became particularly important for the macroeconomic stability of the
participating economies as well as for the EMU as a whole. Indeed, in the absence
of country-specific nominal exchange rates and monetary policy conduction implied by
a monetary unification, the country-specific wage and price developments are likely to
gain a much more important role as macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms to internal
and external imbalances through their effect on the real exchange rates and therefore
on the competitiveness of the different economies. Their ability to fulfill this function,
however, depends to a significant extent on their degree of persistence and therefore on
their capability to react in a quick and sufficient manner to those shocks.
From this perspective, the high degree of persistence of most of the national inflation
rate differentials of the EMU Member States observed in the years posterior to the
introduction of the euro has raised serious concerns among researchers and policy mak-
ers alike: Because the differences in the national inflation rates seem not to be caused
primarily by accordant developments in the productivity in those economies, the rela-
tive competitiveness of the member countries might be suffering from significant shifts
which might bring about serious consequences for the future developments of output
and employment in the medium run.
The main purpose of this chapter is to analyze the dynamic behavior of the national
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inflation rates in the euro area and the linkage between their dispersion and persis-
tence to the country-specific business cycles prior and after the monetary unification
from an empirical perspective. This study is organized as follows: In section 1.2 the
main theoretical explanations for the existence of inflation differentials in a common
currency area, with special focus on the EMU are briefly discussed. In section 1.3 the
convergence process of the national inflation rates prior to the introduction of the euro
as well as their dynamic behavior after that date is analyzed by means of econometric
convergence and stationary tests. Structural inflation adjustment equations as well as
inflation differential equations for selected EMU countries are estimated and discussed
in section 1.4, in order to find structural explanations for the observed persistent in-
flation differentials in the EMU. Section 1.5 draws some concluding remarks from this
chapter.
1.2 Inflation Differentials within Monetary Unions: Main Causes
and Consequences
According to the Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) theory developed after the work
by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), a high mobility of the factors
of production, and especially of labor, is a central pre-condition for countries to be
adequate candidates for a common currency area. Only in a currency union with
high interregional factor mobility asymmetric shocks do not represent a threat for the
internal stability of the former. This is because the regional labor markets are able to
absorb these shocks in a quick and efficient manner by reorganizing the distribution
of the labor force within the regions. In such a case, the currency union’s central
monetary authorities will thus be able to focus on the currency union’s external balance,
once the internal balance is assured by the high interregional labor mobility. In the
new macroeconomic environment resulting from a monetary unification and the related
disappearance of the country-specific nominal exchange rates, other macroeconomic
characteristics such as the mobility of the production factors and the degree of wage and
price flexibility become even more relevant as macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms
to asymmetric shocks at the national level.
The empirical evidence concerning the mobility of the factors of production in the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union is twofold: While the factor capital has become highly mobile
across the EMU members, the degree of labor mobility in the EMU has remained much
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lower primarily due to the language and cultural barriers among the EMU Member
States, as pointed out by Bertola (2000) and Braunerhjelm, Faini, Norman, Ruane and
Seabright (2000). Concerning the euro area countries, De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke
(1993, p.124) find that, “at the national level, there is almost no labor mobility but
significantly more exchange rate variability”. This result corroborates the intuition by
Meltzer (1986), whereafter in a monetary union as the EMU more of the adjustment
to asymmetric shocks will take the form of real exchange rate changes than of labor
mobility.1
In the absence of the country-specific nominal exchange rate channel, effective adjust-
ments of the real exchange rate to macroeconomic internal or external imbalances at
the national level can only take place through wage and price adjustments. In a mon-
etary union with low labor mobility as the EMU, thus, “inflation differentials are [. . . ]
the product of an equilibrating adjustment process within a monetary union and, as
such, are not only unavoidable, but also desirable.”2 Now, while the full equality of
the inflation rates of monetary union members is an undesirable situation which would
hinder the individual adjustment of the different economies to asymmetric shocks, a
similar dynamic behavior of the national inflation rates is desirable due to a variety of
reasons. In the first place, similar national inflation rates imply also similar real inter-
est rates, and therefore more uniform monetary policy impulses across the monetary
union. In the second place, similar inflation rates imply stable bilateral real exchange
rates among the monetary union’s members, and therefore also a balanced competi-
tiveness development among them. Furthermore, similar inflation rates are likely to
lead to similar inflationary expectations in the member countries, making the control
of inflation at a currency area wide level easier for the central bank. On the contrary,
if the national inflation rates differ from each other persistently and subsequently the
national inflation differentials are upwardly or downwardly biased from the monetary
union’s average level, an unstable macroeconomic development of the monetary union
members might occur, as it will be discussed in the next sections.
1 While a currency union does not involve the existence of a single market, i.e. it does not rule
out the existence of trade barriers, tariffs, etc. between the currency union members, a monetary
union characterizes indeed a single market with a common currency. However, since the EMU is the
focus of this study, I will not stick to this differentiated definitions but will rather use both terms
interchangeably.
2 ECB (2005, p.61). See ECB (2003) and Fritsche, Logeay, Lommatzsch, Rietzler, Stephan and
Zwiener (2005) for an extensive discussion of the main causes for inflation differentials in the European
Monetary Union.
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At this point it should be stressed that the entrance in a monetary union implies for
the joining countries a radical regime change in their macroeconomic environment for
a variety of reasons which go way beyond the loss of an independent monetary policy
to react to exogenous shocks and the disappearance of the country-specific nominal
exchange rates. With the entrance in a monetary union, macroeconomic patterns such
as the wage bargaining processes or the inflationary expectations formation in a coun-
try valid before it joined the monetary union are likely to change after the adoption
of the new common currency, in the sense of the Lucas’s (1976) Critique. Addition-
ally, due to the nominal exchange rate risk- and transaction costs reduction resulting
from the monetary unification, to the subsequent higher economic integration and in-
ternational trade among the monetary union members as well as to the higher regional
production specialization, countries that enter a currency union are likely to experience
dramatically different business cycles as before.
In the following section I briefly review the main structural and cyclical factors which,
at least theoretically, could explain the existence of inflation rate differentials (and their
persistence) in a monetary union,3 and discuss the possible consequences of the exis-
tence of persistent inflation differentials for the macroeconomic behavior of monetary
union members.
1.2.1 Structural Factors
Tradable and Non-Tradable Goods Price Level Convergence: Due to the im-
portant process of real convergence and the high economic integration resulting from
the monetary unification, many observers have interpreted the persistent inflation dif-
ferentials among the EMU member countries mainly as a consequence of the Balassa-
Samuelson (BS) effect4 resulting from the catching-up process of low to high income
EMU members.
In the Balassa-Samuelson framework, the production structure of the economies can be
clearly differentiated between tradable and non-tradable goods, and labor is assumed
3 Here I do not focus on additional methodological issues concerning the composition of basket
of goods of the Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI). As discussed in Alberola (2000, p.60),
the differences in the weights of the goods in the representative basket of the EMU members, while
containing some information, are not fundamental for the explanation of the extent and persistence of
inflation differentials in the euro area.
4 Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964).
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to be perfectly mobile within a country across these two sectors. Under conditions of
perfect competition, profit maximization in both sectors implies
pTf ′T(L) = w = p
Nf ′N(L) (1.1)
where pT and pN denote the price of tradable and non-tradable goods and f ′T(L) and
f ′N(L) denote the marginal product of labor in the tradable and non-tradable goods
sectors. Expressing eq.(1.1) in growth rates delivers
piT + αT = piN + αN (1.2)
where αT and αN denote the growth rate of labor productivity in the tradables and
non-tradables production sector, respectively. Under the assumption of perfect goods
market integration across the countries of a monetary union and the absence of arbitrage
possibilities, the inflation rate of the tradable goods is the same across the member
countries, so that
piTi = pi
T i = 1, . . . N.
This, however, does not necessarily hold for the inflation rate of the non-tradable goods
in the different economies. If the aggregate price level can be expressed as a Cobb-
Douglas function of both tradable and non-tradable goods, the aggregate inflation rate
in country i can be expressed as
pii = (1− γ)piTi + γpiNi = piTi + γ(αTi − αNi ).
Since the production of tradable goods is usually more capital intensive and therefore
gains more from technological process than the non-tradable goods production, a higher
growth rate of labor productivity in the first production sector is to be expected. When
labor productivity increases in the tradable goods sector, wages in that sector can rise
without leading to an increase in the price tradable goods. Nevertheless, due to the
assumed intersectoral labor mobility, the nominal wage in the non-tradable sector is
likely to increase to the same extent, despite of the lower productivity growth in that
sector. The result is an increase in the non-tradable goods prices and therefore also in
the general price level.
For the inflation differentials between two countries i and j, or between country’s i
inflation rate pii and the monetary union’s average pimu, it follows
pii − pimu = γ(αTi − αNi + αTmu − αNmu). (1.3)
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This implies that the difference between the national and the monetary union’s average
inflation rates arise from the sector and country differences in productivity. According
to eq.(1.3), the existence of inflation differentials is caused solely by different structural
factors concerning the production schemes between two countries, or alternatively, by
the differences between their economic development.
However, despite of its apparent high explanatory power for the existence of inflation
rate differentials in a monetary union, the Balassa-Samuelson model exhibits a variety
of conceptual and empirical shortcomings. At the conceptual level, in the first place, it
is possible that a catching up effect might take place with productivity growth equally
high in both the tradable and non-tradable sectors. In this case the explaining content
of the BS model would vanish, since the catching up effect would occur without exerting
any pressure on the aggregate price levels. In the second place, the differentiation of
the production structure of an economy between a tradable and a non-tradable goods
sector is in the actual world almost impossible, due to the high integration of goods at
all stages of the production process. In the third place, the BS model assumes constant
production elasticities in both sectors, while in reality they are likely to be endogenously
determined. Additionally, on empirical grounds, the econometric studies by Alberola
(2000), Sinn and Reutter (2000), Ortega (2003) and Lommatzsch and Tober (2004)
find that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is not able to explain the inflation differentials
in the euro area due to the size and persistence of the latter, since “it appears that the
actual [inflation differentials] between groups of countries have been significantly larger
than what the BS model would imply.”5
Exchange Rate Pass-Through: The extent of the exchange rate pass-through on
the aggregate domestic price levels of the different countries and therefore on the infla-
tion differentials between them depends on the degree of openness of their economies
and on their production profile, i.e. on their dependence on foreign intermediate and
energy goods. Obviously, the influence of external factors on the price level varies with
the measure of the price level which is used. Concerning producer prices and the GDP
deflator, these are affected by external effects only to the extent up to which foreign
intermediate goods are used in the production of domestic final goods. If on the con-
trary the consumer price index (CPI) is analyzed, as done in the majority of empirical
5 ECB (2003, p.34). See also De Grauwe (1996), Alberola and Tyrva¨inen (1998), De Grauwe and
Skudelny (2000) and for similar findings.
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studies on inflation dispersion such as Busetti, Forni, Harvey and Venditti (2006), nom-
inal exchange rate fluctuations affect the development of the CPI additionally through
the share of foreign goods in the consumer basket. Inflation dispersion measures based
on the national CPI will thus be biased by the import price dimension. Since the CPI
depends to a higher extent on exogenous, foreign shocks (through the role of the im-
port prices) than the GDP deflator or the producer price index. In this regard ECB
(2003, p.18) finds that “import prices tend to account for the inflation differentials of
most countries with a relatively high degree of openness and/or dependency [with the
Netherlands being a notably exception]”.
Degree of Inflation Persistence: As discussed for example in ECB (2003), while
the existence of national inflation rate differentials across the EMUMember States is in-
evitable and even more, desirable as an adjustment mechanism to asymmetric, country-
specific shocks, a high degree of persistence of these inflation differentials above or below
the monetary union’s average might, through its cumulative effect, lead to significant
shifts in the relative competitiveness positions of the monetary union’s members. In-
deed, while persistent inflation rate differentials arising from corresponding differences
in the productivity levels of the respective countries might not be a source of macroeco-
nomic instability but rather an expression of the catch-up mechanism of less developed
to more developed economies, persistent inflation rate differentials arising solely from
the persistence in the price setting behavior by firms might represent a danger for the
medium run sustainability of the currency area.
As it will be shown below, the degree of inflation persistence within the member
economies is likely to explain an important share of the inflation differentials within a
currency union: When nominal wages and prices are sticky and react only in a delayed
and slow manner to exogenous shocks, differences in the inflation rates of the member
countries of a monetary union might be of greater magnitude and longer duration than
in the case where wages and prices are flexible and the degree of inflation persistence
is low. As stated in ECB (2005, p.63), “since the late 1980s there has been evidence of
an ongoing increase in the cyclical synchronization of euro area countries. [. . . ] At the
same time, inflation differentials in the euro area appear to be very persistent, in the
sense that many countries have systematically maintained either a positive or a negative
inflation gap against the euro area average since the introduction of the euro”.6
6 A further possible explanation for the different degree of inflation differentials persistence in the
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1.2.2 Business Cycle Related Factors
Business Cycle Synchronization: Besides the structural factors discussed above,
a main determinant of the inflation rate of a country is its actual position within its
business cycle, that is the extent of the actual excess aggregate demand. A high excess
aggregate demand is likely to lead, due to capacity constraints and the eventual price-
setting power of the firms, to an increase in the growth rate of the price level. On the
contrary, the growth rate of the price level is likely to fall with a low excess aggregate
demand due to the reluctance from side of the firms to carry the burden of storage
costs in case of overproduction. In a monetary union consisting of different countries,
differences in the actual position of the different economies within their respective
business cycles are likely to explain to an important extent the existence of inflation
differentials among them.
The characteristics of the national business cycles are in turn likely to be affected by the
monetary unification of the participating countries to a significant extent. Nevertheless,
both at the theoretical and the empirical level, there is still no consensus on whether
countries within a monetary union are likely to have more or less synchronized national
business cycles. On the one hand, according to Kenen (1969), Eichengreen (1990),
Krugman (1993) and Krugman and Venables (1996), a higher economic integration
is likely to increase the degree of regional production specialization in the monetary
union countries, and therefore the disparity in the regional economic development in the
presence of high interregional labor mobility and asymmetric, industry-specific shocks,
reducing the correlation between their business cycles. In this regard Frankel and Rose
(1998, p.1014) state that “Increased trade results in greater specialization if most trade
is inter-industry. [. . . ] If much trade is within rather than between industries, these
specialization effects may be small.”7 On the other hand, according to Frankel and Rose
(1998) and Rose and Engel (2002), more international trade is likely to result in more
highly correlated business cycles. Rose and Engel (2002, p.1084) show, by regressing the
pairwise correlations of detrended real GDP between the euro area countries on a variety
U.S. and the euro area could be delivered by the empirical findings of Flaschel and Krolzig (2006) and
Proan˜o, Flaschel, Ernst and Semmler (2006): Thereafter the degree of wage and price flexibility to
labor and goods market pressures, respectively, is higher in the U.S. than in the euro area. This could
explain why, compared to the inflation rate differentials across U.S. regions, the inflation differentials
in the euro area feature a much higher degree of persistence.
7 According to Deroose, Langedijk and Roeger (2004, p.8), “depending on the definition, intra-
industry trade is about twice as important within the euro area than inter-industry trade”.
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of macroeconomic variables as well as currency union dummies, that “countries that are
members of a common currency union tend to have more highly synchronized business
cycles; the correlation is perhaps .1 higher on average for currency union members than
for non-members. [However,] while economically and statistically significant, the size
of this effect is small in an absolute sense.” The European Commision (2004, p.29),
in turn, shows, by calculating the output gap correlation among EMU members, other
European countries and the U.S., that “cyclical synchronization has tended to be much
higher between euro-area Member States than between the euro area and other EU-
countries (EU-3) or the USA.”
Country-Specific Shocks: Besides of the influence of the regular business cycles
fluctuations on the inflation gaps between the different countries, the occurrence of
asymmetric, country-specific shocks is also likely to affect, at least temporarily, the
relative dynamic behavior of the national price levels in a monetary union, due to the
increased adjustment role of respective wages and prices in the absence of the country-
specific nominal exchange rate.
In both cases, the resulting dynamic behavior of wages and prices is likely to affect
the country’s level of economic activity through a variety of channels, being the real
interest rate and the competitiveness channels the most important ones. Now, while the
competitiveness channel is likely to act in a stabilizing manner,8 the real interest channel
is likely to operate in the opposite direction. Thereafter high inflation rates caused by
an overheating economic activity lower the real interest rate, boosting furthermore
aggregate investment and therefore aggregate demand.
1.3 Inflation Differentials in EMU: Convergence and Stationarity
Analysis
The convergence of the national inflation rates – and therefore the reduction of the
national inflation rate differentials – to a similar (and low) level was considered by the
EMU architects a prerequisite for the monetary unification and a necessary condition
for the future sustainability of the EMU: Indeed, one of the convergence criteria for
8 high inflation rates caused by an excessive aggregate demand lead to a real appreciation of the prices
of the domestic goods and a subsequent loss of competitiveness which in turn, through a reduction of
the net exports, cools down the level of economic activity.
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joining the European Monetary Union established by the Maastricht Treaty 1992 was
“the achievement of a high degree of price stability; this will be apparent from rate of
inflation which is close to that of, at most, the three best performing Member States
in terms of price stability”.9
In line with the Maastricht criteria of nominal convergence, during the years previous
to Stage Three of EMU (the culmination of the monetary unification process with the
introduction of the euro), a significant convergence process of the national inflation
rates to a similar low level (and therefore also a significant reduction in their disper-
sion) could be observed in all eleven candidate countries, as shown in Figures 1.1 and
1.2.10 As it can be observed in Figure 1.1, the standard deviation of inflation rate
differentials among the EU-12 group fell from 0.03 in 1991 to 0.01 in 1999, at the time
of the introduction of the euro. However, while a reduction in the dispersion of the
inflation differentials might reduce eventual asymmetric effects of the common one-size-
fits-all monetary policy of the ECB across the EMU members, this measure does not
tell much about the individual development in the respective countries. More impor-
tantly, it does not deliver much insight into the consequences for the differentials in the
national price levels resulting from the inflation rate differentials. Indeed, as discussed
in De Grauwe (1996), the criterion of convergence of the inflation rates, as postulated
by the Maastricht Treaty, might not be sufficient to ensure the future sustainability of
a monetary union as the EMU, since a “convergence in yearly inflation rates can hide
increasing divergences of trends in price levels, when the same countries have small
9 The convergence criteria are established in article 121 § 1 and in protocol 21 of the Treaty on
European Union (url: http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html). The other convergence criteria
established therein are
• “the sustainability of the government financial position; this will be apparent from having
achieved a government budgetary position without a deficit that is excessive as determined
in accordance with Article 104c(6);
• the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the Exchange Rate Mechanism
of the European Monetary System, for at least two years, without devaluing against the currency
of any other Member State;
• the durability of convergence achieved by the Member State and of its participation in the
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System being reflected in the long-term
interest rate levels.”
10 Throughout this analysis we will focus on the EU-11 group and will leave Greece aside due to the
widely-known lack of reliability of the Greek macroeconomic data prior to its joining to EMU.
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Fig. 1.1: Inflation Differentials: Unweighted Standard Deviation of EU-12, EU-11 (EU-12 less
Greece) and EU-10 (EU-11 less Portugal)
but consistently higher inflation rates than other countries.”11 Not the convergence
but instead the non-persistence of a one-sided divergence is what is determining for a
balanced medium run macroeconomic development of the member countries of a mon-
etary union as a group. As stated before, different countries may have from time to
time inflation rates different from the currency union’s average as a result of the na-
tional adjustment to asymmetric shocks. Nevertheless, when these differentials remain
persistently positive or negative over a long period of time, they might lead to ongoing
shifts in the relative competitiveness position of the member countries.
Figure 1.2 shows the dynamic path of the national inflation differentials with respect
to the EMU average for selected Member States. As it can be observed there, the
national inflation rates have been persistently above or below the EMU average not
only at EMU Stage II (what could be attributed to a wage and price rigidity which
could have slowed down the nominal convergence process), but, more problematically,
also after the official introduction of the euro (EMU Stage III) in January 1999. This
pattern is also observable if the gaps between the national inflation rates and the levels
determined by the Maastricht convergence criterion, that is, the average of the three
11 In section 3.3 this issue is addressed by means of half-lives analysis of the national inflation differ-
entials.
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Fig. 1.2: Inflation Differentials (to EMU Average) of selected EMU Countries
lowest inflation rates of the EMU Member States, are taken into account, as shown in
Figure 1.3.
In order to provide a graphical notion of the cumulative effects of persistently above- or
below-average inflation rates for the relative medium run competitiveness of the EMU
members, Figure 1.4 shows the cumulated inflation and nominal unit labor costs dif-
ferentials of selected EMU member countries. As it is clearly observable there, while
the significant persistence of these two macroeconomic indicators also after the mon-
etary unification 1999 has lead to a clear significant enhancing in the competitiveness
of Germany and Austria, it has lead to the opposite result in Spain, Ireland and the
Netherlands.
Whether this development has been caused by the drop out of punishing mechanisms
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Fig. 1.3: Inflation Differentials (to Maastricht Convergence Criterion)
for countries not fulfilling the Maastricht criteria after their joining to EMU, and the
resulting “non cooperative” behavior of some EMU countries after 1999 or, on the
contrary, it has been the result of other structural problems such as a high degree of
nominal rigidities, or whether it is only the reflection of the macroeconomic adjustment
mechanisms acting in a monetary union, is an issue which will be addressed in section
1.4.
In the analysis of this section, on the contrary, the possible β–convergence of the na-
tional inflation rate differentials to the EMU average is investigated.12 In Barro and
Sala-i Martin (1991) and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992)’s terms, β convergence is
12 The concepts of β- and the σ convergence date back on Barro and Sala-i Martin’s (1991) analysis
on cross country economic growth convergence.
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Fig. 1.4: Cumulated Inflation and Nominal Unit Labor Costs Differentials of selected EMU
countries
present if different cross-sectional time series show a mean reverting behavior to a com-
mon level . σ convergence, the other convergence criterion, concerns on the contrary
the reduction of the overall dispersion of the time series.
Following previous empirical studies on inflation differentials as Mentz and Sebastian
(2003), Beck andWeber (2005) and Busetti et al. (2006), we use unit root and stationary
tests to investigate the dynamic behavior of the national CPI inflation rate diffentials (to
the EMU average) prior to and after the monetary unification. However, while Mentz
and Sebastian (2003) employ the Johansen procedure to test for possible cointegrating
relationships between the levels of the national inflation rates, here the eventual process
of convergence and stationary of the national inflation differentials to the euro area
average is investigated – obviously, the presence of a cointegrating relationship between
the levels of the national inflation rates, as investigated in Mentz and Sebastian (2003)
would imply a convergent/stationary behavior of their differences –. Busetti et al.
(2006) also follow a similar strategy by performing unit root and stationarity tests on
the bilateral inflation differentials of all EMU countries. Indeed, as discussed in Harvey
and Carvalho (2002), the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) or the Phillips-Perron unit
root tests are adequate to test whether two time series tend to converge to a similar
level after being hit by an exogenous shock. Stationarity tests as for example proposed
in Kwiatkowsky, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992), on the contrary, are suitable to
test whether those series have converged, that is if they tend to remain at similar levels
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after a similar shock.
The strategy can be summarized as follows: For the sub-period prior to the creation of
the EMU (EMU Stage II), univariate unit root tests on the national inflation differen-
tials are performed in order to check for statistical evidence on the convergence process.
For the subperiod after the monetary unification (EMU Stage III), stationary tests on
the same time series are calculated. This separate hypothesis testing on the two subpe-
riods makes particular sense due to the regime change discussed by Frankel and Rose
(1998), whereafter due to the change in the behavior of the economic agents resulting
from a monetary unification, previously valid parameters are likely to lose explanatory
power for the macroeconomic developments after the monetary unification.
The data set used in this section stems from the OECD Main Economic Indicators
database. In order to have a representative sample size, monthly data of the national
Consumer Price Indices is used (since monthly data is not available for Ireland, we do
not include this country in our analysis).13 The national inflation rate pii,t is measured as
the annual percentage change in the CPI, the deviation of country’s i national inflation
rate from the euro area’s aggregate inflation rate at time t is denoted ϕi,t = pii,t−pimut .14
1.3.1 Univariate Convergence and Stationarity Tests
The simplest univariate representation of the Data Generating Process (DGP) of the
national inflation differentials is an AR(1) process expressed as
ϕi,t = ρϕi,t−1 + α+ δt+ ²i,t, (1.4)
where α denotes a time-invariant drift term and t represents a linear time trend. The re-
formulation of eq.(1.4) as an AR(p) process in error-correction form which additionally
incorporates lagged differences of ϕi,t in order to control for eventual serial correlation,
delivers
∆ϕi,t = φϕi,t−1 +
pi∑
j=1
γi,j∆ϕi,t−j + α∗ + δ∗t+ ²i,t, (1.5)
13 The use of the Harmonized Consumer Price Indices (HCPI) – available only from 1995 – would,
despite of being the “more correct” variable, have reduced significantly the number of available obser-
vations and therefore also the explanatory power of the performed unit root tests.
14 The analysis of the inflation rate differentials with respect to the euro area average instead of the
simple levels controls additionally for cross-section dependence, see Beck and Weber (2005, p.7).
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with φ = ρ − 1, α∗ = (1 − ρ)α and δ∗ = (1 − ρ)δ, which is the equation normally
used by standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests.15 Hereby the null
hypothesis H0 : ρ = 1 is tested against H1 : ρ < 1.16 It should be easily observable
that for ρ < 1, a mean reverting behavior in the levels of the inflation rate differentials
would be observed. The specific value of ρ, furthermore, provides some information
about the speed of convergence of the analyzed time series.
An important question arises in this respect when the analysis concerns specifically
inflation differentials, namely whether a constant should be included or not in eq.(1.5).
Busetti et al. (2006) state that when testing for inflation differentials, the focus should
be on absolute convergence, with the consequence that no constant should be included
in the test. In our view, such specification strategy is likely to bias the test results, since
a certain behavior of the time series, namely relative convergence, is a priori factored
out. Especially concerning the observed persistence in the national inflation rates, the
(eventual) value of the constant could also contain some information about their degree
of persistence. Due to this reason we believe that a constant should be included when
testing for unit root in a first stage and only be excluded from a new computation in
the second stage if it is statistically insignificant under the normal distribution.
With respect to the inclusion of a deterministic linear ( ! ) time trend in (1.5), it should
be clear that its statistical significance in eq.(1.5) would imply trend-stationarity for the
inflation rate differential, because δ∗ > 0 also implies that ρ < 0, since δ∗ = (1− ρ)δ).
A trend-stationary inflation differential of country i implies that a) from the beginning
it will diverge upwards or downwards the euro area average if the national inflation rate
lied close to the monetary union’s average or b) after having reached the currency area
average at a certain point, it would diverge (upwards or downwards) again, depending
on whether at the starting point country i’s inflation differential was below or above
the currency area average. These two implications would speak against the inclusion
of a linear time trend in the convergence tests equations.17
15 To check for the robustness of the ADF test results, we perform also Phillips-Perron unit root
tests, which correct in a different, non-parametric manner as the ADF tests for serial correlation.
Those statistics are reported in the appendix of this chapter.
16 As stated before, Mentz and Sebastian (2003) follow an alternative though equivalent strategy:
using the Johansen procedure, they test for cointegrating relationships between the levels (not the
differentials) of national inflation rates. Obviously, in presence of cointegration between the inflation
rate levels, the differentials between them would be stationary.
17 Nevertheless, due to the regime change caused by the monetary unification discussed in Frankel
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Concerning the second subperiod, the Kwiatkowsky et al. (1992) (KPSS) test was
used in order to check for the stationary of the national inflation rate gaps after the
introduction of the euro. The main difference between the KPSS test and the unit root
tests discussed in the previous section is the definition of the null hypothesis: While in
the first mentioned tests the null is the existence of a unit root, in the KPSS under the
null the analyzed time series is stationary. To test for this hypothesis, Kwiatkowsky
et al. (1992) use the residuals of the OLS regression of the analyzed series yt on the set
of exogenous variables Xt,
ϕt = X ′tδ + ut (1.6)
where Xt can consist of a constant or a constant and a deterministic time trend. Under
the null of the KPSS test, yt is assumed to be level or trend stationary. Now, for
my analysis of national inflation rate differentials, not only the eventual stationarity
of the time series, but also the level around which these time series can be considered
to be stationary is important: a stationarity around a nonzero level would imply a
persistence in the inflation rate differentials, and therefore a sustained gain or loss
of relative competitiveness towards the other Member States, depending whether the
nonzero level is below or above zero. As it will be discussed below, such a dynamic
behavior of the national inflation differentials in the EMU will be confirmed for many
countries by the econometric estimation results.
Table 1.1 contains a variety of interesting and somewhat concerning results. In the
first place, concerning the univariate ADF unit root tests results,18 we find in the first
subsample from 1990:1-1997:12 a very differentiated picture of the absolute convergence
process of the inflation differentials among the EMU countries. Indeed, when the ADF
tests are computed without the intercept, as proposed by Busetti et al. (2006), only for
Portugal, the country with the most remarkable disinflation process besides Greece, the
H1 hypothesis of absolute convergence cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level.
At the 10% level, this hypothesis cannot be rejected additionally for Austria, Germany,
Spain and the Netherlands, and with some tolerance, Italy. If not absolute, but relative
or conditional convergence is tested by including an intercept in the ADF tests, we
find statistically significant coefficients also for Finland. For the remaining countries,
and Rose (1998), such theoretically plausible outcomes are not likely to occur, since the linear time
trend might lose validity for the dynamics of the inflation rate gaps due to the possible change in the
behavior of the economic agents.
18 Alternatively, we computed Phillips-Perron unit root tests with nearly the same results. These
univariate and panel Phillips-Perron tests can be found in the appendix of this chapter.
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Tab. 1.1: National Annual Inflation Rate Differentials (to EMU average): Univariate ADF
Unit Root Tests
Subsample: 1990:1 - 1997:12 1998:1 - 2005:12
No Intercept With Intercept No Intercept
Country φ p-val∗ φ p-val∗ const. t-stat φ p-val∗
AUT -.0544 .0544 -.1333 .0788 -.0010 .0557 -.0770 .0981
BEL -.0164 .3063 -.0545 .4977 -.0006 .2110 -.1062 .0827
DEU -.0366 .0688 -.0387 .5327 -3.8E-5 .8977 -.0206 .3366
ESP -.0437 .0566 -.1110 .2232 .0008 .1473 -.0050 .6062
FIN -.0313 .1115 -.0834 .0344 -.0013 .0082 -.0218 .3336
FRA -.0082 .3939 -.0224 .8256 -.0002 .6118 -.0266 .3046
ITA -.0264 .1332 -.0442 .5729 .0002 .4885 -.0569 .1568
LUX -.0233 .2326 -.0828 .4700 -.0008 .2085 -.1612 .0495
NLD -.0256 .0778 -.0229 .7862 4.7E-5 .8985 -.0400 .1452
PRT -.0217 .0499 -.0218 .6408 6.1E-6 .9933 -.0300 .1977
Note: * denotes MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Belgium, France and Luxembourg, we find a completely different dynamic behavior of
their national inflation differentials: For these economies, the null of a non-convergent
dynamic behavior of the national inflation differentials cannot be rejected at standard
confidence levels, even when a linear trend is included (not reported in Table 1.1).
In order to investigate the degree of persistence in the national inflation rate differentials
half-lives are computed with the empirical estimates of φˆ = ρˆ− 1 according to
τi =
ln(0.5)
ln(ρˆi)
.
Table 1.2 shows the speed of convergence of the inflation differentials of the EMU Mem-
ber States: While during the 1990s the speed of convergence of the national inflation
differentials was on average nearly two years, or 24 months,19 in the second subsample
posterior to the monetary unification (EMU Stage III) the average speed of conver-
gence of the inflation gaps in the EMU was nearly eighteen months, or one and a half
years. For comparison Beck and Weber (2005) calculate half-lives for the interregional
inflation rate differentials in the U.S., Canada and Japan between six months and one
year. The EMU thus, compared with these economies – the other monetary union com-
parable in size and economic characteristics –, seems to exhibit a much higher degree
19 hereby we do not take into account Belgium, France and Luxembourg, the countries for which the
null of a non-convergent behavior could not be rejected at standard confidence levels.
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Tab. 1.2: Inflation Differentials to EMU Average: Computed Half Lives
Country AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA ITA LUX NLD PRT
Subsample: 1990:1 - 1997:12
τ 12.39 41.91 18.58 15.51 21.79 84.18 25.90 25.90 26.72 31.59
Subsample: 1998:1 - 2005:12
τ 8.65 6.173 33.30 138.2 31.44 25.71 11.83 3.94 16.97 22.75
of persistence in its inflation rate differentials, which could, if this behavior remains
unchanged in the following years, represent a problem for the conduction of monetary
policy and the balanced macroeconomic development of the EMU Member States, as
discussed before.
Respecting the stationarity of the inflation gaps in the subperiod posterior to the mone-
tary unification, we find that while the null hypothesis of stationary cannot be rejected
for Austria, Belgium Germany, Spain, Luxembourg and Portugal, only for Belgium and
Luxembourg the stationarity of their inflation differentials around the zero level cannot
be rejected. For all other mentioned countries, we find that the respective inflation
differentials are stationary around a nonzero level.
Tab. 1.3: National Annual Inflation Rate Differentials (to EMU average): KPSS Stationarity
Tests.
Subsample: 1998:1 - 2005:12
Country AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA ITA LUX NLD PRT
LM-stat .1711 .2509 .2288 .2351 .9628† .7103† .4635† .1827 .6268† .4017
const -.0023 -.0008 -.0061 .0097 -.0052 -.0043 .0029 .0009 .0039 .0099
t-stat .0000 .0893 .0000 .0000 .0030 .0000 .0000 .0809 .0000 .0000
Note:† denotes rejection at the 5% level according to Kwiatkowsky et al. (1992, Tab.1).
According to the KPSS test results shown in Table 1.3, we can categorize the EMU
countries in three subgroups:20 a below-average inflation group, an above-average in-
flation group, and a subgroup with non-stationary inflation behavior. In the first one,
consisting of Austria, Belgium and Germany, the national inflation rate differentials are
stationary around a below-average level. In the second subgroup, composed by Spain,
Luxembourg and Portugal, the inflation rate differentials rather fluctuate around an
20 The categorization of ECB (2003, p.7) of the EMU countries in high and low inflation countries is
in line with our results.
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above-average level. In the third subgroup, consisting of Finland, France, Italy, and
the Netherlands, the null hypothesis of stationary inflation rate differentials around a
constant level can be rejected at the 5% level: all countries in this subgroup, even Italy
and the Netherlands after showing pronouncedly positive inflation rate differentials be-
tween 1998 and 2003, show increasingly negative inflation rate differentials in the past
three years.
Additionally, stationarity tests for the national inflation differentials to the Maastricht
criteria consistent levels were computed, that is, to the average inflation of the three
countries with the lowest inflation rates. Indeed, since other candidates to join EMU as
Bulgaria and Romania still have to fulfill the Maastricht convergence criteria, it would
be interesting to investigate whether the countries already members in EMU would still
fulfill such EMU entrance criteria.We thus redefine the national inflation differentials
not relative to the EMU average, but relative to the average of the three countries with
the (at each period) highest price stability.
Tab. 1.4: National Annual Inflation Rate Differentials (to Maastricht Criterion): KPSS Sta-
tionarity Tests.
Sample: 1998:1 - 2005:12
Country AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA ITA LUX NLD PRT
LM-stat .4829† .5599† .5494† .5884† 1.006† .7275† .1219 .4169† .5046† .2155
const .0051 .0066 .0001 .0172 .0022 .0031 .0104 .0084 .0114 .0173
t-stat .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0030 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
Note:† denotes rejection at the 5% level according to Kwiatkowsky et al. (1992, Tab.1).
Table 1.4 shows the results of the KPSS stationarity tests: As it can be observed, for
nearly all countries the null hypothesis of stationary inflation differentials around the
level consistent with the Maastricht criteria can be rejected. If the EMU countries
where to enter the EMU now, nearly none of them would fulfill the convergence criteria
of the Maastricht Treaty.
1.3.2 Multiple Series Convergence and Stationarity Tests
Besides investigating the dynamic behavior of the national inflation differentials through
single equation tests, we use multiple series or panel tests. As discussed in Breitung
and Pesaran (2005), the panel approach has additional advantages with respect to the
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univariate analysis of the previous section, since it allows to extract more information
from the cross sectional dimension, if the analyzed time series are expected to exhibit
a similar behavior. Additionally, this procedure allows to identify convergence “clubs”
or subgroups, by the statistical test of a similar autoregressive term.21
We use two different types of panel unit root tests for our analysis: the multivariate
versions of the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests (the latter reported in the appendix) as
proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) and by Choi (2001) and the Breitung (2000) test.
The Breitung (2000) test for example is a two-step procedure which is based on the
following equation
∆ϕi,t = φϕi,t−1 +
pi∑
j=1
βi,j∆ϕi,t−j +X ′i,tδ + ²i,t with i = 1, 2, . . . N, t = 1, 2, . . . , T.
(1.7)
where X ′i,t contains as exogenous terms an intercept and a linear trend. As it can be
observed in eq.(1.7), the Breitung test allows for a different cross-sectional lag order,
but assumes that the autoregressive coefficient (φ) is cross-sectionally equal, so that
the null of a unit root process
H0 : φ = φi = 0, ∀ i.
is tested against H1 : φ < 0. In the first step of the Breitung procedure, ϕi,t and ∆ϕi,t
are regressed on the lagged terms ∆ϕi,t−j to correct for autocorrelation.
In the second step, the (standarized) residuals ϕ¯i,t and ∆ϕ¯i,t are used to calculate the
standarized proxies ϕ˜i,t = ϕ¯i,t/si, which are transformed and (eventually) detrended
according to22
∆ϕ∗i,t =
√
T − t
T − t+ 1
(
∆ϕ˜∗i,t −
∆ϕ˜∗i,t+1 + . . .+∆ϕ˜
∗
i,t+T
T − t
)
ϕ∗i,t−1 = ϕ˜
∗
i,t−1 − ci,t,
where
ci,t =

0 if no intercept or trend
ϕ˜i,t with intercept, no trend
ϕ˜i,1 − ((t− 1)/T )ϕ˜i,t with intercept and trend.
21 See e.g. Busetti et al. (2006).
22 See Eviews 5 (2004, p.521).
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The autoregressive coefficient φ is then estimated by
∆ϕ∗i,t = φϕ
∗
i,t−1 + νi,t.
Breitung (2000) shows that φ is asymptotically normal distributed.
By means of these panel convergence tests, as also done in previous studies as Beck
and Weber (2005) and Busetti et al. (2006), we can confirm the results obtained by
univariate unit root tests shown in Table 1.1: As shown by the panel ADF tests in
Table 1.5, for the subgroup consisting of Austria, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands
and Portugal, the null hypothesis of a joint process of absolute convergence cannot be
rejected for the period prior to the introduction of the euro. Our strategy to identify
Tab. 1.5: National Annual Inflation Rate Differentials (to EMU average): Panel ADF and
Breitung Unit Root Tests
Subsample: 1990:1 - 1997:12
M-ADF Breitung
Group Fisher-χ2 p-val∗ Choi-Z p-val∗ Br. t-stat p-val∗
EU10 43.58 .0017 -3.660 .0001 .1393 .5554
NCG1: EU10-PRT 37.59 .0044 -3.309 .0005 .2779 .6095
NCG2: NCG1-AUT 31.77 .0107 -2.943 .0016 .5563 .7110
NCG3: NCG2-ESP 26.02 .0257 -2.547 .0054 .7489 .7730
NCG4: NCG3-DEU 20.67 .0554 -2.145 .0159 .8968 .8151
NCG5: NCG4-NLD 15.56 .1128 -1.715 .0431 1.0566 .8547
NCG6: NCG5-FIN 11.17 .1918 -1.308 .0953 -.4835 .3144
EUCG1={AUT,DEU,ESP,NLD,PRT} 28.02 .0018 -3.460 .0003 -.953 .1703
* Probability values assuming asymptotic Chi-Square distribution.
this subgroup was the following: Due to the definition of the null hypothesis in the
panel context (where under the null all series in the panel possess a unit root, common
or individual), we dropped stepwise from the group of EMU members and analyzed
the countries for which the null of a unit root (and therefore the hypothesis of non-
convergence) could be rejected at standard significance level by means of the ADF unit
root (with no intercept) test results of Table 1.1. This stepwise procedure allowed us
to identify the subgroup of non-convergent countries, and residually, also the subgroup
of convergent countries. Hereby we followed the multivariate version of the ADF tests,
primarily for the sake of comparability between Tables 1.3 and 1.5. For comparison we
show also the resulting statistics from the Breitung panel unit root tests. Nevertheless,
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since under the null of these panel tests all series have a common autoregressive term
φ, these tests impose more restriction under the null than the multivariate versions of
the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests.
In sum these findings confirm the test results of the above mentioned studies concerning
the convergence of the national inflation differentials prior to the monetary unification
and a somewhat divergence thereafter. Especially we do not find support for a hy-
pothesis of stationary inflation rate differentials around a zero mean, since as Busetti
et al. (2006, p.21) state, when applying a multivariate stability test on a 11-dimensional
vector of all (pairwise) inflation differentials obtain that “the null hypothesis is clearly
rejected when testing without an intercept term while it cannot be rejected [. . . ] if an
intercept is included. Thus, while inflation rates within the EMU can be considered
jointly stationary over the period 1998-2004, they appear to fluctuate around different
means, forming two or possibly three convergence clubs.”
Keeping in mind the cumulative effects that inflation rates which are persistently above
or below average inflation rates can have on the competitiveness of domestic products
in the international markets of goods and services, these findings rise serious concerns
regarding the adequacy of the Maastricht convergence criteria for future candidate
countries prior, and the complete absence of them after their entrance in EMU. As
discussed before, persistently above-(below-)average inflation rate levels are likely to
affect the relative level of economic activity of the monetary union’s member countries
through the real interest and exchange rate channel, and might represent a threat for
their medium run competitiveness if they are not supported by accordant productivity
growth developments.
1.4 Structural Analysis of Inflation Differentials and Business Cycles
Fluctuations in the EMU
In this section the causes of the rise in inflation rate differentials among the EMU
countries before and after the introduction of the euro are investigated. Hereby we
focus on the link between the dynamics of relative price inflation and the relative
country-specific level of economic activity to the euro area average.
The methodological approach of this section resembles the one of Honohan and Lane
(2003), who investigated the existence of inflation differentials in the EMU using differ-
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ent price indices by means of pooled OLS and GMM estimation methods. Their main
empirical findings concerning the main determinants of inflation differentials in EMU
can be summarized as follows:
• The coefficient of the lagged price level, a proxy for the price level convergence
within EMU, enters significantly and with the correct sign in all specifications.
• The rate of change of the nominal effective exchange rate (a measure for the pass-
through) influences significantly the inflation gaps calculated with all used price
indices.
• The fiscal surpluses are found to be insignificant in all specifications –with the
exception of the inflation gap based on the private consumption deflator– where
the fiscal surplus is found to be only marginally significant.
• The effect the output gap is positive and statistically significant for all inflation
differentials but the one calculated with the import price index.
This study nevertheless differs from Honohan and Lane (2003) in that while they used
a panel approach with fixed effects to find joint effects among the EMU countries,
the focus here is to determine the country specific role of the national business cycles
positions, import price inflation and real marginal costs developments for the inflation
differentials.
1.4.1 Theoretical Foundations
Concerning the empirical study of inflation (and more specifically, of the inflation dif-
ferentials in the EMU), the majority of previous empirical investigations such as von
Hagen and Hofmann (2004) and Hofmann and Remsperger (2005) use the hybrid New
Keynesian Phillips Curve as the starting point of their econometric estimations. In-
deed, during the last decade, New Keynesian style models have become the standard
workhorse of structural macroeconomic analysis in the majority of academic and policy-
maker circles. Set up in an intertemporal utility maximizing framework, the type of
models discussed in Roberts (1995), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Gal´ı and
Gertler (1999) explain inflation as the result of a Calvo (1983) staggered price setting
by monopolistic firms which, under the assumption that wages are perfectly flexible,
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reset their prices in an optimal manner when they obtain the opportunity to do so.
Under this theoretical setting, the resulting adjustment equation for aggregate price
inflation, known as the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,23 is expressed as
pit = yt + Et[pit+1]. (1.8)
where yt denotes the output gap and Et[pit+1] denotes the expected inflation at t + 1
based on the information set available at t.
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve –as discussed for example in Mankiw (2001) Estrella
and Fuhrer (2002) and Rudd and Whelan (2005)– has, despite of its solid microfoun-
dations, two main empirical shortcomings: In the first place, it implies a negative rela-
tionship between the rate of change of inflation and the output gap, while the opposite
holds in the majority of countries. In the second place, as eq.(1.8) explains, inflation
is only dependent on the actual output gap and on the future expected inflation, with
past inflation being completely irrelevant for its actual level. Aggregate macroeconomic
data shows, on the contrary, a high degree of inflation persistence not only in the U.S.
but in the majority of industrialized countries. In order to account for the high degree
of autocorrelation observable in aggregate inflation data, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) and
Gal´ı, Gertler and Lo´pez-Salido (2001) have proposed a hybrid version New Keynesian
Phillips Curve:
pit = υt + Et[pit+1] + pit−1, (1.9)
where actual inflation does not depend only on future expected inflation, but also on
past inflation and additionally not the output gap y, but υ = ln(v/vo), the log deviation
of the real marginal costs from their steady state value (the actual variable derived by
the theoretical New Keynesian model) is included. Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) justify their
modification concerning the past inflation influence through the assumption of “rule of
thumb”-led firms which –when unallowed to reset their prices optimally– increase them
according to the last inflation rate.
Apart from the empirical caveats concerning the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, its very
much essence concerning its perception of reality has been questioned in a a variety of
recent papers as Erceg et al. (2000) and Blanchard and Gal´ı (2005). The main argument
which has been put on the table is that empirical evidence suggests that not prices,
but actually nominal wages should be considered as sticky. The high autocorrelation
23 See Walsh (2003b) for an extensive discussion of the theoretical derivation of the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve.
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of inflation, or in other words its significant persistence, is likely to be caused primarily
by the sluggishness of the nominal unit labor costs (that is, nominal wages corrected
from labor productivity) and not by the sluggishness of the price level per se. Based on
this notion, Erceg et al. (2000) and Christiano et al. (2005) have developed, again in
an intertemporal utility maximizing framework, theoretical models with both staggered
wages and prices, where nominal wages, staggered also in a Calvo (1983) manner, are
set in a monopolistic manner by the households.24
We leave however these critical considerations on the New Keynesian approach aside in
the empirical analysis of this section and proceed in a rather a-theoretical way which
does not constrain our specification to a specific theoretical approach, but rather include
freely different variables which are presumed to explain actual inflation by these and
other different schools of economic thought. More specifically, we include besides the
expected future inflation and past inflation also the log-deviation of the real marginal
costs from their long run mean υ, the growth rate of the nominal unit labor costs piulc,
or in other words, the nominal wage inflation rate corrected by the growth rate of labor
productivity and pim, the import price inflation since, as discussed by Goodhart and
Hofmann (2005, p.762), “omitting oil prices, commodity prices or import prices from
the empirical Phillips Curve may give rise to a downwards biased estimate of the output
gap coefficient, which may explain Mehra’s (2004) finding that the significance of the
output gap can be restored when supply shocks are included in the empirical model.”
Indeed, as discussed in ECB (2005, p.63-64), the main contributors to the observed
inflation differentials in the euro area have been internal factors such as national unit
labor costs and gross operating surpluses, and in relatively more open economies as the
Netherlands and Belgium, the import prices. The below average development of the
unit labor costs in Germany and France since the introduction of the euro also explain
the negative inflation gap of these two countries with respect to the euro area average.
Our general specification can be thus expressed as
pit = c+ βyyt−1 + βυυt−1 + κfEt[pit+1] +
J∑
j=1
κb,j pit−j + κmpimt + κwpi
ulc
t . (1.10)
24 As discussed in the previous chapter, alternatively to the New Keynesians, other researchers such
as Fair (2000), or Chiarella, Flaschel and Franke (2005) have modeled the dynamics of wage and price
inflation through two separate Phillips Curves, for both price and nominal wage inflation, the latter
with different measures of demand pressure – the labor market on nominal wages and the goods market
on prices – and more elaborated expectation schemes.
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In the same manner, we estimate the national inflation differentials according to
ϕt = c+ βyy˜t−1 + βυυ˜t−1 + κfEt[ϕt+1] +
J∑
j=1
κb,j ϕt−j + κmϕmt + κwϕ
ulc
t (1.11)
where ˜denotes the deviation of real variables (output gap and real unit labor costs)
from the euro area average, and ϕ denotes the gap of price inflation, import price
inflation and the growth nominal unit labor costs with respect to the euro average.
1.4.2 Econometric Analysis
Our main objective is to detect the principal differences in the inflation (and infla-
tion differential) determination between the EMU countries. We perform in the first
place individual estimations of these two variables by means of the GMM (Generalized
Method of Moments) methodology.25 This estimation procedure, developed on the
work by Hansen (1982), is basically an instrumental variables estimation procedure,
which nevertheless does not rely on any assumption concerning the distribution of the
estimation residuals but instead, as a minimum distance estimator, seeks to optimize a
determined objective function. The GMM estimator of β is a vector βˆGMM which solves
the problem26
βˆGMM ≡ argmin
β
[
N∑
i=1
Z ′i(yi −Xiβ)
]′
Wˆ
[
N∑
i=1
Z ′i(yi −Xiβ)
]
where Z is the matrix of instrumental variables, X the matrix of explanatory variables,
y the vector of explained variables and Wˆ a symmetric, positive semidefinite weighting
matrix which particular form is to be chosen. For the estimations discussed below,
we used a weighting matrix which allows the GMM estimates to be robust against
possible heteroskedasticity, as well as serial correlation (of any order and form), in the
error terms. The parameter values were computed through simultaneous updating of
the HAC (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) weighting matrix and the
matrix of parameters, whereas the parameter convergence criterion was set to 0.001.
The use of an instrumental variables estimator as GMM is also adequate since it al-
lows for the accounting for eventual regressor endogeneity in the case that some of
25 For a comprehensive discussion of the GMM methodology see Hayashi (2000) and Wooldridge
(2001).
26 See Wooldridge (2002, p.190).
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the explaining variables are not completely exogenous. Additionally, since among the
explaining variables contained in our general specification there are also expected fu-
ture variables, the use of an instrument set composed solely by lagged variables allows
for the approximation of the expected values of those forward-looking variables on the
basis of the information available at time t. In order to test for the validity of the
overidentifying restrictions we calculate the J-statistics as proposed by Hansen (1982).
We performed our single-equation GMM estimations of the inflation rate and infla-
tion differentials adjustment equations according to eqs.(1.10) and (1.11) for Germany
(DEU), France (FRA), Spain (ESP), Italy (ITA) and the Netherlands (NLD) including
alternatively different measures of aggregate demand pressure on inflation in the set
of explaining variables: The cyclical components of the industrial production indices
and the national GDPs at constant 1995 prices calculated by the asymmetric band-
pass filter of Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) and by the Hodrick-Prescott Filter, the
utilization rate of capacity and the output gap according to the OECD methodology
(shown in Figure 1.5). In the set of instrumental variables the four lags of price inflation
were included, the respective measure of aggregate demand, import price inflation and
the nominal unit labor costs inflation.
With the exception of France, the output gap series, calculated by the OECD, did
not turn out to possess any explaining power for the analyzed economies. The use
of the cyclical components of the real GDP computed by the asymmetric Christiano-
Fitzgerald methodology delivered results quite similar to the ones obtained with the
more standard Hodrick-Prescott filtered GDP series. Therefore we discuss here only
the estimated equation for each country obtained with the HP filtered GDP as measure
of the aggregate demand. The obtained GMM parameter estimates are reported in
Table 1.6.
As it can be observed in Table 1.6, the coefficient of aggregate demand pressure βy
enters significantly in both the inflation rate and the inflation differentials equation of all
analyzed countries, with exception of Germany, where it possess significant explanatory
power only in the first equation. Respecting the extent of such influence on the national
inflation differentials, Table 1.6 shows that this is at its largest in Italy and at its lowest
in France.
Concerning the coefficient of the real marginal costs, the first main determinant of
aggregate price inflation in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, in Table 1.6 it is found to
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Fig. 1.5: Measures of aggregate demand pressure: GDP at constant 1995 prices (Hodrick
Prescott and asymmetric Christiano-Fitzgerald cyclical components), capacity uti-
lization rate of the business sector and output gap (OECD series)
be statistically significant at standard confidence levels only in the inflation adjustment
equations of France and Italy, and in the inflation differential equation of France. The
second main determinant of inflation according to the New Keynesian approach, the
expected future inflation, is found to possess a significant and similar explanatory power
for the dynamics of the inflation and the inflation gaps of Italy and the Netherlands.
Lagged price inflation, as well as contemporaneous import price inflation, enter in a
significant – and concerning the dimension of their estimated coefficients also in a quite
similar – manner in the inflation adjustment equations of all five analyzed countries,
and with the exception of Italy, also of all inflation rate differential equations. The sum
of the coefficients of lagged inflation, often used as a persistence measure, is found to
be the largest in Spain. Finally, respecting the growth rate of the nominal unit labor
costs, these seem to account up to a certain degree the difference between the Dutch
inflation rate and the euro area average, a result which is consistent with the empirical
stylized facts discussed in ECB (2003).
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Tab. 1.6: Single-Equation GMM Estimation Results. Aggregate Demand Proxy: GDP at
constant 1995 prices (HP Filter Cyclical Components)
Sample: 1990:1 - 2005:12
βy βυ κf κb,j κb,4 κm κw const R¯
2 DW J-stat
piDEUt .1176
[.0000]
- - .1262
[.0000]
.2292
[.0001]
.0253
[.0000]
- .0002
[.4718]
.5381 1.737 .1463
.7928
ϕDEUt .0208
[.8365]
- - .2458
[.0001]
- .0187
[.0001]
- −.0019
[.0000]
.5016 1.672 .1578
.9540
piFRAt .0580
[.0234]
.0353
[.0339]
- - .3689
[.0000]
.0313
[.0000]
- .0028
[.0000]
.4832 1.871 .1147
.9576
ϕFRAt .2878
[.0002]
.0983
[.0000]
- - .5159
[.0000]
.0053
[.0000]
- −.0020
[.0000]
.4488 2.079 .1716
.9018
piITAt .1163
[.0008]
.0109
[.0933]
.0892
[.1531]
.2882
[.0000]
.3432
[.0000]
.0065
[.1000]
- .0020
[.0025]
.7035 1.614 .1322
.9272
ϕITAt .0534
[.6602]
- - .3365
[.0008]
.1172
[.0787]
.0129
[.0000]
- - .1083 1.678 .1855
.8656
piESPt .0652
[.1138]
- - .3248
[.0015]
.4749
[.0000]
.0118
[.0789]
- - .4721 2.369 .2006
.7551
ϕESPt .2198
[.0000]
- - - .9501
[.0000]
.0004
[.8666]
- −.0018
[.0065]
.2640 2.5508 .1379
.9445
piNLDt .0546
[.0538]
- - - .3753
[.0000]
.0161
[.0010]
- .0565
[.0288]
.2945 2.212 .1786
.9644
ϕNLDt .5734
[.0000]
- .3908
[.0004]
- .2278
[.0006]
.0113
[.0000]
- .0032
[.0000]
.3098 1.803 .1316
.9645
Departing from these single-equation GMM estimation results, we focus now on the
effect of the aggregate demand pressure on inflation before and after the introduction
of the euro. Hereby we rely on the single-estimation results provided by Table 1.6 and
estimate by panel two-stage least squares (TSLS) a reduced form of eq.(1.10), where
only lagged price inflation, contemporaneous import price inflation and the proxy for
aggregate demand pressure enter as explanatory variables, not including the expected
future inflation, which was found to be significant only in Italy and Spain.27
Due to the increased sample size which is obtained by a panel estimation procedure, we
split our analyzed sample in a pre- and a post-euro subperiod, 1990:1-1997:4 and 1998:1-
2005:4, respectively. According to the discussion of the previous section, we would
expect an increased influence of the national business cycle position on the aggregate
27 Hofmann and Remsperger (2005), Goodhart and Hofmann (2005) and Angeloni and Ehrmann
(2007), the first and the third concerning the inflation rates and not their differentials, found by fixed-
effects panel estimation with euro area country data that expected inflation enters significantly in
inflation adjustment equations based on the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve. Nevertheless, we
would like to stress again that our estimated coefficients were obtained in a free GMM estimation
without the use of constraints such as κf + κb,1 = 1, as was done in these mentioned studies.
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inflation after the monetary unification due to the disappearance of the country-specific
nominal exchange rates. In order to increase the degrees of freedom of the panel estima-
tion and due to the similarity of the estimated coefficients of the past CPI and present
import price inflation reported in Table 1.6, we restrict their coefficient in the panel
estimation to be the same across countries and allow only βy to be country-specific.
In both subsamples, the balanced panel contains 155 observations.28 We present in
Table 1.7 the estimation results for two specifications, I and II. In I we used the
output gap (measured as the percent deviation of real GDP from the Hodrick-Prescott
trend as in the previous section) at t− 1, while in II the actual output gap value was
used.
Tab. 1.7: Panel Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation Results. Aggregate Demand Proxy:
GDP at constant 1995 prices (HP Filter Cyclical Components)
Sample: 1990:1 - 1998:4 Sample: 1998:1 - 2005:4
I II I II
coeff. t-stat p-val coeff. t-stat p-val coeff. t-stat p-val coeff. t-stat p-val
const. .0044 2.506 .0133 .0043 2.465 .0148 .0072 4.644 .0000 .0075 5.066 .0000
pit−1 .1700 2.768 .0064 .1745 3.166 .0019 - - - - - -
pit−4 .5737 10.36 .0000 .5693 11.84 .0000 .5648 12.78 .0000 .5716 12.09 .0000
pimt .0267 3.036 .0028 .0212 2.905 .0042 .0184 5.136 .0000 .0175 5.309 .0000
yDEUt−j .6405 1.919 .0569 -.8628 -1.294 .1974 .1969 .9232 .3574 .1886 0.674 .5011
yESPt−j .1352 0.647 .5182 .3233 1.324 .1875 .0635 .1732 .8627 .7126 1.977 .0499
yFRAt−j .5101 2.895 .0044 .1923 1.171 .2432 .1861 .6599 .5103 .1848 0.601 .5483
yITAt−j .2998 1.322 .1882 .6118 1.601 .1113 .4377 2.755 .0066 .6641 4.565 .0000
yNLDt−j .2493 1.098 .2740 .1150 0.412 .6804 .5088 2.224 .0276 .6048 2.089 .0384
R¯2 .6063 .6095 .4158 .4218
DW 2.055 2.130 2.063 2.073
The estimated coefficients of past CPI inflation and the actual import price inflation
are quite stable across the four different estimations reported in Table 1.7. However,
a considerable variability concerning the coefficients of the country-specific aggregate
demand proxies between the two specifications and also between the two analyzed sub-
samples can be observed in Table 1.7. Indeed, in specification I, for the first subperiod
we have positive, statistically significant and similar coefficients only for Germany and
France. For the same subperiod, using not the past but the actual proxy for exces-
sive aggregate demand (specification II), we find insignificant coefficients for all five
28 The four quarters of 1998 are included in both subsamples due to the fact that, while the euro
officially was introduced at the beginning of 1998, it got into circulation among the public in January
1999.
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analyzed countries at standard confidence levels.
Concerning the second subperiod, which comprises the monetary unification and the
adoption of the euro, we find that the coefficient of aggregate demand turns out to be
highly significant in specification I for Italy and the Netherlands, and also for Spain
in specification II. Interestingly, the same coefficient for France and Germany loses
significance with respect to the first subperiod.
How are these somewhat puzzling results to be interpreted? There are different possible
explanations: As a first alternative, the German reunification (and the subsequent
exceptional increase in the aggregate demand in Germany) might have influenced to a
significant extent not only the German, but also the behavior of the price inflation rates
of the other European countries, as Spain, Italy and the Netherlands during the first
half of the 1990s. The monetary unification, as well as the slowdown of the German
economy in recent years, might have dampened the effect of the German reunification,
with the subsequent increase in the influence of the own business cycles observed in our
estimations for Spain, Italy and the Netherlands in the second subperiod.
An alternative interpretation could be related with the pro-cyclicality of the fiscal
deficits resulting from the present formulation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
The main argument goes as follows: Due to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
criteria, the possibilities to conduct a counter-cyclical fiscal policy are restricted to a
budgetary deficit limit of 3% of the national GDP, and a level of fiscal debt of 60% of
GDP. These values, nevertheless, are not independent from the economic performance
of the economy. As it is widely known, the budgetary positions are highly pro-cyclical,
with increasing tax revenues (and decreasing social security expenses) in economic up-
swing phases and widening deficits in recessions. In pronounced recession phases, as for
example in Germany since the middle 1990s, governments that are constraint by the
SGP criteria, will increase indirect taxes in order to reduce their fiscal deficits, as for
example done in Germany in 2007. Higher taxes, nevertheless, are likely to lead to gen-
eral increases the aggregate price levels, contributing so to a counter-cyclical behavior
of national inflation rates.
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1.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter the reasons for the existence and the dynamic behavior of the national
inflation rates in the euro are countries were investigated from both the theoretical
and the empirical perspective. Among other things, statistical evidence for a persistent
upward or downward bias of national inflation differentials of several EMU Member
States was found. Taking into account that in a monetary union such as the EMU the
development of the national price levels is central for the homogeneity of the monetary
policy impulses as well as for the international competitiveness of the monetary union
member countries, the presence of inflation differentials persistently different from zero
indeed raises some concerns about the future medium run macroeconomic development
of the EMU members.
In order to identify the main determinants for the existence of inflation differentials
in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, single-equation GMM estima-
tions were performed. The resulting parameter estimates shed some interesting insights
across the analyzed countries worth to be stressed: First, the effect of the relative busi-
ness cycle position of the economy is statistically significant for both inflation and
inflation differentials adjustment equations in all countries but Germany, where this
only holds for the former. Second, the degree of persistence, measured by the coeffi-
cients of the lagged values of inflation, is significant and of similar extent in all analyzed
countries for both inflation and inflation differentials estimations. Despite the fact that
this result is to a significant degree only the reflection of the persistence in the levels
of the inflation rate, the importance of lagged values, as one of the main explaining
variables in the inflation rate differentials, raises some concerns with respect to the
probable destabilizing effects that such a persistence might bring with in the medium
run for the EMU Member States and also for the EMU as a whole.
These results, nevertheless, are not definitive. The occurrence of extraordinary events
such as the German reunification, as well as the simultaneous influence of contrarily
acting effects and interplays might have weakened the accuracy of our econometric
estimations. With the availability of larger data sets for the EMU Member States after
the monetary unification, some of these open questions might be answered in the future.
Appendix A
Univariate and Panel Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests
Tab. 1.8: National Annual Inflation Rate Differentials (to EMU average): Univariate Phillips-
Perron Unit Root Tests
Subsample: 1990:1 - 1997:12 1998:1 - 2005:12
No Intercept With Intercept No Intercept
Country φ p-val∗ φ p-val∗ const. t-stat φ p-val∗
AUT -.0544 .0544 -.1333 .0705 -.0010 .0557 -.1082 .0913
BEL -.0164 .3063 -.0545 .4976 -.0005 .2110 -.1502 .0494
DEU -.0366 .0688 -.0387 .5251 -3.8E-5 .8977 -.0293 .3467
ESP -.0369 .1016 -.0940 .3445 .0005 .1311 -.0182 .6087
FIN -.0313 .1115 -.0834 .0361 -.0013 .0082 -.0218 .3387
FRA -.0082 .3939 -.0323 .8142 -.0004 .3795 -.0372 .3134
ITA -.0264 .1332 -.0442 .5650 .0004 .4885 -.0793 .1558
LUX -.0228 .3209 -.1054 .3167 -.0012 .0609 -.3127 .0021
NLD -.0256 .0778 -.0229 .7787 4.7E-5 .8985 -.0400 .1440
PRT -.0217 .0499 -.0218 .6375 6.1E-6 .9933 -.0300 .1975
Note: * denotes MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Tab. 1.9: National Annual Inflation Rate Differentials (to EMU average): Panel Phillips-
Perron and Breitung Unit Root Tests
Subsample: 1990:1 - 1997:12
M-Phillips Perron Breitung
Group Fisher-χ2 p-val∗ Choi-Z p-val∗ Br. t-stat p-val∗
EU10 42.10 .0027 -3.511 .0002 .1393 .5554
NCG1: EU10-PRT 36.58 .0059 -3.191 .0007 .2779 .6095
NCG2: NCG1-AUT 31.15 .0129 -2.853 .0022 .5563 .7110
NCG3: NCG2-ESP 26.30 .0237 -2.540 .0055 .7489 .7730
NCG4: NCG3-DEU 20.74 .0542 -2.116 .0172 .8968 .8151
NCG5: NCG4-NLD 15.32 .1206 -1.646 .0499 1.0566 .8547
NCG6: NCG5-FIN 10.69 .2195 -1.196c .1158 -.4835 .3144
EUCG1=
{AUT,DEU,ESP,NLD,PRT} 26.77 .0028 -3.319 .0005 -.953 .1703
* Probability values assuming asymptotic Chi-Square distribution.
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2. Gradual Wage-Price Adjustments and Keynesian
Macrodynamics: Theoretical Formulation and
Cross-Country Evidence
2.1 Introduction
During the last decade Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models in
the line of Erceg et al. (2000), Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al. (2005)
have become the workhorse framework for the study of monetary policy and inflation
in the academic literature. Based on solid microfoundations, the representation of the
dynamics of the economy by theoretical frameworks of this type is derived from first
principles (which result from a rational, forward-looking maximizing behavior by firms
and households) and the condition of general equilibrium holding at every moment in
time. However, though intellectually appealing at first sight, this approach has nev-
ertheless been questioned from both the theoretical and empirical point of view by a
numerous amount of researchers like Mankiw (2001), Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) and
Solow (2004), among others, primarily due to its highly unrealistic assumptions con-
cerning the alleged“rationality” in the forward-looking behavior of the economic agents.
Indeed, as discussed in Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Mankiw (2001) and more recently in
Eller and Gordon (2003), empirical estimations of wage and price Phillips curves based
on the New Keynesian approach have, despite their sound microfoundations, only a
poor performance in fitting the predictions generated by the underlying theoretical
models of this approach with aggregate time series of both the United States and the
euro area. As Mankiw (2001) states, “although the new Keynesian Phillips curve has
many virtues, it also has one striking vice: It is completely at odds with the facts”.
Alternatively, in Chiarella and Flaschel (1996) and Chiarella and Flaschel (2000) a
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theoretical macroeconomic framework has been proposed where wages and prices react
sluggishly to disequilibrium situations in both the goods and labor markets. As it will be
discussed in this chapter, despite of the apparent similarity that the gradual wage and
price inflation adjustment equations along the lines of Chiarella and Flaschel (2000)
share with their recent New Keynesian and DSGE analogues (which, among other
things, also include elements of forward and backward looking behavior concerning
the inflation dynamics of the economy), their approach is based on the notion of non-
clearing goods and labor markets, and therefore of underutilized labor and capital stock.
This alternative approach to the modeling of wage and price inflation dynamics thus
permits an interesting comparison to New Keynesian work which, knowingly, models the
dynamics of wage and price inflation as the result of the reoptimization by the economic
agents under a staggered wage and price setting mostly in the line of Rotemberg (1982)
and Calvo (1983).
In this chapter the semi-structural baseline Disequilibrium AS-AD model discussed
in Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel and Semmler (2006) is described and estimated using
aggregate macroeconomic time series not only of the U.S. economy, but also of the
Euro Area, the U.K., Germany and France. On this basis, some of the questions
to be addressed in this chapter are: To what extent is this semi-structural Keynesian
macroeconomic model able to fit the behavior of wages, prices and other macroeconomic
variables in the major industrialized economies? Are there significant differences in
wage and price inflation (the wage-price spiral) among these economies observable over
the past twenty years? Of the main Keynesian transmission channels, which ones
are functioning and how strong are they in the analyzed countries? What are the
implications of the wage-price spiral for the dynamics of income distribution in those
economies?
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2 the Keynesian
semi-structural macroeconomic framework introduced in Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel and
Semmler (2006) is briefly discussed and its main conceptual differences from to the New
Keynesian approach are highlighted. In section 2.4 the model is estimated by means of
GMM with aggregate time series of the U.S., the Euro Area, the U.K., Germany and
France in order to find out sign and size restrictions for its behavioral equations and
to study which feedback mechanisms may have primarily influenced these economies in
the past twenty years. Section 2.5 focuses on the eigen-value stability analysis of the
system. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 A Baseline Semi-Structural Macromodel
In this section the baseline Keynesian macromodel introduced in Chen, Chiarella,
Flaschel and Semmler (2006) is briefly presented. As it will be discussed in more
detail below, this theoretical framework builds on gradual wage and price inflation ad-
justments as recent New Keynesian macroeconometric models, but assumes in contrast
to those models that such adjustments are not the result of the agents’ reoptimization
to new economic conditions, but instead occur as a reaction to disequilibrium situations
in both the goods and the labor markets.
2.2.1 The Goods and Labor Markets
Since the focus of this theoretical framework is indeed the modeling of the wage-price
dynamics, the goods and labor markets are modeled in a rather parsimonious manner.
Concerning the goods markets dynamics, a dynamic IS-equation is assumed (see also
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) in this regard) where the growth rate of output gap
(represented by the growth rate of the capacity utilization rate of firms u) is determined
by
uˆ = −αu(u− uo) + αuv(v − vo)− αur((i− pˆ)− (io − pio)), (2.1)
Eq.(2.1) has three important characteristics; (i) it reflects the dependence of output
changes on aggregate income by assuming a negative, i.e. stable dynamic multiplier
relationship in this respect, (ii) it shows the joint dependence of consumption and
investment on the real wage – which joint parameter may in the aggregate be positive
(αuv > 0) or negative (αuv < 0), depending on whether consumption or investment is
more responsive to real wage changes1 – and finally (iii) it shows the negative influence
of the real rate of interest on the evolution of economic activity.
Concerning the labor market dynamics, a simple empirical relationship is assumed
which links output and employment (in hours) according to
eh/e¯h = (u/uo)b.
Consequently, the growth rate of employment (in hours) is accordingly given by
eˆh = b uˆ. (2.2)
1 This simplifying formulation helps to avoid the estimation of separate equations for consumption
and investment.
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Employment in hours is in fact the relevant measure for the labor input of firms and
therefore for the aggregate production function in the economy. Nevertheless, due to
the lack of available time series of this variable for the European economies (this series is
available only for the U.S.) and for the sake of comparability of the parameter estimates
in the next section, it will be assumed here that the dynamics of employment in hours
and actual employment are quite similar, so that eq.(2.2) in fact describes the dynamics
of actual employment e, so that eˆ = b uˆ holds.
2.2.2 The Wage-Price Dynamics
As stated before, the core of our theoretical framework, which allows for non-clearing
labor and goods markets and therefore for under- or over- utilized labor and capital
stock, is the modeling of wage-price dynamics, as being specified through two separate
Phillips Curves, each one led by its own measure of demand pressure (or capacity
bottlenecks), instead of a single one as is usually done in many New Keynesian models
as for example by Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) and Gal´ı et al. (2001).
The approach of estimating two separate wage and price Phillips curves is not altogether
new: While Barro (1994) observes that Keynesian macroeconomics are (or should be)
based on imperfectly flexible wages and prices and thus on the consideration of wage
as well as price Phillips Curves equations, Fair (2000) criticizes the low accuracy of
reduced-form price equations. In the same study, Fair estimates two separate wage and
price equations for the United States, using nevertheless a single demand pressure term,
the NAIRU gap. In contrast, by the modeling of wage and price dynamics separately
from each other, each one determined by its own measures of demand pressure in the
market for labor and for goods, namely e−eo and u−uo, respectively,2 the identification
problem pointed out by Sims (1987) for the estimation of separate wage and price
equations with the same explanatory variables is circumvented.3 By these means, the
dynamics of the real wages in the economy can be analyzed and converse effects which
might result from different developments on labor and goods markets can be identified.
The structural form of the wage-price dynamics in this theoretical framework is given
2 hereby e denotes the rate of employment in the labor market (eo being the NAIRU-level of this
rate) and u the rate of capacity utilization of the capital stock –knowingly closely linked with the output
gap– (uo being its normal level).
3 See Erceg et al. (2000) and Sbordone (2004) for other alternative approaches.
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by:
wˆ = βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo) + κwppˆ+ (1− κwp)pic + κwz zˆ, (2.3)
pˆ = βpu(u− uo) + βpv ln(v/vo) + κpw(wˆ − zˆ) + (1− κpw)pic. (2.4)
where wˆ = w˙/w and pˆ = p˙/p denote the growth rates of nominal wages and prices,
respectively, that is, the wage and price inflation rates. The demand pressure terms
e−eo and u−uo in the wage and price Phillips Curves are augmented by three additional
terms: the log of the wage share v or real unit labor costs (the error correction term
discussed in Blanchard and Katz (1999, p.71)), a weighted average of corresponding
expected cost-pressure terms, assumed to be model-consistent, with forward looking,
cross-over wage and price inflation rates wˆ and pˆ, respectively, and a backward looking
measure of the prevailing inertial inflation in the economy (the “inflationary climate”,
so to say) symbolized by pic, and labor productivity growth zˆ (which is expected to
influence wages in a positive and prices in a negative manner, due to the associated
easing in production cost pressure). Concerning the latter variable we assume for
simplicity that it is always equal to the growth rate of trend productivity, namely
zˆ = gz =const.4
Concerning the inertial inflation term, this may be formed adaptively following the ac-
tual rate of inflation (by use of some linear or exponential weighting scheme), a rolling
sample (with bell-shaped weighting schemes), or other possibilities for updating expec-
tations. For simplicity of exposition the use of a conventional adaptive expectations
mechanism will be assumed in the theoretical part of this chapter, namely
p˙ic = βpic(pˆ− pic). (2.5)
Note that here the Chiarella and Flaschel (1996) approach differs again from the stan-
dard New Keynesian framework based on the work by Rotemberg (1982) and Calvo
(1983). Instead of assuming that the aggregate price (and wage) inflation is determined
in a profit maximizing manner solely by the expected future path of nominal marginal
costs, or in the hybrid variant discussed in Gal´ı et al. (2001), which includes the effects
of lagged inflation, it assumes that instead of last period inflation, the medium run
inflationary development in the economy is taken into account by the economic agents.
4 Even though explicitly formulated, we will assume in the theoretical framework of this chapter
gz = 0 for simplicity and leave the modeling of the labor productivity growth for future research.
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The microfoundations of the wage Phillips curve are thus of the same type as in Blan-
chard and Katz (1999), see also Flaschel and Krolzig (2006), which can be reformulated
as expressed as in eq.(2.3) and eq.(2.4) with the unemployment gap in the place of the
logarithm of the output gap if hybrid expectations formation is in addition embedded
into their approach. Concerning the price Phillips curve, a similar procedure can be
applied, based on desired markups of firms. Along these lines an economic motivation
for the inclusion of – indeed the logarithm of – the real wage (or wage share) with neg-
ative sign in the wage PC and with positive sign in the price PC is obtained, without
any need for loglinear approximations. Furthermore the employment- and the output
gap are incorporated in these two wage- and price-Phillips Curves equations, respec-
tively, in the place of a single measure (the log of the output gap). This wage-price
module is thus consistent with standard models of unemployment based on efficiency
wages, matching and competitive wage determination, and can be considered as a valid
alternative to the – at least empirically questionable – New Keynesian formulation of
wage-price dynamics.
Note additionally, that model-consistent expectations with respect to short-run wage
and price inflation are assumed, incorporated into the Phillips curves in a cross-over
manner, with perfectly foreseen price- in the wage- and wage inflation in the price-
inflation adjustment equations. It should be stressed that forward-looking behavior
is indeed incorporated here, without the need for an application of the jump variable
technique of the rational expectations school in general and of the New Keynesian
approach in particular.5
Slightly different versions of the two Phillips curves given by eq.(2.3) and eq.(2.4)
have been estimated for the U.S. economy in various ways in Flaschel and Krolzig
(2006), Flaschel, Kauermann and Semmler (2007), Chen and Flaschel (2006) and Chen,
Chiarella, Flaschel and Semmler (2006), and have been found to represent a significant
improvement over the conventional single reduced-form Phillips curve. A particular
finding of these studies is that wage flexibility is larger than price flexibility with respect
to their demand pressure measures in the labor and goods markets,6 respectively, and
that workers are more short-sighted than firms with respect to their cost pressure terms.
5 For a detailed comparison with the New Keynesian alternative to this model type see Chiarella
et al. (2005).
6 for lack of better terms we associate the degree of wage and price flexibility with the size of the
parameters βwe and βpu, though of course the extent of these flexibilities will also depend on the size
of the fluctuations of the excess demand expression in the market for labor and for goods.
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The corresponding across-markets or reduced-form Phillips Curve equations resulting
from eqs.(2.1) and (2.2) are given by (with κ = 1/(1− κwpκpw)):
wˆ = κ [βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo) + κwp(βpu(u− uo) + βpv ln(v/vo))
+(κwz − κwpκpw)gz] + pic, (2.6)
pˆ = κ [βpu(u− uo) + βpv ln(v/vo) + κpw(βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo))
+κpw(κwz − 1)gz] + pic, (2.7)
with pass-through terms behind the κwp, κpw−parameters, representing a considerable
generalization of the conventional view of a single-market price PC with only one mea-
sure of demand pressure, namely the one in the labor market.
Note that for this current version of the wage-price spiral, the inflationary climate
variable pic does not matter for the evolution of the labor share v = w/(pz), which law
of motion is given by :
vˆ = wˆ − pˆ− zˆ
= κ [(1− κpw)(βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo))− (1− κwp)(βpu(u− uo)
+βpv ln(v/vo)) + (κwz − 1)(1− κpw)gz] . (2.8)
Eq.(2.8) shows the ambiguity of the stabilizing property of the real wage channel dis-
cussed by Rose (1967) which arises – despite the incorporation of specific measures of
demand and cost pressure on both the labor and the goods markets – if the dynamics of
the employment rate are linked to the behavior of output and if inflationary cross-over
expectations are incorporated in both Phillips curves. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure
2.1, a real wage increase can act, taken by itself, in a stabilizing or destabilizing manner,
depending on whether the output dynamics depend positively or negatively on the real
wage (i.e. if consumption reacts more strongly than investment or vice versa) and on
whether price flexibility is larger than nominal wage flexibility with respect to its own
demand pressure measure.
These four different scenarios can be jointly summarized as in Table 2.1. As Table 2.1
clearly shows, the combination of these four possibilities sets up four different scenarios
where the dynamics of the real wage (in their interaction with the goods and labor
markets) might turn out to be per se convergent or divergent. As it can be observed
in Figure 2.1, there exist two cases where the Rose (1967) real wage channel operates
in a stabilizing manner: In the first case, aggregate goods demand (approximated in
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Real Wage Increase
↑= pwω
↑↑⇒ dYC
  
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Adverse Rose EffectsNormal Rose Effects
↓↓⇒ dYI
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Fig. 2.1: Normal (Convergent) and Adverse (Divergent) Rose Effects: The Real Wage Channel
of Keynesian Macrodynamics
this framework by the output gap) depends negatively on the real wage, which can be
denoted in a closed economy as the profit-led case7 – and the dynamics of the real wage
are led primarily by the nominal wage dynamics and therefore by the developments in
the labor market. In the second case, aggregate demand depends positively on the real
wage, and the price inflation dynamics (and therefore the goods markets) determine
primarily the behavior of the real wages.8
One of the goals of this chapter will thus be the categorization within this setup of the
real wage dynamics in the U.S. and the euro area.
7 In an open economy other macroeconomic channels, such as the real exchange rate channel, would
also be influenced by the real wage and in turn influence aggregate demand dynamics, so that the des-
ignation “profit led” would not be appropriate anymore. Nevertheless, since we restrict our theoretical
analysis to closed economies (or relatively closed as in our econometric analysis of the United States
and the euro area), we will adhere to the designation used in Table 2.1.
8 Note here that the cost - pressure parameters also play a role and may influence the critical stability
condition of the real wage channel, see Flaschel and Krolzig (2006) for details.
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Tab. 2.1: Four Baseline Real Wage Adjustment Scenarios
wage-led goods demand profit-led goods demand
labor market-led adverse normal
real wage adjustment (divergent) (convergent)
goods market-led normal adverse
real wage adjustment (convergent) (divergent)
2.2.3 Monetary Policy
Concerning monetary policy, the nominal interest rate is endogenized by using a simple
Taylor rule as is customary in the literature, see e.g. Svensson (1999). Indeed, as Romer
(2000, p.154-55) states, “Even in Germany, where there were money targets beginning in
1975 and where those targets paid a major role in the official policy discussions, policy
from the 1970s through the 1990s was better described by an interest rate rule aimed
at macroeconomic policy objectives than by money targeting.”9 The target rate of the
monetary authorities and the law of motion resulting from an interest rate smoothing
behavior by the central bank are defined as
iT = io + φpi(pˆ− pio) + φy(u− uo)
i˙ = αi(iT − i).
The target rate of the central bank iT is thus assumed here to depend on the steady
state real rate of interest io − pio augmented by actual inflation back to a nominal
rate, and as usual also on the inflation and on the output gap.10 With respect to this
target there are interest rate smoothing dynamics with strength αi. Inserting iT and
rearranging terms we obtain from this expression the following dynamic law for the
nominal interest rate
i˙ = −αi(i− io) + γip(pˆ− pio) + γiu(u− uo) (2.9)
where we have: γip = αiφpi, i.e., φpi = γip/αi and γiu = αiφy.
Furthermore, the actual (perfectly foreseen) rate of inflation pˆ is used to measure the
inflation gap with respect to the inflation target pio of the central bank. Note finally
9 See also Clarida and Gertler (1997).
10 All of the employed gaps are measured relative to the steady state of the model, in order to allow
for an interest rate policy that is consistent with it.
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that a new kind of gap, namely the labor share gap, could have included into the above
Taylor rule since in this model aggregate demand depends on income distribution (and
therefore on the labor share), so that the state of income distribution matters to the
dynamics of the model and thus should also play a role in the decisions of the central
bank. However this has not been done here.
Taken together the model of this section consists of the following five laws of mo-
tion (with the derived reduced-form expressions as far as the wage-price spiral is con-
cerned):11
The Model
vˆ
LaborShare= κ[(1− κpw)(βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo))
−(1− κwp)(βpu(u− uo) + βpv ln(v/vo)) + δgz], (2.10)
with δ = (κwz − 1)(1− κpw)
uˆ
Dyn.IS
= −αu(u− uo) + αuv(v − vo)− αur(i− pˆ− (io − pio)), (2.11)
i˙
T.Rule= −αi(i− io) + γip(pˆ− pio) + γiu(u− uo), (2.12)
p˙ic
I.Climate= βpic(pˆ− pic) (2.13)
eˆ
O.Law= b uˆ, (2.14)
Note that the law of motion given by eq.(2.10) for the labor share: vˆ = wˆ− pˆ− zˆ makes
use of the same explanatory variables as the New Keynesian approach but contains
inflation rates in the place of their time rates of change and features no accompanying
sign reversal concerning the influence of output and wage gaps, as is the case in the
4D baseline New Keynesian models as discussed e.g. in Walsh (2003b). Together with
the IS goods market dynamics (2.11), the Taylor Rule (2.12), the law of motion (2.13)
that describes the updating of the inflationary climate expression and finally Okun’s
Law (2.14) as link between the goods and the labor markets, eq.(2.10) represents a sim-
ple theoretical framework which nevertheless features the main transmission channels
operating in modern economies. Note that the model can be reduced to a 4D sys-
tem if the actual level of employment is recovered from eq.(2.14)by making use of the
original formulation of Okun’s Law (see the equation preceding eq.(2.2)), the resulting
11 As the model is formulated we have no real anchor for the steady state rate of interest (via invest-
ment behavior and the rate of profit it implies in the steady state) and thus have to assume that it is
the monetary authority that enforces a certain steady state value for the nominal rate of interest.
2.3. 4D Feedback-Guided Stability Analysis 51
functional relationship is inserted in the remaining equations of the system. We can
thus prescind from eq.(2.14) (and the influence of e as an endogenous variable) in the
stability analysis to be discussed below.
In order to get an autonomous nonlinear system of differential equations in the state
variables labor share v, output gap u, the nominal rate of interest i, and the inflationary
climate expression pic, we have to make use of eq. (2.7) (the reduced-form price Phillips
Curve equation). This then has to be inserted into the remaining laws of motion in
various places.
With respect to the empirically motivated restructuring of the original theoretical
framework, the model is as pragmatic as the approach employed by Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999). By and large it represents a working alternative to the New Keyne-
sian approach, in particular when the current critique of the latter approach is taken
into account. It overcomes the weaknesses and the logical inconsistencies of the old
Neoclassical synthesis, see Asada, Chen, Chiarella and Flaschel (2006), and it does so
in a minimal way from a mature, but still traditionally oriented Keynesian perspective
(and is thus not really “New”). It preserves the problematic stability features of the real
rate of interest channel, where the stabilizing Keynes effect or the interest rate policy
of the central bank is interacting with the destabilizing, expectations driven Mundell
effect. It preserves the real wage effect of the old Neoclassical synthesis, where – due
to an unambiguously negative dependence of aggregate demand on the real wage –
it was the case that price flexibility was destabilizing, while wage flexibility was not.
This real wage channel, summarized in the Figure 2.1, is not normally discussed in the
New Keynesian literature due to the specific form of wage-price and IS dynamics there
considered.
2.3 4D Feedback-Guided Stability Analysis
In this section the local stability properties of the interior steady state of the dynamical
system given by eqs.(2.10)-(2.13) (with eq.(2.7) inserted wherever needed) are analyzed
through partial considerations from the feedback chains that characterize this empir-
ically oriented baseline model of Keynesian macrodynamics. The Jacobian of the 4D
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dynamic system, calculated at its interior steady state, is
J =

− ± 0 0
± + − +
± + − +
± + 0 0
 .
Since the model is an extension of the standard AS-AD growth model, we know from
the literature that the real rate of interest, first analyzed by formal methods in Tobin
(1975) (see also Groth (1992)) typically affects, in a negative manner, the dynamics
of the economic activity (J23). Additionally, there is the activity stimulating (partial)
effect of increases in the rate of inflation (as part of the real rate of interest channel) that
may lead to accelerating inflation under appropriate conditions (J24). This transmission
mechanism is known as the Mundell effect. The stronger the Mundell Effect, the faster
the inflationary climate adjusts to the present level of price inflation. This is due to the
positive influence of this climate variable both on price as well as on wage inflation and
from there on rates of employment of both capital and labor. Concerning the Keynes
effect, due to the use of a Taylor rule in the place of the conventional LM curve, it
is here implemented in a more direct way towards the stabilization of the economy
(coupling nominal interest rates directly with the rate of price inflation) and it works
the stronger the larger the choice of the parameters γip, γiu.
As it is formulated, the theoretical model also features further potentially (at least
partially) destabilizing feedback mechanisms due to the Mundell- and Rose-effects in
the goods-market dynamics and the converse Blanchard-Katz error correction terms
in the reduced form price Phillips curve. There is first of all J12, see eq.(2.10), the
still undetermined influence of the output gap (the rate of capacity utilization) on the
labor share, which depends on the signs and values of the parameter estimates of the
two structural Phillips curves, and therefore on the cross-over expectations formation
of the economic agents. In the second place, see eq.(2.11), we have J21, the ambiguous
influence of the labor share on (the dynamics of) the rate of capacity utilization. This
should be a negative relationship if investment is more responsive than consumption to
real wage increases and a positive relationship in the opposite case. Concerning also
the effects of the labor share on capacity utilization, we have aggregate price inflation
determined by the reduced form price Phillips curve given by eq.(2.7). Thus there
is an additional, though ambiguous channel through which the labor share affects the
dynamics of the output gap on the one hand and the inflationary climate of the economy
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(J41) through eq.(2.13) on the other hand. Mundell-type, Rose-type and Blanchard-
Katz error-correction feedback channels therefore make the dynamics indeterminate on
the theoretical level.
The feedback channels just discussed will be the focus of interest in the following stabil-
ity analysis of the D(isequilibrium)AS-AD dynamics. Reduced-form expressions have
been employed in the above system of differential equations whenever possible. Thereby
a dynamical system in four state variables was obtained that is in a natural or intrinsic
way nonlinear (due to its reliance on growth rate formulations). We can see further-
more that there are many items that reappear in various equations, or are similar to
each other, implying that stability analysis can exploit a variety of linear dependencies
in the calculation of the conditions for local asymptotic stability. A rigorous proof of
the local asymptotic stability for the original model version and its loss by way of Hopf
bifurcations can be found in Asada, Chen, Chiarella and Flaschel (2006).
In order to focus on the interrelation between wage-price and output gap dynamics, we
make use of the following proposition.
Proposition 1:
Assume that the parameter βpic is not only close to zero but in fact equal
to zero. This decouples the dynamics of pic from the rest of the system
and the system becomes 3D. Assume furthermore that the partial derivative
of the second law of motion J22 depends negatively on v, and that (1 −
κp)βwe > (1− κw)βu holds. Then: The interior steady state of the implied
3D dynamical system
vˆ = κ[(1− κpw)(βwe(e(u)− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo))
−(1− κwp)(βpu(u− uo) + βpv ln(v/vo))], (2.15)
uˆ = −αu(u− uo)− αuv(v − vo)− αur((i− pˆ)− (io − pio)), (2.16)
i˙ = −αi(i− io) + γip(pˆ− pio) + γiu(u− uo), (2.17)
is locally asymptotically stable.
Sketch of proof: In the considered situation we have for the Jacobian of the reduced
dynamics at the steady state:
J =
 − + 0− − −
0 + −
 .
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According to the Routh-Hurwitz stability conditions for the characteristic polynomial
of the considered 3D dynamical system, asymptotic local stability of a steady state is
fulfilled when:
ai > 0, i = 1, 2, 3 and a1a2 − a3 > 0,
where: a1 = −trace(J), a2 =
∑3
k=1 Jk with
J1 =
∣∣∣∣∣ J22 J23J32 J33
∣∣∣∣∣ , J2 =
∣∣∣∣∣ J11 J13J31 J33
∣∣∣∣∣ , J3 =
∣∣∣∣∣ J11 J12J21 J22
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
and: a3 = −det(J). The determinant of this Jacobian is obviously negative if the
parameter γi is chosen sufficiently small. The sum of the minors of order 2: a2 is unam-
biguously positive. The validity of the full set of Routh-Hurwitz conditions then easily
follows, since trace J = −a1 is obviously negative.
Proposition 2:
Assume now that the parameter βpic is positive, but its specific value is cho-
sen sufficiently small, Assume furthermore that αi is sufficiently small, and
that γip > 1. Then: The interior steady state of the resulting 4D dynamical
system (where the state variable pic is now included)
vˆ = κ[(1− κpw)(βwe(e(u)− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo))
−(1− κwp)(βpu(u− uo) + βpv ln(v/vo))], (2.18)
uˆ = −αu(u− uo)− αuv(v − vo)− αur(i− pˆ− (io − pio)), (2.19)
i˙ = −αi(i− io) + γip(pˆ− pio) + γiu(u− uo), (2.20)
p˙ic = βpic(pˆ− pic) (2.21)
is locally asymptotically stable.
Sketch of proof: Under the mentioned stated assumptions, the Jacobian of the 4D
system is equal to:
J =

− + 0 0
− − − +
0 + − +
0 + 0 −
 .
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We can clearly see that J34 describes the reaction of the nominal interest rate with
respect to inflation. According to the Taylor (1993) principle, as long as γip > 1, mon-
etary policy stabilizes the economy. Together with sufficiently small βpic and αi, the
incorporation of the inflationary climate as a state variable in the dynamical system
does not disturb the local stability properties of the system.
Summing up, we can state that a weak Mundell effect; the neglect of Blanchard-Katz
error correction terms; a negative dependence of aggregate demand on real wages,
coupled with larger nominal wage- than price level flexibility; and a Taylor rule that
stresses inflation targeting are here (for example) the basic ingredients that allow for
the proof of local asymptotic stability of the interior steady state of the dynamics (2.10)
– (2.13).
In order to investigate in more detail the stability properties concerning variations in
the parameter values, in the next section the theoretical model discussed here will be
estimated with aggregate data of major industrialized economies in order to obtain
empirical parameter values. These in turn will serve as baseline parameters in the
eigen-value analysis below.
2.4 Econometric Analysis
In this section the estimation results of the theoretical model of the previous section
obtained with aggregate time series data of the U.S., the euro area, the U.K., Germany
and France are reported. The objective of these estimations is twofold: On the one hand
they are supposed to demonstrate the consistency of theoretical model discussed in the
previous section with aggregate empirical data and; on the other hand, to highlight
the main similarities and differences of the determinants of wage and price inflation
dynamics in these economies.
2.4.1 Model Estimation
As discussed in the previous section, the law of motion for the real wage rate given by
eq.(2.10) represents a reduced form expression of the two structural equations for wˆt and
pˆt. Noting again that the inflation climate variable is defined in the estimated model
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as a linearly declining function of the past twelve price inflation rates, the dynamics of
the system (2.3) – (2.9) can be then reformulated as:
wˆt = βwe(et−1 − eo)− βwv ln(vt−1/vo) + κwppˆt + (1− κwp)pi12t + κwz zˆt
pˆt = βpu(ut−1 − uo) + βpv ln(vt−1/vo) + κpw(wˆt − zˆt) + (1− κpw)pi12t
lnut = lnut−1 + αu(ut−1 − uo)− αui(it−1 − pˆt) + αuv(vt − vo)
eˆt = αeu−1uˆt−1 + αeu−2uˆt−2 + αeu−3uˆt−3
it = φiit−1 + (1− φi)φpipˆt + (1− φi)φy(ut−1 − uo) + ²it,
with sample means denoted by a subscript o (with the exception of eo, which is supposed
to represent the (eventually time-varying) NAIRU-equivalent employment rate). We
estimate this model with time series of the U.S., the Euro Area, the UK, Germany
and France. The corresponding time series stem from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis data set (see http:/www.stls.frb.org/fred) for the U.S. and the OECD database
for the European countries and the Euro Area as a whole (where also estimates for the
U.S. NAIRU are available). The data is quarterly, seasonally adjusted and concerns the
period from 1980:1 to 2004:4. The logarithms of wages and prices are denoted by ln(wt)
and ln(pt), respectively. Their first differences (backwardly dated), i.e. the current rate
of wage and price inflation, are denoted wˆt and pˆt.
Tab. 2.2: Data Description
Variable Description of the original series
e Employment Rate
u Capacity Utilization: Manufacturing, Percent of Capacity
w Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour, 1992=100
p Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator, 1996=100
z Output Per Hour of All Persons, 1992=100
v Real Compensation Per Output Unit, 1992=100
i Short Term Interest Rate
As stated above, in eq. (2.22) e − eo represents the deviation of the employment rate
from its NAIRU consistent level, and not the deviation of the former from its sample
mean, as it is the case with the other variables. This differentiation is particularly
important for the estimation of the European countries, since while the U.S. unem-
ployment rate has fluctuated, roughly speaking, around a constant level (what would
suggest a somewhat constant or at least a not all too varying NAIRU) over the last two
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decades, the European employment (unemployment) rate has displayed a persistent
downwards (upwards) trend over the same time period.
This particular European phenomenon has been explained by Layard, Nickell and Jack-
man (1991) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) by an over-proportional increase in the
number of long-term unemployed (i.e. workers with an unemployment duration over
12 months) with respect to short term unemployed (workers with an unemployment
duration of less than 12 months) and the phenomenon of hysteresis especially in the
first group. One main explanation for the persistence in long-term unemployment is
that human capital, and therefore the productivity of the unemployed, tend to diminish
over time, which makes the long-term unemployed less“hirable” for firms, see Pissarides
(1992) and Blanchard and Summers (1991). Because the long-term unemployed become
less relevant, and primarily the short-term unemployed are taken into account in the
determination of nominal wages, the potential downward pressure on wages resulting
from the unemployment of the former diminishes, with the result of a higher level of the
NAIRU.12 When long-term unemployment is high, the aggregate unemployment rate of
an economy thus, “becomes a poor indicator of effective labor supply, and the macroe-
conomic adjustment mechanisms – such as downward pressure on wages and inflation
when unemployment is high – will then not operate effectively.”13 Indeed, Llaudes
(2005) for example, by using a modified wage Phillips curve which incorporates the dif-
ferent influences of long-and short-term unemployed in the wage determination, finds
empirical evidence of the fact that for some OECD countries the long-term unemployed
have only a negligible influence on the wage determination.
Since time series data for long-term unemployment in the euro area is not available as
is the case for the other analyzed countries, we have tried to approximate it in a rather
simple way: First we ran the HP-filter on the euro area unemployment rate with a high
smoothing factor (λ = 640000). The resulting smoothed series are then normalized so
that the 1970:1 value equals zero, implicitly assuming that in 1970:1 the number of
long-term unemployed was not too different from zero, since before the oil shocks in
the 1970s unemployment (and also long-term unemployment) was extremely low on the
European continent. This smoothed series can be interpreted as a proxy for the actual
development of long-term unemployment. The difference between this series and the
aggregate unemployment rate, denoted ust, can then be interpreted as a proxy for the
12 See Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
13 OECD (2002, p.189).
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Fig. 2.2: Employment Rate and NAIRU (left axis) and Employment Rate Deviation from
NAIRU-consistent Level (HPMethodology and OECD Data) (right axis) (normalized
data)
short term unemployment rate, which is the relevant variable in the wage bargaining
process. With this series the alternative employment rate measure e = 1− ust for the
euro area is calculated. In Figure (2.2) the equivalent time series for the U.S., the
U.K., Germany and France calculated according to this procedure are contrasted with
the actual employment gap,14 showing that indeed this procedure, though quite simple
and ad-hoc, can nevertheless deliver an acceptable proxy for the short-term unemployed
in the euro area.15
In order to test for stationarity, Phillips-Perron unit root tests were carried out for
each series in order to account, not only for residual autocorrelation as is done by the
standard ADF Tests, but also for possible residual heteroskedasticity when testing for
14 defined as the deviation of the employment rate from the time-varying NAIRU-employment rate
calculated by the OECD.
15 Note nevertheless that, by the construction of the Hodrick-Prescott filter, the calculated course of
the proxy for the long-term unemployed (the smoothed series) depends on the whole sample period.
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Tab. 2.3: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test Results
Sample: 1980:1 - 2004:4
Country Variable Lag Length Determ. Adj. Test Stat. Prob.*
pˆt 1 -. -2.106 0.034
U.S. wˆt 1 - -2.589 0.010
d(et) - - -4.909 0.000
d(ut) 1 - -7.122 0.000
i 1 - -1.856 0.061
dln(p) 1 - -2.362 0.018
Euro area dln(w) 1 - -2.197 0.027
d(e) 1 - -3.152 0.001
d(u) 1 - -8.089 0.000
i 1 - -1.481 0.129
pˆt 1 - -5.289 0.000
U.K. wˆt 1 - -3.139 0.002
d(et) 1 - -8.576 0.000
d(ut) 1 - -23.695 0.000
i 1 - -1.697 0.085
pˆt 1 - -3.788 0.000
Germany wˆt 1 - -4.386 0.000
d(et) 1 - -3.657 0.000
d(ut) 1 - -7.969 0.000
i 1 - -1.405 0.148
pˆt 1 - -2.316 0.021
France wˆt 1 - -2.376 0.018
d(et) 1 - -2.977 0.003
d(ut) 1 - -8.494 0.000
i 1 - -1.550 0.113
*McKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
stationarity. The Phillips-Perron test specifications and results are shown in Table 2.3.
As it can be observed there, the applied unit root tests confirm the stationarity of
all series with the exception of the short term nominal interest rate i in all countries.
Nevertheless, although the Phillips-Perron test on these series cannot reject the null
of a unit root, there is no reason to expect both time series to be unit root processes.
Indeed, it is reasonable to expect these rates to be constrained to certain limited ranges.
Due to the general low power of the unit root tests, these results can be interpreted as
providing only a hint of the possibility that the nominal interest rates exhibit a strong
autocorrelation.
The discrete time version of the structural model formulated above was estimated by
means of instrumental variables system GMM (Generalized Method of Moments).16
16 As stated in Wooldridge (2001, p.92), a GMM estimation possesses several advantages in compari-
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The use of an instrumental variables estimator such as GMM is indeed adequate since
it allows for eventual regressor endogeneity to be accounted in the case that some of
the explaining variables are not completely exogenous. Additionally, since among the
explaining variables contained in our general specification there are also expected future
variables, the use of an instrument set composed solely by lagged variables allows for the
approximation of expected values of those forward-looking variables on the basis of the
information available at time t. In order to test for the validity of the overidentifying
restrictions (since we have more instrumental variables as coefficients to be estimated)
we calculate the J-statistics as proposed by Hansen (1982).
The weighting matrix in the GMM objective function was chosen to allow the resulting
GMM estimates to be robust against possible heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
of an unknown form in the error terms. Concerning the instrumental variables used in
our estimations, since at time t only past values are contained in the information sets
of the economic agents, for all five equations, besides the strictly exogenous variables,
the last four lagged values of the employment rate, the labor share (detrended by the
Hodrick-Prescott Filter) and the growth rate of labor productivity were incorporated.
In order to test for the validity of the overidentifying restrictions, the J−statistics
for both system estimations were calculated. We present and discuss the structural
parameter estimates for the analyzed economies (t-statistics in brackets), as well as the
J−statistics (p-values in brackets) in the next subsections.
Before discussing the estimation results for each country individually, it should be
pointed out at a general level, that the GMM parameter estimates shown in the fol-
lowing tables deliver an empirical support for the theoretical Keynesian disequilibrium
model specified in the previous section. This confirms for the Euro Area, UK, Germany
and France some of the empirical findings of Flaschel and Krolzig (2006) and Flaschel
et al. (2007) for the U.S. economy. Especially, the specification of cross-over inflation
expectation terms, with the wage inflation entering in the price Phillips curve and the
price inflation entering in the wage Phillips Curve, as well as the inclusion of lagged
price inflation (as a proxy for the inflationary climate term) in both equations seems
son to more traditional estimation methods such as OLS and 2SLS. This is especially true in time series
models, where heteroskedasticity in the residuals is a common feature: “The optimal GMM estimator
is asymptotically no less efficient than two-stage least squares under homoskedasticity, and GMM is
generally better under heteroskedasticity.” This and the additional robustness property of GMM esti-
mates, of not relying on a specific assumption with respect to the distribution of the residuals, make
the GMM methodology appropriate and advantageous for our estimation.
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to be supported by the data. Nevertheless, the role of this term in the wage and price
inflation determination in the two analyzed economies seems to be somewhat hetero-
geneous: While for example in the estimated wage Phillips curves for the U.S. and the
U.K. the influence of the perfectly foreseen actual price inflation κwp is around 0.4 and
in the Euro area, Germany and France it is around 0.8; in the estimated price Phillips
curves the corresponding parameter κpw is around 0.10 for all economies with the ex-
ception of the U.K., where this parameter is around 0.35. The lagged price inflation
thus seems to have a predominant role in the price determination by the firms, while
actual price inflation apparently influences to a higher extent the dynamics of wage
inflation.
Also in line with Flaschel and Krolzig (2006) and Flaschel et al. (2007) the empiri-
cal evidence from the analyzed countries suggests that wage flexibility is larger than
price flexibility (towards their demand pressure terms in the labor and goods markets,
respectively) by and large, in all economies. Concerning the (log of the) wage share,
namely the Blanchard-Katz error correction terms, we find by and large statistically
significant and numerically similar coefficients in both wage and price adjustment equa-
tions with a similar influence on the price inflation dynamics in all analyzed economies
and a larger effect of this variable on the wage dynamics in the European countries,
confirming (from a qualitative perspective) the empirical findings of Blanchard and
Katz (1999).
Next the estimations of the individual countries are discussed in detail.
Estimation Results: U.S. Economy
As stated before, the theoretical model specification discussed in the previous section
is confirmed by parameter estimates shown in Table 2.4 for the U.S. economy. As
expected, we find a large responsiveness of wage inflation towards the labor market gap,
which is higher than the responsiveness of price inflation towards the goods markets gap.
Concerning the (log of the) wage share, statistically significant coefficients (with the
expected negative sign in the wage inflation- and the positive sign in the price inflation
equations) were estimated. This result contradicts the findings of Blanchard and Katz
(1999), which found these coefficients to be significant only in Europe. Concerning the
effect of the wage share in the dynamic IS equation represented by the coefficient αuv,
a negative and statistically significant influence was found which supports the standard
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Tab. 2.4: GMM Parameter Estimates: U.S.
Estimation Sample: 1980 : 1− 2004 : 4
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Andrews (2.59)
wˆ βwe βwv κwp κwz const. R¯
2 DW
0.948 -0.234 0.350 0.278 0.016 0.354 1.871
[12.055] [5.824] [3.152] [8.809] [11.457]
pˆ βpu βpv κpw const. R¯
2 DW
0.293 0.116 0.046 - 0.763 1.263
[13.277] [5.107] [3.167]
uˆt αu αui αuv const. R¯
2 DW
-0.077 -0.040 -0.176 0.002 0.902 1.521
[9.028] [4.256] [8.163] [3.511]
eˆ αeu−1 αeu−2 αeu−3 αeu−4 R¯2 DW
0.202 0.114 0.040 - 0.387 1.638
[22.780] [8.204] [3.884]
i φi φip φiu R¯
2 DW
0.831 2.173 0.423 0.929 1.916
[71.464] [36.152] [5.113]
Determinant Residual Covariance: 7.95E-21
J-Statistic [p-val]: 0.373 [0.975]
notion that real wage increases lead to a de-acceleration of the economy due to its
effects on aggregate investment and on net exports. With respect to the labor market
dynamics, the sum of the estimated lagged coefficients of uˆ is quite close to 0.3, what
also confirms Okun’s (1970) notion about the relationship between goods and labor
markets. This result is consistent across all estimated economies with the exception of
Germany.
Estimation Results: Euro Area
Concerning the parameter estimates for the Euro Area (shown in Table 2.5), the main
finding is the quite significant and numerically high coefficient of the (log of the) wage
share in the wage inflation equation, what corroborates (also from the qualitative per-
spective) the findings of Blanchard and Katz (1999). But also the numerically large
(and statistically significant) coefficient of the wage share in the goods markets dy-
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Tab. 2.5: GMM Parameter Estimates: Euro Area
Estimation Sample: 1980 : 1− 2004 : 4
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Andrews(3.20)
wˆ βwe βwv κwp κwz const. R¯
2 DW
0.346 -0.383 0.886 0.223 0.005 0.692 1.606
[4.724] [8.613] [7.579] [9.587] [8.027]
pˆ βpu βpv κpw const. R¯
2 DW
0.291 0.089 0.075 - 0.887 1.389
[9.320] [3.551] [4.229]
uˆt αu αui αuv const. R¯
2 DW
-0.104 -0.061 -0.238 -0.068 0.926 2.012
[10.997] [-6.968] [-14.889] [14.622]
eˆ αeu−1 αeu−2 αeu−3 αeu−4 R¯2 DW
0.128 0.115 0.057 0.159 0.645 1.501
[28.448] [19.691] [7.972] [14.994]
i φi φip φiu R¯
2 DW
0.936 1.539 1.782 0.981 1.385
[105.06] [15.977] [6.056]
Determinant Residual Covariance: 2.18E-22
J-Statistic [p-val]: 0.316 [0.996]
namics equation suggest that the link between the wage share and the dynamics of
output might be stronger in the euro area than in the U.S.. In addition, the estimated
parameter βwe (which measures the wage flexibility with respect to labor market devel-
opments) is found to be significantly higher in the United States than in the euro area
if the proxy variable for the euro area short term unemployed (which as stated before
is the relevant group in the wage bargaining process) is used instead of the aggregate
unemployment rate.
Estimation Results: U.K.
Concerning the model estimation with U.K. time series shown in Table 2.6, it corrobo-
rates the overall formulation of the theoretical model and the related sign restrictions
on the variables of the system, delivering by and large similar structural coefficients to
those of the U.S. and the euro area. The main differences between the U.K. and the
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Tab. 2.6: GMM Parameter Estimates: U.K.
Estimation Sample: 1980 : 1− 2004 : 4
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Andrews: 2.62
wˆ βwe βwv κwp κwz const. R¯
2 DW
0.345 -0.212 0.289 0.360 0.010 0.589 1.183
[15.84] [16.678] [21.971] [21.784] [20.998]
pˆ βpu βpv κpw const. R¯
2 DW
0.357 0.219 0.383 - 0.353 2.338
[4.647] [7.081] [16.262]
uˆt αu αui αuv const. R¯
2 DW
-0.361 -0.015 -0.095 - 0.426 1.995
[23.217] [4.089] [12.046]
eˆ αeu−1 αeu−2 αeu−3 αeu−4 R¯2 DW
0.124 0.057 0.122 0.266 1.396
[33.624] [9.420] [26.413]
i φi φip φiu R¯
2 DW
0.949 0.249 1.181 0.934 1.805
[221.371] [4.460] [6.703]
Determinant Residual Covariance: 1.91E-21
J-Statistic [p-val]: 0.241 [0.961]
euro area are the significantly lower values of κwp, αuu and αuv, as well as the larger
value of κpw compared with the two previous cases. Besides of these differences, an
interesting finding in the U.K. estimation is the remarkable similarity in all coefficients
in the wage and price inflation equations, what follows from the fact that these two
macro-variables have exhibited in the U.K. a quite similar dynamic behavior in the last
twenty years.
Estimation Results: Germany
With respect to the Germany estimation, Table 2.7 shows three main findings which
highlight the differences in the dynamics of wage and price inflation in the German
economy with respect to the U.S. and the U.K. In the first place, we have at first glance
a counterintuitive finding that wage flexibility towards the labor market gap is indeed
of a comparable dimension to that in the U.S.; This, however, becomes understandable
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Tab. 2.7: GMM Parameter Estimates: Germany
Estimation Sample: 1981 : 2− 2003 : 4
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Andrews (2.06)
wˆ βwe βwv κwp κwz const. R¯
2 DW
0.809 -0.887 1.149 0.190 0.001 0.371 2.035
[22.012] [45.026] [50.048] [12.076] [2.543]
pˆ βpu βpv κpw const. R¯
2 DW
0.086 0.199 0.124 0.005 0.427 2.166
[30.861] [27.069] [47.469] [48.653]
uˆt αu αui αuv const. R¯
2 DW
-0.157 -0.044 -0.784 0.002 0.893 1.804
[57.542] [7.691] [75.529] [7.369]
eˆ αeu−1 αeu−2 αeu−3 αeu−4 R¯2 DW
0.042 0.031 0.051 - 0.341 0.976
[31.334] [25.827] [32.280]
i φi φip φiu const. R¯
2 DW
0.926 0.631 1.195 0.002 0.966 1.309
[438.31] [10.827] [35.775] [26.713]
Determinant Residual Covariance: 1.03E-20
J-Statistic [p-val]: 0.476 [0.754]
when one recalls that it is indeed the deviation of the actual employment rate to its
NAIRU-consistent- and not to its long-run average level the variable included in the
wage adjustment equation. In the second place, we find a quite high numerical value
of βwv, the effect of income distribution on wage inflation, compared to those in the
other economies, showing the significant influence of trade unions in the German wage
setting. And lastly, the relatively low value of βpu should also be highlighted, which is
indeed the lowest among all analyzed countries.
Concerning the dynamics of the capacity utilization rate, particularly interesting is the
high numerical value of αuv, which is the reaction coefficient of uˆ with respect to the
wage share for the German economy. This value, though, should be interpreted not
as coming about from the importance of income distribution for the goods markets
dynamics, but rather from the clear export-orientation of the German economy. Under
this interpretation, a higher wage share (or, in a more neoclassical language, higher
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real unit labor costs) leads to a slowdown of the economic activity not due to the
predominant decrease of investment over consumption, but rather due to the loss of
competitiveness in the international goods markets. And finally, concerning Germany’s
employment rate dynamics, there are the low values of αeu for several estimated lags,
which clearly show the decoupling of the labor and the goods markets in the German
economy.
Estimation Results: France
The estimated French parameter values (shown in Table 2.8), are also quite in line with
the parameter values obtained from the other economies, corroborating again the em-
pirical validity of the model specification discussed in the previous section. Particularly
Tab. 2.8: GMM Parameter Estimates: France
Estimation Sample: 1980 : 1− 2004 : 4
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Andrews (4.87)
wˆ βwe βwv κwp κwz const. R¯
2 DW
0.354 0.109 0.745 0.025 0.027 0.767 1.434
[16.701] [5.627] [23.770] [1.628] [27.857]
pˆ βpu βpv κpw const. R¯
2 DW
0.403 0.158 0.070 - 0.888 1.172
[31.699] [12.668] [7.028]
uˆt αu αui αuv const. R¯
2 DW
-0.113 -0.026 -0.047 0.001 0.906 1.609
[17.295] [9.983] [25.074] [7.605]
eˆ αeu−1 αeu−2 αeu−3 αeu−4 R¯2 DW
0.209 0.188 0.106 - 0.436 0.689
[31.442] [25.941] [12.588]
i φi φip φiu R¯
2 DW
0.935 1.236 1.649 0.958 1.716
[214.86] [20.367] [7.697]
Determinant Residual Covariance: 2.00E-21
J-Statistic [p-val]: 0.217 [0.975]
we find highly significant coefficients of the cross-over inflation expectations terms in
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both wage and price inflation adjustment equations. Again, the coefficient κwp is found
to be higher than κpw, as it was the case in all analyzed countries with the U.K. as the
sole exception.
The main particularity in Table 2.8 is, however, that the estimation with French ag-
gregate data delivers the Blanchard-Katz error correction terms coefficients with the
lowest numerical values (though statistically significant) of all economies, and that the
corresponding coefficient of the wage share in the goods markets equation is also the
lowest estimated. Income distribution, though, seems to play a lesser role for both the
dynamics of wage and price inflation in a direct manner as well as in an indirect manner
through its effect on the dynamics of the capacity utilization rate.
2.5 Eigen-Value Stability Analysis
After having obtained empirical numerical values for the parameters of the theoretical
model, in this section the effect of parameter value variations –and especially of wage-
and price flexibility– for the stability of the economic system is further investigated.17
For this, following Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel and Semmler (2006), the focus is set on the
effect of parameter variations for the maximum value of the real parts of the eigenvalues
of the model using exemplarily the estimated parameters of the U.S. economy.18
These maximum eigen-value diagrams concerning variations in the structural param-
eters of the wage-price module are depicted in Figure 2.3. They clearly show in a
graphical manner what was indeed proven in the local stability analysis of section 2.3,
namely the relevance of the cross-over inflation expectations terms κpw and κwp in both
wage and price Phillips Curves, of the degree of price flexibility to goods markets dise-
quilibria βpu as well as of the adjustment speed of the inflationary climate variable βpic
for the stability of the system.
Indeed, in Figure 2.3 we can clearly observe that higher values of these parameters
lead ceteris paribus to a loss of local stability of the steady state of the system. This
leads to the conclusion that a somehow sluggish adjustment of the system variables is
indeed needed to ensure local stability if the dynamics of the system are not driven
17 The calculations underlying the plots in this section were performed using the SND package de-
scribed in Chiarella, Flaschel, Khomin and Zhu (2002).
18 An analogous analysis was also performed using the estimated parameters of the other countries
which led to similar conclusions. These graphs are available upon request.
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Fig. 2.3: Eigen-Value-based Stability Analysis: Wage-Price Dynamics
by the rational expectations assumption, where possible unstable paths are simply not
possible by definition.19
Goods Markets
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Fig. 2.4: Eigen-Value Stability Analysis: Goods Markets Dynamics and Monetary Policy
Concerning the parameters determining the goods markets dynamics, the second panel
in the first row of figure 2.4 shows the destabilizing influence of Mundell-Effect, which
would increase for higher values of the goods markets real interest rate sensitivity
parameter αur. As expected, the monetary policy parameters, shown in the second row
of figure 2.4, confirm two standard notions in the monetary policy literature (see e.g.
19 See Flaschel, Groh, Proan˜o and Semmler (2008, ch.1) for an extensive discussion of this issue.
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Woodford (2003)): First, that a too large interest rate smoothing term might reduce the
effectiveness of monetary policy and, second, that the validity of the Taylor principle,
i.e. of a sufficiently active interest rate policy (what implies φpi = γip/(1 − φi) > 1) is
central for the stability of the economy.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter a significant extension and modification of the traditional approach to
AS-AD growth dynamics developed by Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel and Semmler (2006)
was discussed and estimated with aggregate time series of the main industrialized coun-
tries.
The various estimations of the structural model equations for the different economies,
besides confirming the theoretical sign restrictions of the dynamical system, delivered
some interesting insights into the similarities and differences of both economies with
respect to the analyzed macroeconomic variables. In the first place a remarkable simi-
larity in nearly all of the estimated coefficients in the structural equations was found.
For the euro area this is indeed a rather surprising result if we keep in mind that the
euro area became a factual currency union with a unique and centrally determined
monetary policy only eight years ago, on January 1999, so that for a long interval of
the estimated sample the estimated coefficients reflect only the theoretical values of an
artificial economy. Nonetheless, the euro area and all other analyzed economies seem
to share more common characteristics than is commonly believed, specially concerning
the wage inflation reaction to labor market developments, once a proxy for the rate
of short term unemployed rather than the aggregate unemployment rate is taken into
account.
Taken together, these results deliver a different perspective on the dynamics of wage
and price inflation. While the alternative New Keynesian approach is based on the
assumption that primarily future expected values are relevant for the respective wage
and price determination, the estimation results of this chapter deliver empirical support
for an alternative specification of the wage-price inflation dynamics. Indeed, the cross
over expectation formation (where current price (wage) inflation influences the current
wage (price) inflation rate) as well as the inflationary climate cannot be rejected as
significant explanatory variables in the wage and price Phillips Curves. In sum, the
system estimates for all analyzed countries discussed in the previous section provide
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empirical evidence that supports the theoretical sign restrictions in all economies. They,
moreover, provide more clear answers with respect to the role of income distribution in
the considered disequilibrium AS-AD or DAS-AD dynamics. In particular, they also
confirm the orthodox point of view that economic activity is likely to depend negatively
on real unit wage costs. We have also a stabilizing effect of real wages on the dynamics
of income distribution in the U.S. and the euro area, in the sense that the growth rate
of the real wages depends – through Blanchard-Katz error correction terms – negatively
on its own level.
More empirical work is indeed needed in order to check for the model’s parameter
stability and so to account Lucas’s (1976) Critique. However, given the empirical
cross-country evidence discussed in this chapter, this framework (which may be called
a disequilibrium approach to business cycle modeling of mature Keynesian type) seems
to provide an interesting alternative to the DSGE framework for the study of monetary
policy and inflation dynamics.
Appendix A
The Time Series Data
As previously stated, the time series data used in the econometric estimations of this chapter stem from
the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for the U.S. and the OECD database
for the euro area and the individual European countries. DLNP and DLNW denote price and nominal
wage inflation rates, respectively, u the capacity utilization rate (or output gap, when the former to
available), e the deviation of the actual employment rate from its NAIRU-equivalent, v the HP cyclical
component of the wage share and i the short term nominal interest rate.
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Time Series: Euro Area
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Note: In the first panel in the second row UR stands for the unemployment rate, LT for
long-term, ST for short term (calculated through the procedure discussed in this chapter) and
E the resulting deviation of the employment rate from its NAIRU-equivalent.
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Time Series: U.K.
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3. Gradual Wage-Price Adjustments, Labor Market
Frictions and Monetary Policy Rules
3.1 Introduction
In contrast to the assumption of Walrasian labor markets commonly used in mainstream
macroeconometric models, in the real world the existence of structural imperfections
such as search and trading costs hinder the frictionless functioning of the labor markets,
leading generally to outcomes of Non-Walrasian type, with involuntary unemployment
and unfilled vacancies in “equilibrium”. Additionally, the existence of such frictions
also affects the dynamics of the real side of the economy by delaying the responses
of output and employment to exogenous and endogenous shocks, increasing therefore
the persistence of such effects. Concerning wage and price inflation, the presence of
labor market rigidities is also likely to sluggish their response to output developments
through their effect on real unit labor costs (or, from another perspective, on the
labor share), one of the main determinants of price inflation. Due to these different
factors, the incorporation of labor market frictions in a macroeconomic framework
is likely to explain to a significant extent the high degree of persistence observed in
many aggregate macroeconomic indicators such as price inflation in the majority of
industrialized countries, and especially in the major countries of the European Monetary
Union (EMU).
Somewhat surprisingly, though, in most of the macroeconomic models developed in the
last decade – including the increasingly popular DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium) models in the line of Erceg et al. (2000) and Christiano et al. (2005) –
the existence of labor market frictions and their role in the dynamics of employment,
output and inflation remained besides the research agenda due to the almost exclusive
focus of the majority of models of New Keynesian type on the existence and theoretical
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modeling of nominal rigidities. Nevertheless, as discussed for example in Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan (2000), a central problem of intertemporal optimizing macroeconomic
models featuring only nominal rigidities is that the dynamic responses generated by
them do not feature the degree of persistence observed in real data.
The empirical shortcomings of these DSGE models have led recently to the incorpora-
tion within that framework of not only nominal, but also real rigidities in form of labor
market frictions in a wage bargaining setting, as done recently in Walsh (2003a), Trigari
(2004) and Gertler and Trigari (2006), among others. Nevertheless, the adequacy of
such types of models, concerning the rational expectations assumption and the model-
ing strategy, still remains questioned by a large number of researchers such as Mankiw
(2001), Eller and Gordon (2003) and Solow (2004), precisely due to its exclusive fo-
cussing on intertemporal, “rational” and forward-looking modeling of economic agents.
Solow (2004) goes one step further and rises serious doubts about the implications for
economic policy advisement based on such models, primarily due to their low ability
to fit real data. While elegant in their theoretical microfoundations, these types of
macroeconomic models are nevertheless still far too restrictive to describe and analyze
a variety of macroeconomic interactions within an economy. The microfoundations of
the wage and price setting, completely oriented to the intertemporal maximization of
utility and profits, disregard short run factors and dynamics which might take place
even if they are not consistent with the solution of an intertemporal maximization
problem. Aggregate demand pressures, as well as the state of the markets, especially of
the labor markets, are not considered in models of the New Keynesian sort as the ones
developed in Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), Erceg et al. (2000) and Christiano et al. (2005).
Due to these arguments –especially due to our focus on the role of frictions in the
labor markets for the dynamics of the economy as a whole– our theoretical analysis
will be based on disequilibrium rather than equilibrium situations, following the the-
oretical modeling approach by Chiarella and Flaschel (2000), Chiarella et al. (2005)
and Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel and Semmler (2006). As discussed in a previous chapter
of this dissertation, this theoretical approach, which relies on the interdependent but
nevertheless separate gradual adjustments of wages and prices, allows, in contrast to
standard DSGE models, for disequilibrium situations in both goods and labor markets,
and might therefore be more appropriate for a realistic theoretical analysis of the role
of labor market frictions for the dynamics of output, inflation and income distribution.
The remainder of this chapter can be summarized as follows. In section 3.2 the recent
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literature on staggered wage and price and employment dynamics is briefly overviewed,
with special focus on the DSGE approach. In section 3.3 an alternative Keynesian
(Disequilibrium) AS-AD model in the line of Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel and Semmler
(2006) is developed, where frictions in the labor markets are additionally introduced by
means of a search and matching labor market module. As it will be discussed there, this
alternative modelling approach features a similar or even better ability to emulate the
dynamic behavior of aggregate macroeconomic data, generating for example a higher
degree of inflation persistence without the use of the highly questionable Calvo (1983)
price setting mechanism often used in the DSGE framework. After identifying the local
stability conditions of the resulting 4D dynamical system, in section 3.4 the dynamic
adjustment paths of the variables of the theoretical model to monetary and aggregate
demand shocks are analyzed on the basis of previously estimated parameters. There-
after, in section 3.5, the design of monetary policy within our theoretical framework is
discussed through the analysis of the dynamic adjustment and degrees of persistence
of the model variables under alternative monetary policy rules. Section 3.6 draws some
conclusions and further research directions from this study.
3.2 Overview of the Literature
As stated before, labor markets are confronted to a larger extent than other types of
markets with a variety of frictions such as the asymmetric or incomplete information
about the state of the market, geographical and skill mismatches, as well as searching
and trading costs.1 Indeed, as pointed out by Pissarides (2000, p.3), unlike other
markets, trading in labor markets is likely to be “uncoordinated, time-consuming, and
costly for both firms and workers”. It is also likely to depend on the actual market
conditions, that is, on the relative size of unemployed workers and vacancies.
In the last decade, nevertheless, labor markets of Walrasian type, where workers and
employers do not face any type of frictions or trading costs, have been assumed in the
majority of macroeconomic models discussed in the mainstream literature. Indeed, in
models of New Keynesian type such as Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Goodfriend
and King (1997) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), research focused primarily
1 In the EMU, for example, despite of the absence of legal barriers concerning the labor mobility
among the full Member States, language and cultural differences still represent important barriers which
might explain the low degree of labor mobility in EMU.
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on the modelling of nominal rigidities. Specifically, with rational, forward looking, in-
tertemporal utility maximizing households and profit maximizing firms, the only source
of frictions assumed in that framework are the existence of a staggered price setting
mechanism a´ la Calvo (1983), whereafter only a fraction of firms can reset their goods
prices to the monopolistically optimal level in every period.2 The notion of the ex-
istence of Non-Walrasian labor market equilibrium situations, where households and
firms might not be able to find adequate counterparts in the labor markets,3 remained
to a large extent unconsidered in those models: Because firms and households always
(and without time or monetary costs) find a proper workers and employment position,
respectively, and the resulting real wage in the labor markets always fulfills simultane-
ously the intertemporal consumption/leisure preferences of households and the profit
maximization condition by the firms, no involuntary unemployment exists.
In early New Keynesian models featuring only price rigidities as e.g. Roberts (1995),
the assumption of frictionless, Walrasian labor markets delivered also wide-reaching
implications for the conduction of monetary policy. According to the baseline New
Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), inflation is simple a function of the actual output
gap and future expected inflation. This implies for the monetary authorities, so the
conclusion of such models, that there exists no trade-off between inflation and output
stabilization, in contrast to the experience of the majority of central bankers around
the world.4
Contrarily to the above mentioned New Keynesian models, the more recently elabo-
rated DSGE models in the line of Erceg et al. (2000), Smets and Wouters (2003) and
Christiano et al. (2005), feature besides price- also nominal wage rigidities.5 Now, while
with the inclusion of nominal wage rigidities the absence of a trade-off between output,
2 See Mankiw (2001), Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) and Rudd and Whelan (2005) for some critical
assessments concerning the theoretical and empirical implications of the New Keynesian approach.
3 and therefore where involuntary unemployment and unoccupied job positions might exist in equi-
librium.
4 The absence of an output-inflation stabilization trade-off still exists in the more elaborated versions
of the New Keynesian framework, for example under the hybrid NKPC developed by Gal´ı and Gertler
(1999) and Gal´ı et al. (2001) (where actual inflation additionally depends on lagged inflation due to the
assumption of price indexation), also due to its basic assumption of perfect nominal wage flexibility, as
shown in Woodford (2003).
5 These mentioned studies feature additionally various types of real rigidities such as habit formation
in consumption, investment and adjustment costs and variable capacity utilization, but still do not
incorporate labor market frictions.
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employment and inflation stabilization (referred by Blanchard and Gal´ı (2005) as the
“divine trinity”) disappears and the dynamics of inflation predicted by the underlying
theoretical model become, in a more realistic way, more persistent, the wage and price
development is still solely determined by abstract stochastic processes. Indeed, in these
models, wage stickiness is introduced by assuming, in analogy to the standard mod-
eling of optimal price setting by firms, that households – offering differentiated types
of labor – possess enough indeed monopolistic power to unilaterally set ( ! ) the level
of nominal wages which allows them to maximize their intertemporal utility function.
Nevertheless, just like firms in the baseline New Keynesian framework, only a constant
fraction of households obtains in every period the opportunity to reset their wages op-
timally in a Calvo (1983) manner.6 Now, while this scheme of staggered wage contracts
facilitates an easy and elegant incorporation of nominal rigidities in the DSGE frame-
work, its closeness to reality is highly questionable. This criticism applies also to the
standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve, which is also derived from the assumption of
staggered price contracts a` la Calvo (1983)). Indeed, in most industrialized countries,
and especially in the members countries of EMU, most of the wages are set through a
bargaining process between firms and trade unions. Even in more decentralized labor
markets as in the U.S., the assumption of households setting wages in a monopolistic
manner is highly questionable, due to the rather low degree of differentiation of the
labor supply by the majority of the population economically active.7
In recent times, the theoretical research on the role of labor market frictions for the
dynamics not only of output but also of real marginal costs and of wage and price
inflation has experienced a revival, after nearly two decades where it was almost com-
pletely left aside from the academic literature on monetary economics. In a series of
research papers, Walsh (2003a), Trigari (2004), Christoffel, Kuester and Linzert (2006)
and Gertler and Trigari (2006), among others, have started to investigate the role that
labor market frictions play in the dynamics of the real economy by integrating some
elements of the job search theory popularized by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and
Pissarides (2000) (a standard approach used in labor economics to model labor market
frictions) into DSGE frameworks with nominal wage and price rigidities.8 The rea-
6 see e.g. Erceg et al. (2000) and Christiano et al. (2005)
7 In the next section we will discuss the alternative (D)AS-AD approach to wage and price inflation
dynamics by Chiarella and Flaschel (2000) and Chiarella et al. (2005).
8 In the search and matching framework, the search for adequate business partners in the labor
market (firms and employers) is assumed to be costly and time consuming. Vacancies and unemployed
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soning for this new modelling strategy is the following: When labor markets do not
function in a frictionless manner but are confronted to real rigidities, they are not able
to accommodate aggregate demand and supply shocks immediately. Its delayed reac-
tion to such shocks, thus, weakens the link between output and employment, making
their reactions less strong and more persistent.
In order to introduce nominal rigidities in her model, Trigari (2004) assumes that, while
nominal wages are re-set through a bargaining process between firms and workers in
every period, firms can re-optimize their prices in a Calvo (1983) manner with additional
price indexation.9 Gertler and Trigari (2006) follow the same strategy, though in a more
elaborated framework, by gathering nominal wage staggering with a multi-period wage
bargaining resulting from the use of the job search theory. Alternatively, following
Hall (2005), in Christoffel et al. (2006) and Christoffel and Linzert (2006) nominal
rigidity is introduced by specifying a “wage norm or social consensus” after which “the
actual wage level is given by a weighted average of past wage level and the equilibrium
wage level”.10 The basic result of these studies is that while the incorporation of labor
market frictions into DSGE models implies qualitatively similar responses of output,
employment and inflation to aggregate demand shocks and monetary policy shocks as
in DSGE models with Walrasian labor markets, from the quantitative point of view,
this modification decreases the responsiveness of output and inflation and increases
their degree of persistence.
Nevertheless, despite its actual popularity in the mainstream literature, the adequacy
of this type of theoretical modeling approach has been strongly questioned by a large
number of researchers such as Mankiw (2001), Eller and Gordon (2003) and Solow
(2004), precisely due to its exclusive focussing on intertemporal, “rational”and forward-
looking modeling of economic agents. Solow (2004) goes one step further and rises
serious doubts about the implications for economic policy advisement based on such
models, primarily due to their low ability to fit real data. Indeed, these types of
workers are assumed furthermore to be brought together by a matching function which depends on
the state of the market. The use of aggregate search and matching functions in the line of Pissarides
(2000) has become standard in labor economics for the analysis of the labor markets at an aggregate
level, due to the high diversity in the nature of the frictions affecting labor markets. See Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001) for a survey article on the aggregate matching functions.
9 As discussed before, this Gal´ı et al. (2001) specification leads to a hybrid type of New Keynesian
Phillips Curve, where actual inflation depends on future expected and past inflation.
10 Christoffel and Linzert (2006, p.16).
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macroeconomic models are still far too restrictive to describe and analyze a variety
of macroeconomic interactions within an economy. The microfoundations of the wage
and price setting, completely oriented to the intertemporal maximization of utility and
profits, disregard short run factors and dynamics which might take place even if they are
not consistent with the solution of an intertemporal maximization problem. Aggregate
demand pressures, as well as the state of the markets, especially of the labor markets,
are not considered in models of the New Keynesian sort as the ones developed in Gal´ı
and Gertler (1999), Erceg et al. (2000) and Christiano et al. (2005).
Due to these arguments, our theoretical analysis will be based on disequilibrium rather
than equilibrium situations, following the theoretical modeling approach by Chiarella
and Flaschel (2000), Chiarella et al. (2005) and Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel and Semmler
(2006). This theoretical approach, which relies on the interdependent but neverthe-
less separate gradual adjustments of wages and prices, allows, in contrast to standard
DSGE models, for disequilibrium situations in both goods and labor markets. It might
therefore be more appropriate for a realistic theoretical analysis of the role of labor
market frictions for the dynamics of output, inflation and income distribution. Ad-
ditionally, as it will be discussed in the next section, due to the special specification
of the inflation expectations, with perfectly foreseen actual wage inflation entering in
the price inflation adjustment equation and vice versa, both goods and labor markets
influence in a direct manner both wage and price inflation behavior in the economy.
3.3 The Model
In the next section an alternative approach to the DSGE framework developed by
Chiarella and Flaschel (2000) and Chiarella et al. (2005) is modified and extended.
Nevertheless, in contrast to Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel and Semmler (2006) (where the
dynamics of the goods and the labor markets were linked in by a dynamic version of
Okun’s (1970) law) the dynamics in the labor markets will be modeled through a search
and matching module in the line of Pissarides (2000).
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3.3.1 The Labor Markets
In a quite standard manner, a single input factor technology is assumed, by which
output is simply produced according to
Yt = ztNαt , (3.1)
whereNt denotes the actual (realized) level of employment and zt represents the average
labor productivity in the economy.
In the same manner, full employment output Y ft is simply a function of the actual level
of labor supply in the economy Lt = L¯ (assumed for simplicity to be constant)
Y ft = ztL
α. (3.2)
Firms, confronted with an aggregate demand level Y D, determine their labor demand
according to eq.(3.1), that is
LDt = (Y
D
t /zt)
1/α. (3.3)
Due to the existence of labor market frictions, the actual level of employment Nt is not
necessarily consistent with the labor demand by firms LDt , so that L
D
t = Nt does not
hold in the normal case.
Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) find that the rise in unemployment during economic
slowdowns is caused not by a higher rate of job destruction (at least in the U.S. employed
workers do not get fired more frequently than in economic booms), but by a lower rate
of job creation. Following these studies, it is assumed here that a certain number of jobs
are destroyed at an exogenous rate ρ in each period.11 The actual number of employed
workers at t is thus determined by the level of remaining jobs from the previous period
and by the “matches” occurred at the beginning of the actual period. At t, the number
of employees is given by
Nt = (1− ρ)Nt−1 +m(Ut, Vt) (3.4)
11 This assumption is also met by Gertler and Trigari (2006), Christoffel and Linzert (2006) and
Christoffel et al. (2006). Trigari (2004) and Campolmi and Faia (2006), in contrast, assume that the
job separation rate depends partly on the position of the economy within the business cycle, making
the separation rate of employment partly endogenous.
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where m(Ut, Vt) is a matching function of a standard Cobb-Douglas type, expressed as
m(Ut, Vt) = µUνt V
1−ν
t , µ ∈ (0, 1) (3.5)
with µ representing the matching technology level, Ut = Lt − (1− ρ)Nt−1 the number
of unemployed and Vt = LDt − (1− ρ)Nt−1 the number of vacancies at the beginning of
period t (which can be negative if the firms decide to lower their demand of labor).
By defining ut = Ut/Lt and vt = Vt/Lt as the unemployment and vacancy rates,
respectively, and normalizing the total labor supply to Lt = L¯ = 1, we can reformulate
eq.(3.4) in terms of the employment rate et = Nt/L¯ = Nt as
et = (1− ρ)et−1 +m(ut, vt). (3.6)
This specification, though quite simple, allows us to incorporate in our theoretical
framework the dependency of employment on the actual labor market situation. By
defining the degree of actual labor market tightness as
Θt = vt/ut,
we can reexpress the matching function described by eq.(3.5) as
m(Θt, vt) = µΘ−νt vt,
withm′(Θt) = −νµΘ−ν−1t vt < 0. The level of employment, determined by the matching
function, decreases if the ratio of labor demand (the vacancy rate) to unemployment
rate increases. Making use of the fact that
LDt /L =
(
Y Dt /Y
f
t
)1/α
,
we can rewrite eq.(3.6) as
et = (1− ρ)et−1 + µ[1− (1− ρ)et−1]ν
[(
Y Dt /Y
f
t
)1/α − (1− ρ)et−1]1−ν (3.7)
or, after reordering, as
et − et−1 = µ [1− (1− ρ)et−1]ν
[(
Y Dt /Y
f
t
)1/α − (1− ρ)et−1]1−ν − ρet−1, (3.8)
82 Labor Market Frictions and Monetary Policy Rules
which represents the law of motion of employment in discrete time. Defining generally
the time lag length as h, for h −→ 0, we obtain an approximate formulation of eq.(3.8)
in continuous time, expressed as
e˙ = µ [1− (1− ρ)e]ν
[(
Y D/Y f
)1/α − (1− ρ)e]1−ν − ρe. (3.9)
As this labor market module is formulated, the state of the market (the labor market
tightness) influences in a direct way the capability of firms to serve aggregate demand:
Indeed, due to the existence of labor market frictions, firms usually do not obtain their
desired level of labor demand LDt , but Nt instead. Note that the more rigid the labor
markets are, the greater will be the discrepancy between LDt and Nt, and therefore,
through the wage dynamics to be discussed below, the more sluggishly the nominal
unit labor costs will react to exogenous and endogenous shocks.
As eq.(3.9) shows, the rate of change of the employment rate depends on the level of
aggregate demand LD/Lt =
(
Y Dt /Y
f
t
)1/α
, and not on the rate of change of aggregate
output.12 By partial differentiation, we can confirm the adequacy of the qualitative
response of the employment dynamics to the aggregate demand Y D and to the level of
the employment rate:
∂e˙
∂Y D
= (1− ν)µνuνv−να−1
(
Y Dt /Y
f
t
)1/α−1
> 0
∂e˙
∂e
= νµuν−1(−1 + ρ)v1−ν + (1− ν)µuνv−ν(−1 + ρ)− ρ < 0
Note that our formulation of the employment rate dynamics differs significantly from
traditional search and matching labor market models, because here the vacancies are
determined basically by the goods aggregate demand pendant on the labor market
(since LD = (Y D/z)1/α) and not, as usual, through a forward-looking decision process
including Bellman equations and in there the cost-benefit considerations of both work-
ers and firms. However, as discussed later on in this paper, the formulation of the
employment rate dynamics delivers quite reasonable dynamics when simulated.
12 which would be the case if Y Dt = Yt, as formulated for example in Franke, Flaschel and Proan˜o
(2006) with the modeling of a dynamic Okun’s law.
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3.3.2 The Goods Markets
The dynamics of the goods markets in this theoretical model are still of a Keynesian
type, with aggregate demand driving the level of employment and output, in this order.
Indeed, due to the incorporation of labor market rigidities in our theoretical framework,
the level of production in the economy is not only determined by the aggregate demand,
as in standard Keynesian models, but is also influenced in a direct manner by the
degree of inflexibility of the labor markets. Accordingly, we differentiate between the
full-employment production level Y ft = ztL¯
α and the potential output level
Y pt = ztφL¯
α (3.10)
where φ represents a time-invariant term comprising structural labor market factors to
be defined below.
We assume that excess aggregate demand (the log deviation of aggregate demand from
the full employment output level) is simply determined by
ydt = ln
(
Y Dt
Y ft
)
= αyyt−1 − αyr(it−1 − pˆt − (io − pio))− αyv(vt−1 − vo) (3.11)
where yt−1 represents the output gap (to be defined below) in the previous period, io
denotes the steady state nominal interest rate, pio the target inflation rate of the central
bank (assumed for simplicity to be equal to the actual steady state inflation rate) and
vt − vo being the deviation of the actual labor share vt from its steady state level vo.
According to eq.(3.11), aggregate demand is assumed to depend (i) positively (with
0 < αy < 1) on aggregate income, (ii) negatively on the labor share (in principle this
dependence could be positive, depending on whether consumption is more responsive
to real wage changes than investment),13 and (iii) negatively on the real interest rate.
Making use of eq.(3.7) we can express the actual output gap y (defined as the log
deviation of the actual, realized output level from potential output) as
yt = ln (Yt/Y
p
t ) = ln
(
ztN
α
t
ztφLα
)
= α ln(et/φ),
yt = α ln
(1− ρ)et−1 + µ[1− (1− ρ)et−1]ν
[
exp
(
ydt
)1/α − (1− ρ)et−1]1−ν
φ
(3.12)
= fy(et), f ′(et) > 0, f ′′(et) < 0
13 See Franke et al. (2006) for an extensive discussion of the ambiguity of the Rose real wage channel.
84 Labor Market Frictions and Monetary Policy Rules
Note that for et = φ = e0, with eo being the steady state employment rate, yt = 0
holds.
As this module is formulated, aggregate goods demand determines the level of employ-
ment desired by firms, and through the search and matching function expressed by
eq.(3.5), the actual level of employment (the employment rate). This, in turn, deter-
mines the level of production through the assumed production function, which, despite
of being influenced through the existence of labor market frictions, is still demand
driven and thus Keynesian in nature.
Furthermore, the growth rate of the output gap results by definition, namely
yˆt = yt − yt−1
contrarily to the dynamic IS-equation used in Asada, Chen, Chiarella and Flaschel
(2006), for example.
3.3.3 The Wage-Price Dynamics
As stated before, recent DSGE models in the line of Erceg et al. (2000) and Christiano
et al. (2005) incorporate both staggered wage and price setting. In contrast to this
framework, the dynamics of wage and price inflation are driven only by the rational,
forward-looking, profit and utility maximizing behavior of firms and households,14 in
the Keynesian disequilibrium approach by Chiarella and Flaschel (2000) and Chiarella
et al. (2005), the dynamics of wages and prices depend on the demand pressure of
the relevant market, namely of the labor and the goods markets, respectively. In this
theoretical framework, the measure of demand pressure in the labor markets is the
deviation of the actual employment rate from the NAIRU equivalent eo. In the goods
markets, conversely, it is the output gap which measures the pressure of aggregate
demand on prices.15
14 Note furthermore that the influence of both goods and labor market conditions on the behavior of
wages and prices, present in the real world, is not considered explicitly in those types of models.
15 This separate specification of the wage and price dynamics also allows to circumvent the identifi-
cation problem pointed out by Sims (1987) for simultaneous estimations of wage and price equations
with the same explanatory variables.
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The structural form of the wage-price dynamics in our framework is given by:
wˆ = βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo) + κwppˆ+ (1− κwp)pic + κwz zˆ, (3.13)
pˆ = βpu(y − yo) + βpv ln(v/vo) + κpw(wˆ − zˆ) + (1− κpw)pic. (3.14)
The demand pressure terms e − eo and u − uo in the wage and price Phillips Curves
are augmented by three additional terms: the log of the wage share v (the error cor-
rection term discussed in Blanchard and Katz (1999, p.71)), a weighted average of
corresponding expected cost-pressure terms – assumed to be model-consistent with for-
ward looking, cross-over wage and price inflation rates wˆ and pˆ, respectively – and a
backward looking measure of the perceived inertial inflation in the economy (the “in-
flationary climate”, so to say) symbolized by pic, and labor productivity growth zˆ.16
Concerning the latter term for simplicity it is assumed that it always equals the growth
rate of trend productivity, namely zˆ = gz =const.17 Note that here our approach differs
again from the standard New Keynesian approach based on the work by Taylor (1980)
and Calvo (1983). Instead of assuming that the aggregate price (and wage) inflation
is determined in a profit maximizing manner solely by the expected future path of
nominal marginal costs, or in the hybrid variant discussed in Gal´ı et al. (2001), also
by lagged inflation, in the (D)AS-AD framework it is assumed that not only the last
period inflation, but also the inflationary climate where the economy is embedded is
taken into account.
The microfoundations of the wage Phillips curve are of the same type as in Blanchard
and Katz (1999), where the dynamics of nominal wages are determined by a wage
bargaining process between the trade unions and firms. Blanchard and Katz assume,
as in standard wage setting models, that the expected real wage by the trade unions
is simply determined by a weighted average of the reservation real wage ωmint and the
currency labor productivity z, augmented additionally by the state of the labor market,
represented by the unemployment rate ut, that is
ωe = θωmint + (1− θ)zt − βwuut (3.15)
The reservation real wage, in turn, is assumed to be determined by a simple rule of the
16 which is expected to influence wages in a positive and prices in a negative manner, due to the
associated easing in production cost pressure
17 Even though explicitly formulated, we will assume gz = 0 in the theoretical part of this chapter for
simplicity and leave the modeling of the labor productivity growth for future research.
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form
ωmint = a+ λωt−1 + (1− λ)zt. (3.16)
By inserting eq.(3.16) into (3.15), after some arrangements, see e.g. Flaschel and Krolzig
(2006), we obtain
∆wt = −βwuut − (1− θλ) ln(vt−1/vo) + pˆet + (1− θλ)zˆt + θa. (3.17)
Eq.(3.17) is nearly equivalent to eq.(3.13) (with the unemployment gap in the place
of the logarithm of the output gap), if hybrid expectations formation is additionally
incorporated and additionally a zero growth rate of labor productivity is assumed.
Concerning the price Phillips curve, a similar procedure may be applied based on desired
markups of firms, as discussed for example in Flaschel and Krolzig (2006). Along these
lines, an economic motivation for the inclusion of – indeed the logarithm of – the
real wage (or wage share) with negative sign into the wage PC and with positive sign
into the price PC is obtained, without any need for loglinear approximations. The
employment gap and the output gap are thus included in these two Philips Curves,
respectively, in the place of a single measure (the log of the output gap), as done for
example in Woodford (2003). The wage-price module is thus consistent with standard
models of unemployment based on efficiency wages, matching and competitive wage
determination, and can be considered as an interesting alternative to the – at least
empirically questionable – New Keynesian form of wage-price dynamics.18
Note that we assume model-consistent expectations with respect to short-run wage
and price inflation, nevertheless incorporated in the above Phillips Curves in a cross-
over manner, with perfectly foreseen price inflation in the wage Phillips Curve and
wage inflation in the price Phillips curve. We stress that our model indeed features a
18 For comparison, in more elaborated New Keynesian models as e.g. in Woodford (2003, p.225), the
joint evolution of wages and prices is described by the following two loglinear equations
wˆt
WPC
= βEt[wˆt+1] + βwyyt − βwω lnωt,
pˆt
PPC
= βEt[pˆt+1] + βpyyt + βpω lnωt,
where yt represents the output gap, usually calculated as the deviation of the growth rate of output
from its long-term trend, and ω represents the deviation of the real wage from its “natural” level. As it
can easily be observed the expected next period wage inflation does not influence in a direct manner
the price inflation and viceversa, as in eqs.(3.13) and (3.14).
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forward-looking behavior here, without the need for an application of the jump vari-
able technique of the rational expectations school in general and the New Keynesian
approach in particular as will be shown in the next section.19
The corresponding across-markets or reduced-form Phillips curves are given by (with
κ = 1/(1− κwpκpw)):
wˆ = κ [βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo) + κwp(βpy(y − yo) + βpv ln(v/vo))
+(κwz − κwpκpw)gz] + pic, (3.18)
pˆ = κ [βpy(y − yo) + βpv ln(v/vo) + κpw(βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo))
+κpw(κwz − 1)gz] + pic, (3.19)
which both represent a considerable generalization of the conventional view of a single-
market price PC with only one measure of demand pressure, namely the one in the
labor market.
Note that for this version of the wage-price spiral, the inflationary climate variable does
not matter for the evolution of the labor share v = w/(pz), whose law of motion is given
by
vˆ = wˆ − pˆ− zˆ
= κ [(1− κpw)fw(e, v)− (1− κwp)fu(u, v) + (κwz − 1)(1− κpw)gz] . (3.20)
with
fw(e, v) = βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo) and
fp(u, v) = βpu(u− uo) + βuv ln(v/vo)
Eq.(3.20) shows the ambiguity of the stability property of the real wage channel dis-
cussed by Rose (1967) which arises if the dynamics of the employment rate and of the
output gap are linked (despite the incorporation of specific measures of demand and
cost pressure on both the labor and the goods markets), and if inflationary cross-over
expectations are incorporated in both Phillips curves. Indeed, as discussed in Franke
et al. (2006), a real wage increase can act itself in a stabilizing or destabilizing manner,
depending on whether the dynamics of the capacity utilization rate depend positively or
19 For a detailed comparison of our modelling approach to the New Keynesian alternative see Chiarella
et al. (2005).
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negatively on the real wage (i.e. if consumption reacts more strongly than investment
or vice versa) and whether price flexibility is larger than nominal wage flexibility with
respect to its own demand pressure measure.
Concerning the evolution of the overall inflationary expectations among the economic
agents in the model economy, we follow Franke et al. (2006) and assume that the
dynamic behavior of the inflationary climate is described by20
p˙ic = βpic [κpic(pˆ− pic) + (1− κpic)(pio − pic)], (3.21)
where βpic is an adjustment speed parameter and κpic a weight parameter between 0
and 1, and pio is to be thought of as the target rate of inflation of the central bank,
which is assumed to be known by the public. The degree of their confidence vis-a`-vis
the trend-chasing adaptive expectations component is measured by (1 − κpic), which
can also be referred to as the central bank’s credibility.
3.3.4 Monetary Policy
As standard in the actual theoretical literature, the dynamics of the nominal short
term interest rate are modeled through a law of motion of a Taylor rule type. Indeed,
as Romer (2000, p.154-55) states, “Even in Germany, where there were money targets
beginning in 1975 and where those targets payed a major role in the official policy
discussions, policy from the 1970s through the 1990s was better described by an interest
rate rule aimed at macroeconomic policy objectives than by money targeting.”21
The target rate of the monetary authorities and the law of motion resulting from an
interest rate smoothing behavior by the central bank are given as
iT = io + φpˆ(pˆ− pio) + φy(y − yo) (3.22)
i˙ = αi(iT − i). (3.23)
The target rate of the central bank iT is here assumed to depend on the steady state
real rate of interest io − pio augmented by actual inflation back to a nominal rate, and
20 Even though the introduction of an inflationary climate term is not essential for the dynamics of
the model, we introduce it now to facilitate the incorporation of open economy effects, as it will be done
in the next chapter of this dissertation. There, the inflationary climate term refers to the CPI inflation,
and therefore comprises the effects of imported goods prices on the dynamics of domestic inflation.
21 See also Clarida and Gertler (1997).
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as usual on the inflation- and on the output gap.22 By inserting iT into eq.(3.23) and
rearranging terms we obtain from this expression the following dynamic law for the
nominal interest rate
i˙ = −αi(i− io) + γip(pˆ− pio) + γiy(y − yo) (3.24)
where we have γip = αiφpˆ, i.e., φpˆ = γip/αi and γiy = αiφy. The actual (perfectly
foreseen) rate of inflation pˆ is used to measure the inflation gap with respect to the
inflation target pio of the central bank.
3.3.5 The 4D Dynamical System
Taken together, our theoretical model consists of the four laws of motion, which together
form the following autonomous 4D dynamical system
e˙ = µ (1− (1− ρ)e)ν
(
exp(yd)1/α − (1− ρ)e
)1−ν − ρe (3.25)
i˙ = −αi(i− io) + γip(pˆ− pio) + γiyy (3.26)
vˆ = κ [(1− κpw)fw(e, v)− (1− κwp)fu(u, v) + (κwz − 1)(1− κpw)gz] (3.27)
p˙ic = βpic [κpic(pˆ− pic) + (1− κpic)(pio − pic)] (3.28)
with
yd = αyy − αyr(i− pˆ+ (io − pio))− αyv(v − vo)
y = fy(e)
and pˆ, according to eq.(3.19), to be inserted in several places.
Steady State Solution
The unique steady state of the 4D dynamical system can be determined in a sequential
manner as follows. The goods markets are in equilibrium when i = io = 0, pˆ = pio and
yd = y = 0. Inserting these values in the dynamic law of the employment rate delivers
e˙ = µ [1− (1− ρ)e]ν [1− (1− ρ)e]1−ν − ρe
= µ(1− (1− ρ)e)− ρe
22 All of the employed gaps are measured relative to the steady state of the model, in order to allow
for an interest rate policy that is consistent with it.
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since exp(0)1/α = 1. For e˙ = 0, we obtain
eo =
µ
(1− ρ)µ+ ρ. (3.29)
If e = eo, the labor markets are in equilibrium and do not exert any pressures on the
dynamics of wages and prices.
As it can be easily observed, the steady state rate of employment is determined solely
by structural factors concerning the labor markets, namely the labor separation rate ρ
and the matching technology µ, with
∂eo
∂ρ
= −µ[(1− ρ)µ+ ρ]−2(1− µ) < 0
∂eo
∂µ
= [(1− ρ)µ+ ρ]−1 − µ(1− ρ)[(1− ρ)µ+ ρ]−2
=
(1− ρ)µ+ ρ− (1− ρ)µ)
[(1− ρ)µ+ ρ]2 =
ρ
[(1− ρ)µ+ ρ]2 > 0
Note that these factors not only influence the level of the steady state employment rate,
but also the dynamic response of the labor markets to exogenous shocks, as illustrated
in Figure 3.1.
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Fig. 3.1: Employment rate response to an exogenous 1% labor demand shock in t = 2 for
different values of the matching technology µ
As shown there, the larger the value of the matching technology parameter µ, the larger
is the response of the employment rate to an exogenous labor demand shock, and the
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faster is the return of the employment rate to its steady state level (which in turn also
depends on the value of µ). Ceteris paribus, a low matching technology leads thus to
a low response of the actual employment to labor demand shocks that is also more
persistent, a result which is in line with other studies featuring aggregate matching
functions in the labor markets, see e.g. Amable and Ernst (2006).
Concerning the dynamics of wages and prices at the steady state, it should be clear
that in equilibrium none of them is confronted with any demand pressures neither from
the labor nor from the goods markets.
The Jacobian of the 4D dynamic system (which comprises the first partial derivatives of
the dynamical endogenous variables), calculated at the interior steady state described
above, is characterized by the following sign structure:
J =

∂e˙/∂e ∂e˙/∂i ∂e˙/∂v ∂e˙/∂pic
∂i˙/∂e ∂i˙/∂i ∂i˙/∂v ∂i˙/∂pic
∂v˙/∂e ∂v˙/∂i ∂v˙/∂v ∂v˙/∂pic
∂p˙ic/∂e ∂p˙ic/∂i ∂p˙ic/∂v ∂p˙ic/∂pic

=

? − ? +
+ − ? +
? 0 − 0
+ 0 ? −
 .
This representation of the interaction between the different variables within the econ-
omy by means of partial derivatives allows us to examine in more detail the different
channels through which the different variables act in a stabilizing or destabilizing man-
ner.
Due to the formulation of our model and the role that labor market frictions play in
it, the labor markets affect the output determination in a twofold manner: In the first
place, through the restrictions they impose concerning the level of output the firms can
actually produce; and in the second place, due to the effect they have on the reduced
form of the price Phillips curve described by eq.(3.19). The qualitative direction of this
influence, nevertheless, is unambiguously positive. In contrast, as the dynamics of the
labor markets and more specifically of the employment rate are formulated, the effect
of the employment rate on its own rate of change (∂e˙/∂e) is indeed undetermined: On
the one hand, a high level of macroeconomic activity (high employment rate) influences
e˙ positively; but on the other hand, due to the specification of the matching process of
labor, the level of the employment rate itself affects the tightness of the labor market,
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decreasing therefore the rate at which workers and vacancies are matched.23
The rate of change of the employment rate is also influenced (through the aggregate
goods and labor demand) by the nominal (and real) interest rate, as well as by the
wage share (the real wage), of which the influence is assumed here to be negative (due
its cost effect on the firms’ profits and investment). However, it could also be positive
if alternatively the income effect on consumption turns out to be predominant.24 Con-
cerning the real interest rate, note that, through our formulation of the reduced form
Phillips curve equation to be inserted in eq.(3.25), price inflation is determined not only
by the goods, but also by the labor market situations and the weighting coefficients of
both wage and price Phillips curves equations concerning the cross-over expectations
mechanism.
As this model is formulated, it also features additional potential (at least partially)
destabilizing feedback mechanisms concerning the influence of the wage share on ag-
gregate demand, employment and output (in this order), due to the presence of the
Mundell-effect in the dynamics of the goods-market and the opposing Blanchard-Katz
error correction terms in the reduced form price Phillips curve given by eq.(3.19).
As formulated there, the (log of the) labor share (the Blanchard-Katz error correc-
tion terms), affects aggregate price inflation and the inflationary expectations in an
ambiguous manner, through its opposing influence on the structural wage and price
Phillips curve equations given by eq.(3.13) and (3.14). Note that since the net effect
of the Blanchard-Katz terms on aggregate price inflation depends on the values of κwp
and κpw, the cross-over expectation formation by the economic agents determines to a
greater extent the direction of the labor share’s influence on output.
Concerning the dynamics of the labor share (∂v˙/∂e < 0), the joint, net effect of the
goods and labor market dynamics depends on the signs and values of the parameter
estimates of the two structural Phillips curves and therefore, again, on the cross-over
expectations formation of the economic agents. On the contrary, the influence of the
(log of the) wage share on its rate of growth is unambiguously negative, according to
eq.(3.20).
As it can be observed in the last column of the Jacobian of the 4D dynamical system, our
23 In the next section we will show that the relative size of these effects is central for the stability of
the system.
24 See Chiarella et al. (2005), as well as Proan˜o, Flaschel, Ernst and Semmler (2006) and Franke et al.
(2006) for a detailed discussion of the Rose real wage channel.
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Fig. 3.2: The structure of the model
model also incorporates the Mundell inflationary expectations channel, which affects
positively the dynamics of all other dynamic variables of the system through its positive
influence on price and wage inflation, and from there on the employment rate and the
output gap. This unambiguous property of the Mundell expectations channel (discussed
extensively in Chiarella et al. (2005)) is more destabilizing the higher βpi is. These and
the remaining feedback channels and interactions of our theoretical D(isequilibrium)AS-
AD model are illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Reduced 3D-Feedback Guided Stability Analysis
Having explicitly defined the unique steady state of the economy, we now turn to
the analysis of the local asymptotic stability properties of the interior steady state of
the 4D dynamical system given by eqs.(3.25)-(3.28) (with eqs.(3.11), (3.12) and (3.19)
inserted wherever needed) through partial considerations from the feedback chains that
characterize this empirically oriented baseline model of Keynesian dynamics.
Reduced-form expressions in the above system of differential equations have been em-
ployed whenever possible. We have thereby obtained a dynamical system in four state
variables that is in a natural or intrinsic way nonlinear (due to its reliance on growth
rate formulations). Note that there are many items that reappear in various equations,
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or are similar to each other, implying that stability analysis can exploit a variety of
linear dependencies in the calculation of the conditions for local asymptotic stability.
In order to focus more specifically on the role of the labor market friction for the
stability of the economy, we decouple the dynamics of the inflation expectations and
their influence on the rest of the system by setting βpic = 0, reducing so our dynamical
system by one dimension. Note that in this case the inflationary expectations become
static, with the growth rate of labor productivity g` entering in both wage and price
Phillips curve equations with a weight coefficient equal to one.
According to the Routh-Hurwitz stability conditions for a 3D dynamical system, asymp-
totic local stability of a steady state is fulfilled when
ai > 0, i = 1, 2, 3 and a1a2 − a3 > 0,
where a1 = −trace(J), a2 =
∑3
k=1 Jk with
J1 =
∣∣∣∣∣ J22 J23J32 J33
∣∣∣∣∣ , J2 =
∣∣∣∣∣ J11 J13J31 J33
∣∣∣∣∣ , J3 =
∣∣∣∣∣ J11 J12J21 J22
∣∣∣∣∣ .
and a3 = −det(J). Our reduced 3D dynamical system is stable around its interior
steady state, if following propositions are fulfilled:
Proposition 1:
Assume the validity of the inequality
|µ(1 + ρ) + ρ| > (1− ν)µ
ααy
eo
+
αyrκ
(
αβpy
eo
+ βweκpw
)
α
 ,
that assures the unambiguous stability of the employment rate dynamics at
least with respect to its own influence. Then: The trace of the implied 3D
dynamical system (assuming gz=0 for simplicity)
e˙ = µ (1− (1− ρ)e)ν
(
exp(yd)1/α − (1− ρ)e
)1−ν − ρe,
i˙ = −αi(i− io) + γip(pˆ− pio) + γiyfy(e)
vˆ = κ [(1− κpw)(βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo))
−(1− κwp)(βpufy(e) + βpv ln(v/vo))]
around its interior steady state is unambiguously negative.
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Sketch of Proof:
Evaluated at the unique steady state, the 3D Jacobian of the system is given by
−ρ+ µ(ρ− 1) + (1− ν)µ
(
ααy
eo
+
αyrκ
(
αβpy
eo
+βweκpw
)
α
)
−αyr(1−ν)µα
(1−ν)
(
−αyv+αyrκ
(
βpv−βwvκpw
v
))
µ
α
αγiy
eo
+ γipκ
(
αβpy
eo
+ βweκpw
)
−αi γipκ
(
βpv−βwvκpw
v
)
κ(1− κpw)
(
βwe − αβpy(1−κwp)eo
)
0 κ(1− κpw)
(−βwv−βpv(1−κwp)
vo
)

.
Under Proposition 1, which assures a stable dynamic behavior of the employment rate
with respect to its own dynamics, the sign structure of the Jacobian is − − ±+ − ±
± 0 −
 ,
and tr(J) < 0 unambiguously holds.
Proposition 2:
Assume that |αyv| > αyrκ
(
βpv−βwvκpw
vo
)
, and additionally, that βwe ' βpy
hold. Under these conditions, a2 > 0, the second Routh-Hurwitz local sta-
bility condition for a 3D dynamical system,
a2 = J1 + J2 + J3 =
∣∣∣∣∣ J22 J23J32 J33
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ J11 J13J31 J33
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ J11 J12J21 J22
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
is always fulfilled.
Sketch of Proof:
Under the validity of Proposition 1, but without the need of further assumptions, J1
and J3 in are unambiguously positive. If Proposition 2 additionally holds,25 then
25 What would be consistent with the parameter values estimated by Franke et al. (2006) and Proan˜o,
Flaschel, Ernst and Semmler (2006).
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J2 =
µ(1− ρ) + ρ− (1− ν)µ
ααy
eo
+
αyrκ
(
αβpy
eo
+ βweκpw
)
α
 ·
(
βwv + βpv(1− κwp)
vo
)
− (1− ν)µ
α
(
−αyv + αyrκ
(
βpv − βwvκpw
vo
))
·(
βwe − αβpy(1− κwp)
eo
)
> 0,
and the sum of the minors of order 2, a2, is positive.
Under the validity of Propositions 1 and 2, the full set of Routh-Hurwitz conditions are
always fulfilled, since detJ = −a3 is unambiguously negative. In this case, the interior
steady state reduced 3D dynamical system is locally stable.
3.3.6 Model Calibration and Stochastic Simulation
After having identified the stability conditions of the dynamical system, we analyze now
the effects of labor market frictions for the dynamics of the system after different types
of shocks by means of computer simulations. To do so, we use a discrete time version of
the 4D continuous time system discussed in the previous section,26 using nevertheless
alternative labor market specifications to the search framework described in section 3.3
in order to evaluate the dynamic properties of the model. On the one hand, we analyze
a scenario where the labor markets function frictionless, so that LDt = Nt and Y
D
t = Yt
always hold – and the dynamic law of motion of the employment rate based on the
aggregate matching function is replaced simply by the production technology equation
–. On the other hand, we model the link between the goods and labor markets by
means of a dynamic version of Okun’s Law, as done in Asada, Chen, Chiarella and
Flaschel (2006), Proan˜o, Flaschel, Ernst and Semmler (2006) and Franke et al. (2006),
where the growth rate of the employment rate is determined by
eˆt = αey1yˆt−1 + αey2yˆt−2 + αey3yˆt−3. (3.30)
The parameter values used in the different specifications are shown in Table 3.1.
26 The simulations were computed with MATLAB. The source code is available upon request.
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Tab. 3.1: Baseline calibration parameters
Goods Markets αyy αyi αyv
0.7 0.05 0.1
Wage Phillips Curve βwe βwe κwp 1− κwp
0.510 0.230 0.420 0.580
Price Phillips Curve βwe βwe κwp 1− κwp
0.210 0.270 0.550 0.450
Monetary Policy Rule αi φpˆ φy
0.7 1.5 0.5
Labor Markets α µ ρ ν gz
0.70 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.0
Labor Markets In the baseline scenario I set the matching technology factor µ =
0.6 (Christoffel and Linzert (2006) choose µ = 0.4). For the job separation rate ρ
(exogenous in our model), a value of 0.1 was chosen, which is consistent with the
empirical findings (on quarterly frequency) by Hall (1995), Hall (2005), Shimer (2005).
For the choice of the Cobb-Douglas parameter of the the search and matching function
ν, I set a lower value (ν = 0.2) than Walsh (2005), who sets this parameter equal to
0.4.27 Note that in the scenarios featuring the labor search function the steady state
employment rate is not one, as in the other two scenarios, but is instead determined by
the structural labor markets parameters according to eq.(3.29).
Goods Markets For the choice of the parameters αyy, αyi and αyv, we rely on the
system GMM parameter estimates of Proan˜o, Flaschel, Ernst and Semmler (2006) and
Franke et al. (2006), which are consistent with other studies as Goodhart and Hofmann
(2005) who also perform system GMM estimations of Phillips curve and IS equations,
using nevertheless also expected values of future variables.
Wage-Price Dynamics Concerning the parameters in the wage and price Phillips
curve equations (assumed to be equal across all labor market specifications), we use
the empirical parameter estimates obtained for the U.S. economy by Proan˜o, Flaschel,
Ernst and Semmler (2006) and Franke et al. (2006) using system GMM estimation
techniques. These estimated parameter values, even though obtained by means of the
GMM methodology, are consistent with related studies on wage and price inflation
dynamics as Chen and Flaschel (2006) and Flaschel and Krolzig (2006).
27 Setting a value of ν = 0.4 does not change the qualitative reactions of the model, but delivers too
low responses compared with the scenario featuring Okuns’ Law.
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Monetary Policy Following Taylor (1999) and all the related literature on monetary
policy rules, we set the responsiveness of the short term interest rate to the inflation
gap equal to 1.5, and to the output gap, 0.5, and we set the interest rate smoothing
parameter value equal to 0.7 as in Walsh (2005) in order to take into account the high
degree of inertia observable in nominal interest rate time series data.28
In order to evaluate the empirical plausibility of the present theoretical framework under
this parameter calibration the model was simulated over 1000 quarters, assuming that
in each quarter the economy is hit by an aggregate demand, a labor productivity and
a monetary policy shock. For the first two shocks a first order autoregressive process
with an autoregressive parameter of ρy = ρz = 0.7 was assumed, as usually done in the
literature, see e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003).
Based on the estimations by Juillard, Karam, Laxton and Pesenti (2006), we set the
standard deviations of output, labor productivity and the nominal interest rate equal
to σz = 0.0089, σz = 0.0039 and σz = 0.0039, respectively.29
Tab. 3.2: Actual (1980:1 – 2005:4) and Simulated Standard Deviations (in percent)
Output Employment Rate Price Inflation Wage Inflation
U.S. 2.2 1.5 0.525 0.675
euro area 1.7 1.4 0.650 0.850
Model 1.9 2.4 0.600 0.610
Given the rather parsimonious formulation of the present model and the fact that in
this simulation only three types of shocks (compared with the eight of Juillard et al.
(2006)) are assumed to hit the economy in each period, the performance of the model
concerning second moments seems to be quite acceptable, even though precisely the
volatility of the employment rate seems somewhat high when compared with actual
data.
28 As discussed in Rudebusch and Wu (2003) and Franke et al. (2006), there are also some empirical
and theoretical arguments supporting the modelling of monetary policy impulses as autoregressive
processes due, for example, the uncertainty of the monetary authorities at time t concerning the actual
state of the economy. We choose nevertheless to model the interest rate inertia by means of a smoothing
parameter in the Taylor rule, in order to remain consistent with the theoretical framework of the
previous section.
29 We assumed though normally distributed shocks, while Juillard et al. (2006) assume that these are
inverse gamma distributed.
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3.4 Dynamic Adjustments under Different Labor Market Schemes
In the following the dynamic properties of our model by simulating the responses of
the economy to two different types of exogenous shocks: a monetary policy shock and
an aggregate demand shock are analyzed. The underlying time unit is a quarter, but
to ease the interpretation of the simulation results the data is annualized.
Figure 3.3 shows the dynamic response of the artificial economy to a one percent in-
crease in the nominal interest rate. As it can observed, the model delivers quite reason-
able qualitative responses, which are also in line with the predicted reactions of other
macroeconomic models with labor frictions, such as Walsh (2003a) and Walsh (2005).
This is despite the fact that the present approach does not rely on intertemporal utility
and profit maximizing behavior by households and firms assumed there, nor on the
highly questionable Calvo (1983) staggered wage and price setting behavior.
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Fig. 3.3: Impulse-response functions to a one-percent monetary shock for different employment
rate dynamic adjustment mechanisms (annualized inflation rates, in quarters, percent
values): The solid line represents the baseline calibration with labor market frictions
and a matching technology factor of µ = .6. The dashed line represents the scenario
with µ = .1, that is, with a lower degree of labor market rigidity. The dotted line
shows the case where the labor markets function frictionless, and the dashed-dotted
line represents the specification with a dynamic Okun’s law.
As expected, after an increase in the nominal interest rate, both output and employment
decrease, leading also to a fall in wage and price inflation. The reaction of the wage
share, on the contrary, is much more complex. This is because it depends strongly
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not only on the relative sizes of the output and employment growth but also on the
weighting parameters in the wage and price Phillips curve equations. However, we
observe a uniform negative response of the labor share in all labor market scenarios.
The perfectly flexible labor markets scenario, as expected, showed the largest response.
Concerning specifically the role of labor market frictions for the dynamic response of
the economy to shocks, as the impulse response functions in Figure 3.3 show, the more
rigid the labor markets are the weaker is the responsiveness of employment (and output)
to exogenous shocks. This, in turn, affects the reaction of price and wage inflation to
exogenous developments and therefore also the reaction of the wage share dynamics, as
discussed in the previous section.
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Fig. 3.4: Impulse-response functions to a one-percent aggregate demand shock for different
employment rate dynamic adjustment mechanisms
The second scenario studied is the response of the economy to an aggregate demand
shock, say, due to an expansionary fiscal policy impulse (shown in Figure 3.4). Again,
the aggregate variables of our model deliver quite reasonable dynamic responses, with
employment and output increasing in response to the higher aggregate demand, and
price and wage inflation, as well as the nominal interest rate, following the former
variables (the response of the nominal interest rate is due to the Taylor rule specification,
obviously). Note again that the degree of labor market rigidity plays a key role in the
extent as well as in the persistence of the impulse responses generated by the model,
and that the procyclical reaction of the labor share is by no means trivial but rather the
result of the formulation of the cross-over expectations in both wage and price Phillips
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Curves.
Finally, we simulate again the reaction of the economy to a monetary policy shock for
the case of higher credibility of the price stability commitment (represented by a lower
value of κpic in the inflation climate adjustment mechanism) by monetary authorities.
10 20 30 40−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Interest Rate
10 20 30 40−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
Employment Rate
10 20 30 40−0.12
−0.1
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
Output Gap
10 20 30 40−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
Price Inflation
10 20 30 40−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
Wage Inflation
10 20 30 40−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
Labor Share
Fig. 3.5: Impulse-response functions to a one-percent monetary shock with higher credibility.
By comparing the dynamic responses of the economy depicted in Figures 3.3 and 3.5,
we find that in the higher credibility scenario the duration and extent of such reactions
are lower than in the alternative case, where the inflation climate depends on a more
significant manner on the past inflation rates than on the actual inflation target of the
monetary authorities. This result is quite intuitive, showing that higher inflation inertia
leads to an overall slower adjustment of all variables of the economy to exogenous and
endogenous shocks.
3.5 Output Stabilization and Monetary Policy Rules
After the analysis of the dynamic properties of the model under different labor market-
schemes and degrees of search efficiency we focus now on the role of monetary policy
and more specifically on the monetary policy targets for the dynamics of the economy.
In order to investigate the dynamic response of the model economy to a monetary policy
shock under different monetary policy rules, the reaction of the model under different
rules is simulated, whereas as the benchmark rule we use Taylor’s (1993) specification
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(Rule I), according to which
Rule I: φpˆ = 1.5, φy = 0.5.
The alternative monetary policy rules as well as the corresponding target weights values
are shown in table 3.3.
Tab. 3.3: Alternative Monetary Policy Rules: Weighting Parameters
Rule II. Strict III. Flexible IV. Flexible V. Flexible
Inflation Inflation Targeting Inflation Targeting Inflation Targeting
Weights Targeting with with with
Employment Target Wage Inflation Target Wage Share Target
φpˆ 2 1 1 1
φy 0 0.5 0.5 0.5
φe 0 0.5 0 0
φwˆ 0 0 0.5 0
φv 0 0 0 0.5
The (absolute) cumulated dynamic responses of the model sketched in figure 3.6 deliver
three important insights on the importance of the choice of the targets and the relative
weighting values in objective function of the monetary authorities:
In the first place, they highlight the multi-dimensionality of monetary policy conduction
that comes to light once the baseline New Keynesian model with (solely) price stickiness
is abandoned and nominal wage as well as labor market rigidities are incorporated.
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Fig. 3.6: Cumulated impulse-response functions under alternative monetary policy rules.
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As figure 3.6 and table 3.4 clearly show, monetary policy rules that achieve an efficient
stabilization of price inflation are not necessarily as effective concerning other variables.
Indeed, it can be observed, Taylor’s (1993) original specification (I) and the flexible
inflation targeting with nominal wage growth target (IV) outperform the other three
rules: strict inflation targeting (II), flexible inflation targeting with an employment
target (III) and flexible inflation targeting with employment and with wage share target
(V), concerning the overall extent of the dynamic responses of the economy.
In the second place, the dynamic responses under rules I and IV (Taylor’s (1993)
specification and flexible inflation targeting with a nominal wage inflation target) have
an almost identical performance concerning the cumulated reaction of the economy.
According to our model, a pure flexible inflation targeting rule with a weight φpˆ = 1.5
is nearly equivalent to a flexible inflation targeting with weights φpˆ = 1 and φwˆ = 0.5
(both with φy = 0.5).30
30 Gal´ı (2008), in a New Keynesian DSGE model with staggered wages and prices, arrives to a similar
result.
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Tab. 3.4: Cumulated Responses at Different Horizons
8 Quarters 16 Quarters 24 Quarters 32 Quarters
Monetary Policy Rule Output
I 0.3191 0.3700 0.3855 0.3926
II 0.3215 0.3704 0.3945 0.4039
III 0.3246 0.3915 0.3970 0.4017
IV 0.3183 0.3686 0.3831 0.3899
V 0.3229 0.3923 0.3908 0.3959
Employment Rate
I 0.4273 0.4954 0.5162 0.5257
II 0.4305 0.4960 0.5283 0.5408
III 0.4346 0.5242 0.5315 0.5379
IV 0.4261 0.4936 0.5129 0.5220
V 0.4323 0.5119 0.5233 0.5301
Price Inflation
I 0.4095 0.5728 0.6291 0.6331
II 0.3255 0.5718 0.6149 0.6243
III 0.3265 0.5966 0.6775 0.6900
IV 0.3227 0.5709 0.6280 0.6318
V 0.3256 0.5874 0.6584 0.6667
Wage Inflation
I 0.3552 0.5790 0.6277 0.6309
II 0.3577 0.5772 0.6125 0.6205
III 0.3590 0.6047 0.6773 0.6895
IV 0.3545 0.5770 0.6266 0.6300
V 0.3579 0.5947 0.6577 0.6661
Lastly, our dynamic simulations show that the strict inflation targeting rule (II), while
this rule is the most effective in shortening the adjustment duration of the economy, it
is not the most effective when it comes to the reduction in the response variability of all
macroeconomic variables besides price inflation. Indeed, as shown in figure 3.6, due to
the overshooting that takes place when only price inflation is targeted, the adjustment
process of the economy after a monetary policy shock is much more volatile than in
the alternative cases, a result which is in line with the theoretical considerations of
Woodford (2003, ch.4).
In a related paper – though within a DSGE framework – Faia (2006) performs similar
experiments which are all in all in line with our findings. There is though one important
difference between her conclusions and ours: Since in her framework the evolution of the
real marginal costs depend solely on unemployment, targeting the output gap is sub-
optimal towards targeting the unemployment gap, since the latter is the variable which
comprises the source of the inefficiency in the economy. In our framework, however,
3.6. Concluding Remarks 105
the choice of the optimal strategy is not that straightforward, because the dynamics
of the labor share (the real marginal costs) are not only driven by the unemployment
gap but also by the disequilibrium in the goods markets due to our cross-over specifi-
cation in the wage-price dynamics. In fact, a strategy which targets both output and
employment gaps as rule III seems to be less efficient than a Taylor rule with standard
coefficients as rule I, as shown in figure 3.6.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
Despite of the high degree of technological process in the industrialized countries, their
labor markets are and probably will also be in the future confronted with a variety of real
imperfection which will hinder the complete clearing of the market in equilibrium. This
chapter studied the role of structural labor market frictions in the dynamics of the econ-
omy by incorporating in a theoretical framework in the line of Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel
and Semmler (2006) a labor market module containing basic search-and-matching el-
ements. As the present model was formulated, the degree of labor market rigidity
affected not only the dynamics of the employment rate, but also of the output gap (and
consequently also wage and price inflation) through the restrictions it imposed on the
ability of firms to find adequate workers and serve aggregate demand.
This straightforward modification of the baseline (D)AS-AD framework delivered some
interesting results concerning the dynamic responses of the economy to various exoge-
nous shocks. On the one hand, we found that the degree of rigidity in the labor markets
has an important effect on the dynamics of output and inflation: The more rigid the
labor markets are, the smaller is the response of employment, output and inflation to
exogenous shocks. On the other hand, though still concerning this first result, we found
that the dynamic response of the labor share, which in turn influences the aggregate
demand as well as price inflation, depends dramatically on the relative responses of
production and employment to shocks, and therefore on how and through which chan-
nels shocks are transmitted within the economy. Since nowadays the predominant view
(represented also by the DSGE approach) is that the real marginal costs (the labor
share) are the main force driving price inflation, this approach delivers an interesting
alternative to the DSGE modeling approach, which considers the real marginal costs
as being determined primarily by intertemporal profit maximization under imperfect
competition.
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Concerning the role of monetary policy, the dynamic simulations performed here showed
that a flexible inflation targeting rule in the line of Taylor (1993), where price inflation as
well as output are targeted, and/or a flexible inflation targeting rule with an additional
wage inflation target have a better performance than flexible inflation targeting rules
where employment or the wage share besides the output gap are targeted, or strict
inflation targeting where the inflation gap is the only target variable of concern.
On more real world-related grounds, if one takes into account the significant differences
in the characteristics of the labor markets across the EMU countries, the findings of this
chapter might deliver some interesting insights on the recent inflation developments in
those economies, with countries as Germany or Austria with persistently low inflation
rates compared to other countries such as Spain and Ireland, as discussed for example
in the previous chapter, as well as in Honohan and Lane (2003), Fritsche et al. (2005)
and Angeloni and Ehrmann (2007). In the next chapter the implications of labor
market rigidity for as well as the effectiveness of alternative monetary policy rules in
a monetary union with heterogenous national labor market characteristics such as the
EMU are analyzed.
4. Optimal Monetary Policy in Currency Unions with
Asymmetric National Labor Markets
4.1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that the creation of a monetary union implies a significant loss of
their macroeconomic flexibility for the participating economies. With such a step, the
member countries do not only lose their ability to conduct an independent monetary
rate policy; Additionally, due to the replacement of the country-specific for a union-
wide nominal exchange rate, their capability to correct internal and external imbalances
through real exchange rate adjustments in a fast and efficient manner is also significantly
diminished.
Given the radical regime change that the joining in a monetary union represents, the ad-
equacy of a one-size-fits-all monetary policy not only for the currency area as a whole
but also for the individual economies depends to a major extent on their macroeco-
nomic homogeneity. In the case of the initial EMU Member States, it is nowadays
widely accepted that despite of the remarkable success concerning the convergence and
synchronization process initiated at the latest with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty
1992, at the time of the introduction of the euro, these economies could still not be
considered as optimal candidates for a joint monetary union in terms of the Optimum
Currency Areas (OCA) Theory. Indeed, despite the similar sectoral patterns of pro-
duction, relative role of the national governments and financial structure (some of the
OCA optimality criteria), the significant differences in the wage bargaining and price
setting mechanisms and the related wage and price inflation developments, the degree
of openness of the economy, the functioning and strength of the different monetary pol-
icy transmission channels, as well as the low labor mobility existing among the EMU
countries (pointed out by Bertola (2000) and Braunerhjelm et al. (2000)) led to a large
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number of observers to doubt on the long-term viability of the European monetary
unification project.
While in contrast to the one-country-one-currency case the maintenance of price sta-
bility might indeed be “the best contribution that monetary policy can give to reduce
the general level of uncertainty and promote an efficient allocation of resources,”1 in
a monetary union featuring different national inflation rates and output gap devel-
opments the definition of price stability and its stabilization role become much more
complex: Indeed, with different inflation rates and output developments within the
common currency area, what should be their relative importance for the decision mak-
ing of the Monetary Union’s Central Bank (MUCB)? Should the MUCB react solely to
average developments or instead explicitly take into account (and incorporate) national
developments (in its intertemporal loss function)?
The main aim of this chapter is to investigate this issue and, in more general terms, to
conceptualize the design of optimal monetary policy in a common currency area with
asymmetric national labor markets. For this, a simple two-country semi-structural
macroeconomic model featuring labor market frictions based in the model of the pre-
vious chapter is set up which, despite the disequilibrium foundations of the wage-price
dynamics, shares nonetheless many similarities with the more mainstream New Keyne-
sian models as the ones developed by Erceg et al. (2000) and Christiano et al. (2005).
This study is organized as follows. In section 4.2 the relevance of national developments
for the conduction of monetary policy in a monetary union with asymmetric national la-
bor markets such as the EMU is briefly discussed. In section 4.3 the (Disequilibrium)AS-
AD model with labor market frictions developed in the last chapter is extended to a
two-country framework where the economies possess different degrees of labor market
rigidity and therefore different adjustment speeds to exogenous shocks. Section 4.4
focuses on the design of optimal monetary policy under a strict forecast targeting of
average price inflation (under the consideration of the average of certain macroeco-
nomic variables of the member economies) and under an alternative formulation where
the individual country-specific developments of the member economies are explicitly
formulated into the intertemporal loss function of the MUCB. Section 4.5 draws some
concluding remarks.
1 Issing, Gaspar, Angeloni and Tristani (2001, p.67).
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4.2 Preliminary Considerations
As stated before, the design and conduction of monetary policy in currency unions with
asymmetric member economies is of a much higher complexity than in the one-country-
one-currency case. The objectives trade-off which monetary policy is confronted with
in a common currency area were already pointed out by Mundell’s (1961, p.659) in
the following manner: “In a currency area comprising different countries with national
currencies the pace of employment in deficit countries is set by the willingness of surplus
countries to inflate. But in a currency area comprising many regions and a single
currency, the pace of inflation is set by the willingness of central authorities to allow
unemployment in deficit regions.”
The extent to which the member economies of a monetary union are indeed affected by
asymmetric, country-specific shocks (and therefore the extent up to which their business
cycles are correlated – and in a more updated sense the degree of synchronization –
with each other) is a key feature for the effectiveness and adequateness of monetary
policy in a monetary union. Indeed, as already recognized by Mundell (1961), if factor
(and specifically labor) mobility is not sufficiently large between the monetary union
participant countries, the existence of asymmetric (country- or region-specific) shocks
is likely to complicate to a significant degree the conduction of monetary policy by the
central authorities.
Even leaving aside the influence of asymmetric shocks, the complexity of monetary pol-
icy design in a monetary union starts at the mere conception of the union-wide target
variables: Indeed, when an aggregate indicator such as the Monetary Union Index of
Consumer Prices (MUICP) of the ECB is used, national developments matter solely to
the extent of the relative size of the respective economies within the monetary union.
However, can this proceeding be considered optimal? In order to answer this question,
it is helpful to think of a monetary union consisting of two economies which, though
heterogenous in their macroeconomic characteristics, are nevertheless of the same eco-
nomic size. In this case, should the price inflation developments of both economies
enter with the same weight in the aggregate loss function of the MUCB, or should this
rather consider explicitly the structural differences between the two member economies
in its decision making? The central point which should be analyzed is the adequacy of
one-size-fits all monetary policy at the individual country level and the possible viola-
tion of the Taylor (1993) principle – which demands a sufficiently aggressive monetary
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policy reaction to inflation developments – at the member country level. Indeed, even
if member economies are confronted with similar exogenous shocks and the qualitative
direction of the monetary policy responses determined by the MUCB is correct for all
monetary union members, individual macroeconomic characteristics such as the specific
strength and functioning of the monetary policy transmission channels, the degrees of
exchange rate pass-through, the wage and price flexibility as well as the rigidity of
the national labor markets might distort and diminish the efficiency and adequacy of
monetary policy at the country-level.
These considerations are by no means trivial. Concerning the transmission mechanisms
of monetary policy in the euro area countries, Mojon and Peersman (2003) show through
the estimation of identified VAR models for the single member economies that while
their overall reaction to monetary shocks exhibits qualitatively similar patterns, there
is still a high uncertainty concerning the actual dimension of the effects. These authors
also point out the lack of consistency among different studies concerning the ranking
of the potency of monetary policy across countries, highlighting that, for example,
“Barran, Coudert and Mojon (1997) find the largest impact in Germany and the weakest
in Italy, while Peersman and Smets (1999) find the opposite”.2
Looking into the interest rate channel of monetary policy and more specifically into
the relationship between money market and bank interest rates, Sorensen and Werner
(2006) find a significant heterogeneity in the extent of pass-through of market interest
rates to bank interest rates in the euro area. In that study, both long-run multiplier as
well as the speed of the adjustment coefficients are found to be significantly different
between the euro area countries, corroborating the previous findings by Baele, Ferrando,
Ho¨rdahl, Krylova and Monnet (2004).
However, as stated by Berben, Locarno, Morgan and Valle´s (2005), most asymmetries
in the transmission of monetary policy shocks are to be found in the working of labor
and goods markets. This is not surprising given the importance of the labor markets
not only in the determination of the actual production level of the economy but also
2 Mojon and Peersman (2003, p.66). In the same volume, Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon and Terlizzese
(2003, p.390) discuss also the lack of hard and consistent quantitative evidence on the monetary policy
transmission in the euro area, highlighting as the sole reliable stylized fact that in the euro area countries
aggregate investment plays a relative greater role than consumption in the transmission of monetary
policy in contrast to the U.S., where consumption variations clearly represent the main transmission
channel of monetary policy into the real economy.
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due to their role in the determination of the marginal costs of firms, and therefore
for the dynamics of wage and price inflation. Indeed, as shown in a variety of recent
theoretical papers such as Walsh (2003a), Trigari (2004) and Christoffel et al. (2006)
(as well as in the model of the previous chapter) the degree of labor market flexibility
has a central role for the extent and speed to which the main variables of the economy
such as output, employment and inflation react to exogenous shocks.
As previously pointed out, given the fact that the member countries of a monetary
union do not dispose of a country-specific nominal exchange rate that would act in
part as a macroeconomic absorber to exogenous shocks,3 the characteristics of their
national labor markets are of central importance to the extent and duration of the
dynamic responses of the respective economies and by extension for the conduction
of monetary policy in the monetary union. In the next sections the implications of
asymmetric labor markets for the conduction of monetary policy in a currency union
will be discussed within a theoretical framework.
4.3 The Model
In this section a simplified open-economy, two-country version of the Keynesian semi-
structural model with labor market frictions developed in the last chapter is introduced.
Two small open economies which form a monetary union and therefore are subject
to a single common monetary policy by a central monetary authority (the Monetary
Union’s Central Bank MUCB) are assumed. The two economies a and b are modeled
identically in every aspect, differing from each other only in the degree of flexibility of
their respective labor markets, with a featuring a more flexible labor market than b.
This specification will allow us to investigate the working and effectiveness of monetary
policy in a monetary union with asymmetric national labor markets.
4.3.1 The Labor Markets
To keep the model as simple as possible, a linear single input factor technology is
assumed by which output is produced according to
Yt = ztNt, (4.1)
3 Campolmi and Faia (2006), for example, find in a calibrated DSGE that differences in labor market
institutions among the euro area countries can be related to the respective inflation rate differentials.
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where Nt denotes the actual (realized) level of employment and z represents the average
labor enhancing technology level, which is assumed in the following to be constant for
notational simplicity.
In the same manner, full employment output Y ft , is simply a function of the actual
level of labor supply in the economy Lt, expressed as
Y ft = zLt (4.2)
Firms, confronted with an aggregate demand level Y Dt , determine their labor demand
according to eq.(4.1), that is
LDt = Y
D
t /z (4.3)
Nevertheless, due to the existence of labor market frictions, the actual level of em-
ployment Nt is not necessarily consistent with the labor demand by firms LDt , so that
LDt = Nt does not hold in the normal case. Instead, the actual number of employed
workers at t is determined by the level of remaining jobs from the previous period (de-
termined in turn by the exogenous job separation rate ρ) and by the “matches” at the
beginning of the actual period. At t, the number of employees is determined by
Nt = (1− ρ)Nt−1 +m(Ut, Vt) (4.4)
where m(Ut, Vt) is a linear matching function4
m(Ut, Vt) = µ( νUt + (1− ν)Vt), µ ∈ (0, 1) (4.5)
with µ representing the matching technology level, Ut = Lt − (1− ρ)Nt−1 the number
of unemployed and Vt = LDt − (1− ρ)Nt−1 the number of vacancies at the beginning of
period t (which can be negative if the firms decide to lower their demand of labor).
By defining ut = Ut/Lt and vt = Vt/Lt as the unemployment and vacancy rates,
respectively, and normalizing the total labor supply to Lt = L¯ = 1, we reformulate
eq.(4.4) in terms of the employment rate et = Nt/L¯ = Nt as
et = (1− ρ)et−1 +m(ut, vt). (4.6)
Making use of the fact that
LDt /L¯ = Y
D
t /Y¯
f
4 Despite the known shortcomings of linear matching functions, see e.g. Stevens (2004), such a
matching function is used here in order to attain linearity in the employment rate equation, in contrast
to the previous chapter, where a more standard Cobb-Douglas function was used.
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we can rewrite eq.(4.6) as
et = (1− ρ)et−1 + µ
[
ν(1− (1− ρ)et−1) + (1− ν)
(
Y Dt /Y¯
f − (1− ρ)et−1
)]
(4.7)
or, after reordering,
et − et−1 = µ
[
ν (1− (1− ρ)et−1) + (1− ν)
(
Y Dt /Y¯
f − (1− ρ)et−1
)]
− ρet−1, (4.8)
which represents the law of motion of employment in discrete time. Defining generally
the time lag length as h, for h −→ 0, we obtain the following approximate formulation
of eq.(4.8) in continuous time
e˙ = µ
[
ν (1− (1− ρ)e) + (1− ν)
(
Y D/Y f − (1− ρ)e
)]
− ρe. (4.9)
As this labor market module is formulated, the state of the market (the labor market
tightness) influences in a direct way the capability of firms to serve aggregate demand:
Indeed, due to the existence of labor market frictions, firms usually do not obtain their
desired level of labor demand LDt , but Nt instead. Note that the more rigid the labor
markets are, the greater will be the discrepancy between LDt and Nt, and therefore,
through the wage dynamics to be discussed below, the more sluggishly the nominal
unit labor costs will react to exogenous and endogenous shocks.
As eq.(4.9) shows, the rate of change of the employment rate depends on the level of
the aggregate demand LD/L¯ = Y Dt /Y¯
f .5 By partial differentiation, we can confirm
the adequacy of the qualitative response of the employment dynamics to the aggregate
demand Y D and to the level of the employment rate:
∂e˙
∂Y D
= µ(1− ν)/Y¯ f > 0
∂e˙
∂e
= µ(−ν(1− ρ)− (1− ν)(1− ρ))− ρ = −µ(1− ρ)ρ < 0
Note that our formulation of the employment rate dynamics differs significantly from
traditional search and matching labor market models, because here the vacancies are de-
termined basically by the goods aggregate demand pendant on the labor market (since
LD = Y D/z) and not, as usual, through a forward-looking decision process including
Bellman equations and in there intertemporal cost-benefit considerations of both work-
ers and firms. However, as discussed later on in this paper, this formulation of the
employment rate dynamics will deliver economically reasonable dynamic responses.
5 and not on the rate of change of aggregate output (which would be the case if Y D = Yt, as formulated
for example in Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel and Semmler (2006) with the modeling of a dynamic Okun’s
law).
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4.3.2 The Goods Markets
The dynamics of the goods markets in this theoretical model are still of a Keynesian
type, specifically with aggregate demand driving the level of employment and output.
Indeed, due to the incorporation of labor market rigidities in our theoretical framework,
the level of production in the economy is not only determined by the aggregate demand,
as in standard Keynesian models, but is also influenced in a direct manner by the
degree of flexibility of the labor markets. Accordingly, we differentiate between the
full-employment production level Y f = L¯ and the potential output level
Y p = φL¯ (4.10)
where φ represents a time-invariant term comprising structural labor market factors to
be defined below.
We assume that excess aggregate demand yD := (Y D − Y f )/Y f is determined by
yDt = αy(yt−1 − yo)− αyr(it−1 − pˆt − (io − pio))− αyv(vt−1 − vo) + αηηt−1 (4.11)
where yt−1 represents the output gap (to be defined below) in the previous period, io
denotes the steady state nominal interest rate, pio the steady state inflation rate, vt−vo
the deviation of the actual labor share vt from its steady state level vo6 and η the log
real exchange rate (defined as η = ln(pb/pa)).7
Making use of eq.(4.7) we can express the actual output gap y (defined in this chapter
as the ratio of actual, realized output level to potential output) as
yt = = Yt/Y
p
t =
Nt
φLt
= et/φ,
yt = µφ−1
[
ν(1− (1− ρ)φyt−1) + (1− ν)
(
LD/L¯− (1− ρ)φyt−1
)]
(4.12)
= +(1− ρ)yt−1, f ′(yt) > 0, f ′′(yt) < 0
with et = φ and yt = yo = 1. In equilibrium thus eo, the steady state employment rate,
equals φ.8
6 Note that aggregate demand could depend either positively or negatively on the labor share, de-
pending on whether consumption is more responsive to real wage changes than investment. See Proan˜o,
Flaschel, Ernst and Semmler (2006) and Franke et al. (2006) for an extensive discussion of the ambiguity
of the Rose real wage channel.
7 For simplicity this will be the only open-economy term we will analyze here, leaving the introduction
of direct foreign goods demand as a determinant of domestic economic activity for further research.
8 eo and therefore φ will be further defined below.
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As this module is formulated, aggregate goods demand determines the level of employ-
ment desired by firms, and through the search and matching function expressed by
eq.(4.5), the actual level of employment (the employment rate). This, in turn, deter-
mines the level of production through the assumed production function, which, despite
of being influenced through the existence of labor market frictions, is still demand
driven and thus Keynesian in nature.
4.3.3 The Wage-Price Dynamics
Following the theoretical approach by Chiarella and Flaschel (2000) and Chiarella et al.
(2005), the following structural form of the wage-price inflation dynamics is assumed:
wˆt = βwe(et−1 − eo) + κwppˆt + (1− κwp)pict + κwz zˆt, (4.13)
pˆt = βpu(yt−1 − yo) + κpw(wˆt − zˆt) + (1− κpw)pict . (4.14)
The demand pressure terms e − eo and u − uo in the wage and price Phillips Curves
are augmented by two additional terms: a weighted average of corresponding expected
cost-pressure terms, assumed to be model-consistent, with forward looking, cross-over
wage and price inflation rates wˆ and pˆ, respectively, and a backward looking measure of
the perceived inertial inflation in the economy symbolized by pic, and labor productivity
growth zˆ. Concerning the latter variable we assume for simplicity that it is always equal
to the growth rate of trend productivity, namely zˆ = gz =const.9
Concerning the “inflationary climate” term, we assume that the measure that is taken
by workers to judge the medium-run evolution of prices in their respective economies
is the Consumer Price Index, defined as
pc = pξ(spf )1−ξ,
the geometric average of domestic and import prices – with pf as the foreign price level
and s as the nominal exchange rate between the two countries (which equals one by
definition in a monetary union).
9 As stated before, even though explicitly formulated, in this chapter it will be assumed for sim-
plicity that gz = 0. The modeling of the labor productivity growth as well as the investigation of the
implications of different labor productivity developments for the conduction of monetary policy are left
for future research.
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Consequently, the CPI inflation pˆc includes both domestic inflation (with a specific
weight ξ) and imported goods price inflation (with weight 1− ξ), so that
pˆc = ξpˆ+ (1− ξ)pˆf . (4.15)
Because of the uncertainty linked with nominal exchange rate movements, we assume
for both workers and firms’ decision making processes that the perceived CPI inflation
pic is updated in an adaptive manner according to
p˙ic = βpic(pˆc − pic) = βpicξ(pˆ− pic) + βpic(1− ξ)(pˆf − pic) (4.16)
or, expressed in discrete time,
pict = pi
c
t−1 + βpic(pˆ
c
t − pict−1) = βpicξ(pˆt − pict−1) + βpic(1− ξ)(pˆft − pict−1) (4.17)
The corresponding across-markets or reduced-form Phillips curves are given by (with
κ = 1/(1− κwpκpw)):
wˆt = κ [βwe(et−1 − eo) + κwp(βpy(yt−1 − yo)) + (κwz − κwpκpw)gz] + pict , (4.18)
pˆt = κ [βpy(yt−1 − yo) + κpw(βwe(et−1 − eo)) + κpw(κwz − 1)gz] + pict , (4.19)
which represent a considerable generalization of the conventional view of a single-market
price PC with only one measure of demand pressure, namely the one in the labor market.
Note that here the perceived CPI inflation pic does not matter for the evolution of the
labor share v = w/(pz), which law of motion is given by (z, the labor productivity, is
assumed to be constant) :
vˆ = κ [(1− κpw)βwe(e− eo)− (1− κwp)βpu(y − yo) + (κwz − 1)(1− κpw)gz] . (4.20)
Eq.(4.20) shows the ambiguity of the stability property of the real wage channel dis-
cussed by Rose (1967) which arises if despite of the incorporation of specific measures
of demand and cost pressure on both the labor and the goods markets, the dynamics
of the employment rate and the the output gap are linked and if inflationary cross-over
expectations are incorporated in both Phillips curves.
We note that the unique steady state of the system, due to its specific formulation,
can be supplied exogenously. The goods markets are in equilibrium when yD = 0 and
y = yo = 1. Inserting these values in the dynamic law of the employment rate delivers
e˙ = µ [ν(1− (1− ρ)e) + (1− ν)(1− (1− ρ)e)]− ρe
= µ(1− (1− ρ)e)− ρe
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For e˙ = 0, we obtain
eo = φ =
µ
(1− ρ)µ+ ρ. (4.21)
If e = φ = eo, the labor markets are in equilibrium and do not exert any pressures on
the dynamics of wages and prices, so that pˆ = pio and wˆ = pio.
4.3.4 Closing the Model
For the model to be fully formulated an explicit specification of the nominal interest
rate dynamics is still needed. This in fact will be undertaken in the next section
following the work on optimal monetary policy by Svensson (1997) for the case of
two-country monetary union. However, in order to address the consequences of labor
markets asymmetries in a currency union for the efficiency of the monetary union’s
central bank (MUCB) policy in a preliminary manner, for starting a simple monetary
instrument rule of the form
iT = io + φpi(pˆav − pi∗) + φy(yav − y∗) (4.22)
is assumed, where io denotes the steady state nominal interest rate. pi∗ the inflation
target (which in the following will be assumed to be equal to steady state inflation
rate pio, and y∗ the target output (also assumed in the following to be equal to yo)).
As usual, φpi and φy represents the responsiveness of the monetary policy instrument
interest rate to deviations of inflation and output, respectively, from their target levels
(with φpi > 1 and φy ≥ 0).10
The monetary union’s target average inflation rate pˆav (which in the case of the EMU
is the aggregate Monetary Union Index of Consumer Prices (MUICP)) and the average
output yav are given by
pˆav = λapˆa + (1− λa)pˆb (4.23)
yav = λaya + (1− λa)yb, (4.24)
where λa represents the weighting parameter for the member country a, which is nor-
mally given by the relative country size of the respective economy in the monetary
union.
10 In the dynamic simulation of the next section, however, we will set φy = 0 in order to be consistent
with the rest of this chapter, where only the strict inflation targeting case is analyzed.
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With respect to the nominal interest rate dynamics an interest rate smoothing strategy
by the MUCB with a strength given by αi is assumed. By inserting iT and rearranging
terms the following dynamic law for the nominal interest rate can be obtained:
i˙ = −αi(i− io) + γip(pˆav − pio) + γiy(yav − yo) (4.25)
where we have γip = αiφpi, i.e., φpi = γip/αi and γiy = αiφy. Furthermore, the actual
(perfectly foreseen) rate of inflation pˆ is used to measure the inflation gap with respect
to the inflation target pio of the central bank.
Taken together, our two-country theoretical model consists of the three laws of motion
for each country and two linking laws of motion (of the nominal interest rate and of
the real exchange rate) which together form the following autonomous 8D dynamical
system
The Two-Country Model
e˙a = µa
(
ν(1− (1− ρ)ea) + (1− ν) (LD,a/L¯− (1− ρ)ea))− ρea
vˆa = κ [(1− κpw)βwe(ea − eao)− (1− κwp)βpy(ya − yo) + (κwz − 1)(1− κpw)gz]
p˙iac = βpicγ(pˆ
b − pic) + βpic(1− γ)(pˆa − pic)
i˙ = −αi(i− io) + γip(pˆav − pio) + γiy(yav − yo)
η˙ = pˆb − pˆa
e˙b = µb
(
ν(1− (1− ρ)eb) + (1− ν) (LD,b/L¯− (1− ρ)eb))− ρeb
vˆb = κ [(1− κpw)βwe(eb − ebo)− (1− κwp)βpy(yb − yo) + (κwz − 1)(1− κpw)gz]
p˙ibc = βpicγ(pˆ
b − pic) + βpic(1− γ)(pˆa − pic)
with LDt /L¯ = Y
D
t /Y
f , Y D/Y f = 1 + yD and
yD,a = αy(ya − yo)− αyr(i− pˆa + (io − pio))− αyv(va − vo) + αuηη
yD,b = αy(yb − yo)− αyr(i− pˆb + (io − pio))− αyv(vb − vo)− αuηη
pˆj = κ
[
βpy(yj − yo) + κpw(βwe(φjyj − φj))
]
+ pic for j = a,b
It should be pointed out that due to the formulation of our model and the role that
labor market frictions play in it, the degree of labor markets rigidity affects the output
determination in a twofold manner: In the first place, through the restrictions they
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impose concerning the level of output the firms can actually produce; and in the second
place, due to the effect they have on the reduced form of the price Phillips curve
described by eq.(4.19). Concerning this second channel (the real interest rate), note
that, through our formulation of the reduced form Phillips curve equation to be inserted
in eq.(4.9) price inflation is determined not only by the goods, but also by the labor
market situations and the weighting coefficients of both wage and price Phillips curves
equations concerning the cross-over expectations mechanism.
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Fig. 4.1: The Two-Country Model Structure
4.3.5 One-Size-Fits-All Monetary Policy and Asymmetric Monetary
Policy Effects
In order to highlight the role of labor markets asymmetry in the effectiveness of mon-
etary policy in a currency union and to motivate the discussion of country-specific
inflation targeting of the next section, two basic shock scenarios are analyzed in the
following: In the first scenario the dynamic adjustments of the two economies to an
identical aggregate demand shock are investigated, and in the second scenario the effect
of a nominal interest rate shock by the MUCB for the dynamics of the two members
economies is analyzed. In both scenarios the two economies are assumed to be identi-
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cal in all aspects, with the only exception being the parameter µ, which represents the
asymmetry in the degree of labor market rigidity.11
In a similar manner to the ECB practice, the weighting of the individual national price
inflation rates in the MUCB’s target variable pˆav is oriented to the relative economic
size of the individual economies within the monetary union. Given that the same
economic size of both economies is assumed in this chapter, the country weighting is
simply λa = 0.5, despite of the different degrees of labor market flexibility assumed for
both economies.
For the following dynamic simulations the following parameter values are used: Concer-
Tab. 4.1: Baseline calibration parameters
Labor Markets α µ (a) µ (b) ρ ν
0.70 1 0.6 0.1 0.4
Goods Markets αyy αyr αyv
0.7 0.05 0.1
Wage Phillips Curve βwe κwp 1− κwp
0.510 0.420 0.580
Price Phillips Curve βwe κwp 1− κwp
0.210 0.550 0.450
Standard Taylor Rule φpi φy
1.5 0.0
ning the labor markets, in country a the matching technology factor is µa = 0.8 and
in country b µb = 0.6 (Christoffel and Linzert (2006) choose µ = 0.4). For the job
separation rate ρ (exogenously given in this model), a value of 0.1 was chosen, which
is consistent with the empirical findings (on quarterly frequency) by Hall (1995, 2005)
and Shimer (2005). For the choice of the weighting parameter of the linear search and
matching function ν, a lower value (ν = 0.2) is set than in Walsh (2005), where the
corresponding Cobb-Douglas parameter equals 0.4. For the choice of the parameters
αyy, αyr and αyv in the goods markets equation, we rely on the system GMM parameter
estimates of Proan˜o, Flaschel, Ernst and Semmler (2006) and Franke et al. (2006), which
are consistent with other studies as Goodhart and Hofmann (2005) who also perform
11 It should be clear to the reader that for the case of identical member countries, union-wide oriented
monetary policy would have exactly the same effects across all country members. For the case of being
optimally designed, it would be optimal for both countries.
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system GMM estimations of Phillips curve and IS equations, including however also
expected values of future variables in their specification. Concerning the parameters
in the wage and price Phillips curve equations (assumed to be equal across all labor
market specifications), we also use the empirical parameter estimates obtained for the
U.S. economy by Proan˜o, Flaschel, Ernst and Semmler (2006) and Franke et al. (2006).
For starters, Figure 4.2 shows the dynamic adjustments to a symmetric one-percent
aggregate demand shock in the two economies.
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Fig. 4.2: Impulse-response functions to an identical one-percent aggregate demand shock in
both countries a and b (annualized data, in quarters, percent values)
As it can be observed, despite the fact that the aggregate demand shock is identical in
both economies and that both economies are controlled by the same monetary policy
rule, the asymmetry in the national labor markets (modeled by different numerical
values of the matching technology factor µ) leads to a differentiated shock processing
in both economies. The reaction of employment, output and wage and price inflation in
economy b (which features the more rigid labor market) is of a much lower dimension
but nevertheless larger persistence than in economy a.
Interesting is also the reaction of the log real exchange rate between both economies
η = ln(pb/pa). As it can be observed in the last panel of Figure 4.2, a symmetric ag-
gregate demand shock in both economies leads, through the larger reaction of country
a’s output and inflation (and wages and prices), to an initial deterioration of its rela-
tive competitiveness position with respect to country b. This development is however
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reversed over time due to the longer deviation of b from baseline resulting from the
higher degree of rigidity of its labor market.
The same qualitative responses can be observed in the second scenario where the dy-
namic responses of economies a and b to a one-percent monetary shock by the MUCB
are simulated.
5 10 15 20−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Interest Rate
Country A
Country B
5 10 15 20−0.025
−0.02
−0.015
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
Employment Rate
Country A
Country B
5 10 15 20−0.025
−0.02
−0.015
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
Output Gap
Country A
Country B
5 10 15 20−0.1
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
Price Inflation
Country A
Country B
5 10 15 20−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
Wage Inflation
Country A
Country B
5 10 15 20−5
0
5
10
15x 10
−3 Real Exchange Rate
Fig. 4.3: Impulse-response functions to a one-percent monetary policy shock by the MUCB
for economies A and B (annualized data, in quarters, percent values)
In this second case depicted in Figure 4.3, the reaction of all macroeconomic variables
in the more flexible economy a is again larger and its return to baseline faster than in
economy b. As in the previous case, this asymmetry not only in the initial reaction but
also in the persistence effect leads to a shift in the relative competitiveness between the
two economies which is in fact of larger duration than the individual reactions of wage
and price inflation in a and b, as it can be observed in the last panel of Figure 4.3.
It should be noted that that no interest rate smoothing term was included in the mon-
etary policy rule of the MUCB, and that these simple simulations underlie one-time
shocks which were not assumed to exhibit any autocorrelation. Under this perspective,
the significant and persistent shift in the relative competitiveness of the two economies
highlight the importance that asymmetries between the national labor markets of cur-
rency union members have for the effectiveness of monetary policy in such a macroe-
conomic environment. Furthermore, these dynamic simulations open up the question
whether a MUCB should indeed take into account these asymmetries when conducting
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monetary policy. In the next section we attempt to shed some light on this issue.
4.4 Inflation Targeting in Monetary Unions
As previously stated, the aim of this section is to conceptualize an optimal monetary
policy rule which would take into account the structural differences of the member
countries of a monetary union. This idea is not new; Beningno (2004), for example,
shows within a DSGE framework that in a currency area with countries featuring dif-
ferent degrees of nominal rigidity (represented by a longer staggering period in the price
setting), an inflation targeting policy in which a higher weight is put on the inflation of
the country with the highest degree of nominal rigidity is nearly optimal. Alternatively,
Lombardo (2006) focuses on the role of product market competition for the design of
monetary policy. He concludes that ceteris paribus, the welfare-maximizing central
bank should react more aggressively to the inflation pressure generated by the more
competitive economy. Beetsma and Jensen (2005), on the contrary, while assuming that
monetary policy is oriented solely on currency union aggregate developments, focus on
the role of fiscal policy as the main equilibrating mechanism against macroeconomic
asymmetry among the member economies.
In contrast to the previous section, where the dynamics of the nominal interest rate
were modeled through a simple instrument rule obeying the inflation gap solely, in this
section the interest rate will be the result of an optimizing targeting rule. This differ-
entiation is not trivial. As stated in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), an instrument
rule is a rule which expresses the monetary policy instrument as an explicit function of
available information. A targeting rule, in contrast, underlies an explicit loss function
over the deviations of a specific goal from a target level which is assigned to the central
bank, being thus only implicitly an instrument rule.
The explicit formulation of a loss function of the monetary authorities represents in fact
the main advantage of targeting rules over instrument rules, since they provide some
metrics for the analysis of the dynamic adjustments of the model to shocks. It should
be noted, however, that these metrics do not need to underlie an explicit formulation of
the agents’ and firms’ utility and profit maximization problems, in contrast for example
to Woodford (2003, p.382) states: “An important advantage of using a model founded
upon private-sector optimization to analyze the consequences of alternative policy rules
is that there is a natural welfare criterion in the context of such a model, provided by
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the preferences of private agents, which are displayed in the structural relations that
determine the effects of alternative policies.” This reasoning, though appealing at first
sight, is based on three questionable assumptions: First, that the economy’s welfare
can indeed be comprised in terms of representative agents’ and firm’ utility and profit
functions, ignoring the heterogeneity and interest conflicts which come about in the real
world. Second, even if the previous assumption would actually be true, this statement
requires the monetary policy authorities to actually know the exact specification of such
a utility function, something that is highly unrealistic to assume and lastly, that the
preferences of the private sector in fact coincide with those of the monetary authorities.
Due to these and other critical issues, we stick here to the rather descriptive approach
pursued throughout this dissertation. We thus focus in the following on an ad hoc loss
function of the central monetary authorities as for example done in Svensson (1997).
In the following we assume that the central bank’s objective in period t is to choose a
sequence of current and future nominal interest rates {iT}∞s=t so as to minimize
Et
∞∑
s=t
δs−tL(pˆTs ) (4.26)
where Et denotes expectations conditional upon (the central bank’s) information avail-
able in year t, the discount factor δ fulfills 0 < δ < 1, pˆTt is the inflation rate targeted
by the MUCB (to be defined below); and the period loss function L(pˆTt ) is
L(pˆTt ) = λpi(pˆTt − pi∗)2 (4.27)
As observed in eq.(4.27), a strict inflation forecast targeting regime is assumed here,
since the loss function of the MUCB only comprises the deviation of the inflation
rate from its target level. Due to the implicit focus of this chapter on the EMU,
this specification seems to be appropriate since it describes a systematic conduction of
monetary policy which comprises literally the mandate of the European Central Bank as
determined by Article 105 of the Maastricht Treaty, whereafter “the primary objective
of the ESCB [European System of Central Banks] is to maintain price stability.”12
Due to the fact that the nominal interest rate affects price inflation with a two-period
lag, it is possible to find the optimal nominal interest rate at t (which would allow the
12 This quote, however, goes on as following: “Without prejudice of the objective of price stability
the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing
to the achievement of the objectives of the Community [. . . ].”
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economy to hit the inflation forecast of t+2) as the solution of the following simplified
problem (see Svensson (1997))
min
it
Etδ
2L(pˆTt+2)
with the corresponding first-order-condition
∂Etδ
2L(pˆTt+2)
∂it
= Et
[
2λpi(pˆTt+2 − pi∗)
∂pˆTt+2
∂it
]
.
As demonstrated in Svensson (1999, p.618), due to the certainty-equivalence that holds
in linear models with quadratic loss functions and additive shocks, the stochastic opti-
mization problem of minimizing the expected loss function over future random target
variables is equivalent to the deterministic problem of minimizing the deterministic loss
function over the deterministic paths of conditional forecasts of the target variables.
Due to this, we can reformulate the minimization problem of the central monetary
authorities in terms of the two-period ahead inflation forecast
min
it
δ2L(pˆTt+2| t) (4.28)
with the first-order-condition
∂δ2L(pˆTt+2| t)
∂it
=
[
2λpi(pˆTt+2| t − pi∗)
∂pˆTt+2| t
∂it
]
. (4.29)
From eq.(4.29) it follows that
pˆTt+2| t = pi
∗. (4.30)
According to eq.(4.30), the MUCB is thus supposed to set the nominal interest rate
so as to lead the forecast of price inflation two periods ahead to be equal to its target
inflation rate level. In the following the performance of two different specifications for
pˆT.
4.4.1 Alternative I: Inflation Targeting of Average Developments
For starters we analyze the case where the MUCB, using as its target variable the
country-size weighted average monetary union price inflation rate
pˆT = pˆav = λapˆa + (1− λa)pˆb,
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would conduct its monetary policy based on the simple average inflation and output de-
velopments of both economies a and b (to be again denoted by pˆav and yav, respectively,
for average).13
The central bank looks thus to minimize the expected sum of discounted squared future
deviations of inflation from the target level subject to
pˆavt+1 = κ [βpy(y
av
t − yo) + κpw(βwe(φavyavt − φavo ))] + ²pt+1 (4.31)
yavt+1 = µ
av(φav)−1
[
ν (1− (1− ρ)φavyavt ) + (1− ν)
(
1 + yav,dt+1 − (1− ρ)φavyavt
)]
+(1− ρ)yavt (4.32)
with φav = eavo = λae
a
o + (1− λa)ebo, eavt = φavyavt and
yD,avt+1 = λay
D,a
t+1 + (1− λa)yD,bt+1
= αyyavt − αyr(it − pˆavt+1 − (io − pio))− αyv(vav − vo) + ²yt+1 (4.33)
being ²pt+1 and ²
y
t+1 i.i.d. errors.
Note that due to the symmetry concerning the parameters in eq.(4.11) in both countries
a and b and the equal weights of both economies resulting from their same economic
size, the term concerning the real exchange rate η and therefore the relative competi-
tiveness between the two economies disappears in eq.(4.33). This type of aggregation,
as we will see below, will have important consequences for the effectiveness of this
baseline monetary policy strategy.
Using (4.30) we obtain the following expression
pi∗ = κ
[
βpy(yavt+1| t − yo) + κpw(βwe(φavyavt+1| t − eavo ))
]
. (4.34)
In order for eq.(4.34) to hold, the MUCB has to set the optimal nominal interest rate
i∗t at time t so that, at t+ 1, the output level is equal to
yav,optt+1 =
βpyyo + βweκpwφav + pi∗/κ
βpy + βweκpwφav
. (4.35)
Inserting eqs.(4.31), (4.32) and (4.33) into (4.35) and solving for iav,optt leads (after some
13 Note that we have assumed two economies of identical economic size.
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algebra) to
iav,optt = io − pi∗ + (α−1yr αyy + βpyκ)(yavt − yo) + βweκpwκφav(yavt − 1)
+
βpyφ
av((1− ρ)(1− µav)yavt − yo) + βweκpwφav((1− ρ)(1− µav)φavyavt − φav)
αyr(1− ν)(βpy + βweκpwφav)µav
+
(βpy + βweκpwφav)µav − φavpi∗/κ
αyr(1− ν)(βpy + βweκpwφav)µav − α
−1
i αyv(v
av
t − vo) (4.36)
As it can be observed, despite the simplicity of the model and the fact that output does
not enter explicitly into the loss function of the central bank, the determination of the
– under an inflation forecast targeting regime – “optimal” nominal interest rate is of
a significant complexity. Due to our specification of the wage and price inflation and
labor market dynamics there are actually three “gaps” which, being the determinants
of aggregate demand and of wage and price inflation, have to be taken into account by
the central bank14 in order to fulfill its minimization problem: the goods market gap
(yav−yo), the labor markets gap eav−eavo and the wage share gap vavt −vo. Additionally,
eq.(4.36) shows that, in the circumstance that the MUCB knows the nature and struc-
ture of the employment function, its structural coefficients (more precisely, the average
of both economies) also determine the optimal interest rate level. However, as previ-
ously discussed, due to the stage at which the aggregation of the member economies
takes place, the relative competitiveness between them is not taken into account in
eq.(4.36).
4.4.2 Alternative II: Inflation Targeting of Country-Specific
Developments
As previously stated, in the one-country-one-currency case under a strict inflation fore-
cast targeting regime the instrument interest rate is to be set so that the two-period
ahead (due to the assumed transmission lag) inflation forecast equals the goal infla-
tion rate set by the central bank. In a monetary union, however, the MUCB has to
take into account all the price inflation developments in the member countries, being
its target variable at the end of the day a weighted average of the member countries’
national inflation rates as in the previous section. The natural question that arises is:
How should these weights be determined? Is economic size (as in the baseline case just
discussed and as actually practiced by the ECB) the best criterion, or should a MUCB
14 but just to the extent that these would affect the forecast of inflation two periods ahead.
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rather take into account other structural factors such as the different degrees of labor
market rigidity in the member countries? And at which stage should this aggregation
take place?
The main proposal of this chapter is that a MUCB should take into account and ex-
plicitly weight the individual, country-specific structural factors and developments of
the respective countries in its loss function. This strategy would act in a more welfare-
enhancing manner than in the case where only the relative economic size of the mem-
ber economies is the only relevant criterion for the country weighting as previously
discussed.
In order to prove this hypothesis, the period loss function of the central monetary
authorities is re-expressed for the two-country monetary union case (with pˆfw denoting
the flexibly weighted monetary union price inflation) as
L(pˆfw) = λpi(λfwa pˆat + (1− λfwa )pˆbt − pi∗)2 (4.37)
subject to
pˆat+1 = κ [βpy(y
a
t − yo) + κpw(βwe(φayat − φa))] + ²pt+1 (4.38)
yat+1 =
[
µa(ν (1− (1− ρ)φayat ) + (1− ν)(1 + yd,at+1 − (1− ρ)φayat ))
+(1− ρ)φayat ] /φa (4.39)
pˆbt+1 = κ [βpy(y
b
t − yo) + κpw(βwe(φbybt − φb))] + ²pt+1 (4.40)
ybt+1 =
[
µb(ν (1− (1− ρ)φbybt ) + (1− ν)(1 + yd,bt+1 − (1− ρ)φbybt ))
+(1− ρ)φbybt ] /φb (4.41)
with
yD,at+1 = αy(y
a
t − yo)− αyr(it − pˆat+1 − (io − pio))− αyv(vat − vo) + αηηt + ²yt+1 (4.42)
yD,bt+1 = αy(y
b
t − yo)− αyr(it − pˆbt+1 − (io − pio))− αyv(vbt − vo)− αηηt + ²yt+1 (4.43)
being ²pt+1 and ²
y
t+1 again i.i.d. errors.
Analogously to the simple average inflation targeting case discussed in the previous
section, the first-order condition for the (simplified) minimization problem of the MUCB
is
∂δ2L(pˆfwt+2| t)
∂it
=
[
2λpi(λfwa pˆ
a
t+2| t + (1− λfwa )pˆbt+2| t − pi∗)
∂pˆfwt+2| t
∂it
]
= 0, (4.44)
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implying
pi∗ = λfwa κ
[
βpy(yat+1| t − yo) + κpw(βwe(φayat+1| t − φa))
]
(1− λfwa )κ
[
βpy(ybt+1| t − yo) + κpw(βwe(φbybt+1| t − φb))
]
(4.45)
Solving eq.(4.45) for it subject to (4.38)–(4.41) – inserting (4.42) and (4.43) accordingly
– delivers an analogous expression of the instrument interest rate in the average inflation
targeting- for the country-specific inflation targeting case, now indeed with an explicit
inclusion of the individual developments of both economies, namely
ifw,optt = io − pi∗ +
1
αyr(1− ν)(λfwa βapw + (1− λfwa )βbpw)[
(1− ν)(αyy + αyrβpyκ)(λfwa βapw(yat − yo) + (1− λfwa )βbpw(ybt − yo))
+(1− ν)βweκpwαyrκ(λfwa βapw(φayat − φa) + (1− λfwa )βbpw(φbybt − φb))
+φaφbβpy((1− ρ)(λfwa (1− µa)yat + (1− λfwa )(1− µb)ybt )− yo)
+φaφbβweκpw((1− ρ)(λfwa (1− µa)φayat + (1− λfwa )(1− µb)φbybt )− (λfwa φa + (1− λfwa )φb))
−(1− ν)αyv(λfwa βapw(vat − vo)− (1− λfwa )βbpw(vbt − vo)) + αyη(λfwa βapw − (1− λfwa )βbpw) ηt
+βpy(λfwa µ
aφb + (1− λfwa )µbφa) + φaφb(βweκpw(λfwa µa + (1− λfwa )µb)− pi∗/κ)
]
(4.46)
with
βapw = (βpy + βweκpwφ
a)µaφb and βbpw = (βpy + βweκpwφ
b)µbφa.
Alternatively to eq.(4.36) – which shows the optimal nominal interest rate under in-
flation forecast targeting for the case where the MUCB responded only to average
(monetary union-wide) inflation developments – the solution for the optimal nominal
interest rate given by eq.(4.46) shows that in the case where the MUCB takes into ac-
count the country-specific developments of a monetary union characterized by national
labor markets with different degrees of labor market flexibility, all structural factors
of both economies (and not simply their averages) enter explicitly into the nominal
interest rate expression. But beyond this, eq.(4.46) takes also into account the relative
competitiveness between a and b (expressed by the term αyη(αyr(1− ν))−1ηt).
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Note that for λfwa = 1, eq.(4.46) reduces to
ifw,optt = io − pi∗ +
1
αyr(1− ν)βapw[
(1− ν)(αyy + αyrβpyκ)βapw(yat − yo) + (1− ν)βweκpwαyrκβapw(φayat − φa)
+φaφbβpy((1− ρ)(1− µa)yat − yo) + φaφbβweκpw((1− ρ)(1− µa)φayat − φa)
+βpyµaφb + φaφb(βweκpwµa − pi∗/κ)− (1− ν)αyvβapw(vat − vo) + αyηβapw ηt
]
= io − pi∗ + (α−1yr αyy + βpyκ)(yat − yo) + βweκpwκ(φayat − φa)
+
φaβpy((1− ρ)(1− µa)yat − yo) + φaβweκpw((1− ρ)(1− µa)φayat − φa)
αyr(1− ν)(βpy + βweκpwφa)µa
+
(βpy + βweκpwφa)µa − φapi∗/κ
αyr(1− ν)(βpy + βweκpwφa)µa − α
−1
yr αyv(v
a
t − vo) + (αyr(1− ν))−1αyη ηt, (4.47)
and equivalently, for λfwa = 0,
15
ifw,optt = io − pi∗ + (α−1yr αyy + βpyκ)(ybt − yo) + βweκpwκ(φbybt − φb)
+
φbβpy((1− ρ)(1− µb)ybt − yo) + φbβweκpw((1− ρ)(1− µb)φbybt − φb)
αyr(1− ν)(βpy + βweκpwφb)µb
+
(βpy + βweκpwφb)µb − φbpi∗/κ
αyr(1− ν)(βpy + βweκpwφb)µb − α
−1
yr αyv(v
b
t − vo)− (αyr(1− ν))−1αyη ηt. (4.48)
Eq.(4.46), as well as the special cases described by eqs.(4.47) and (4.48), show the ad-
vantage of the explicit incorporation of the individual structural factors of the member
countries of a monetary union in the loss function of the MUCB. As eq.(4.46) demon-
strates, this alternative specification of the MUCB’s monetary policy conduction allows
for a more precise control of the macroeconomic dynamics in the individual countries
by an appropriate management of the country-weighting parameter λfwa .
Note that in contrast to eq.(4.36), which came about under the assumption that, due
to the almost perfect symmetry between country a and b, in the average aggregate
demand – given by eq.(4.33) – of the two countries can be expressed as
yav,dt+1 = αyy
av
t − αyr(it − pˆavt+1 − (io − pio)) + ²yt+1,
the log real exchange rate η = ln(pb/pa) was canceled out, in eqs. (4.48) and (4.47)
even in the case where λfwa = 0.5, the term concerning ηt does not disappear from the
optimal interest rate equation.
15 In the appendix of this chapter the dynamic responses of all variables in the economy to an aggregate
demand shock according to eq.(4.36) for λfwa = 0.5, as well as to eq.(4.46) for the cases λ
fw
a = 0 and
λfwa = 1 are depicted.
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As we will see in the next section, this difference concerning the stage at which the
aggregation of the inflation and output developments of the member economies takes
place as well as the choice of the country-weights in the MUCB’s loss function, will turn
out to be by no means trivial for the dynamics and effectiveness of monetary policy in
a common currency area.
4.4.3 Dynamic Adjustments under Alternative Weighting Schemes
It should intuitive that for the case where both countries are perfectly identical – also
in their degree of labor market rigidity –, the solution and dynamics of both economies
under inflation targeting in the average- and the country-specific cases are equivalent for
any value of the country weight λfwa , since, given the symmetry of both countries, both
strategies are equally efficient at the country level. Therefore solely the case where the
two member countries feature a different degree of labor market rigidity, with µa > µb,
will be analyzed here.
For starters and in order to clarify the effects of an alternative country-weighting for the
dynamics of both countries, Figure 4.4 shows the deviations of the dynamic responses
to a symmetric aggregate demand shock in both economies resulting under an MUCB
instrument rule with pˆT = 0.5pˆa + 0.5pˆb from those which would occur if each country
would be controlled by its own instrument rule (that is, λfwa = 0 for country b and
λfwa = 1 for country a in eq.(4.22)). The sum of the two is shown in the third graph
column.
As it can be observed, such a MUCB instrument rule is sub-optimal for both member
economies for all values of λfwa > 0. So we can see that for λ
fw
a < 0.5, while the more
flexible economy (here country a) is subjected to an insufficient reaction by the policy
instrument of the MUCB, the more rigid economy (country b) experiences an excessive
tightening of its real interest rate.
In Figure 4.5, in contrast, the dynamic responses in the flexible weighting, country-
specific inflation targeting case are illustrated as deviations from the individual, country-
specific optimal paths (which would take place in the one-country-one-currency case,
that is, where λfwa = 1 and λ
fw
a = 0 in eq.(4.36), respectively). By and large the same
qualitative individual behavior after some quarters as in the standard instrument rule
case can be observed (with positive deviations of price inflation and output in country
a and the opposite holding for country b). However, in the first quarters following the
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Fig. 4.4: Price Inflation and Output Responses under Standard Instrument Rule (Deviations
from Country-Specific Instrument Rule Responses)
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Fig. 4.5: Inflation and Output Responses under Flexibly-Weighted Inflation Targeting (Devi-
ations from Optimal Country-Specific Paths)
symmetric aggregate demand shock in a and b both price inflation and output react
the oppositive way in the two countries. This results from the determination of the
optimal interest rate for country a (country b), and shows thus the inadequacy of the
4.4. Inflation Targeting in Monetary Unions 133
respective optimal policies for the other economies.
The cumulated absolute deviations of the price inflation rates in the member economies
a and b from their respective optimal paths – which could be considered as proxies
for the welfare decrease which the entrance into a monetary union and the loss of an
independent monetary policy represent for the joining countries – for the two alternative
inflation targeting rules are illustrated in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.6.
Tab. 4.2: Welfare Losses at Different Horizons (Cumulated Absolute Deviations, in percent)
Horizon Country-Specific Inflation Targeting Average Inflation Targeting
(Quarters) λfwa Country A Country B MU Country A Country B MU
4
0.1 0.0893 0.0465 0.0679 0.1243 0.0138 0.0690
0.2 0.0856 0.0468 0.0662 0.1072 0.0268 0.0670
0.3 0.0817 0.0489 0.0653 0.0911 0.0390 0.0651
0.4 0.0776 0.0522 0.0649 0.0759 0.0506 0.0632
0.5 0.0734 0.0554 0.0644 0.0615 0.0615 0.0615
0.6 0.0689 0.0586 0.0638 0.0479 0.0718 0.0599
0.7 0.0643 0.0617 0.0630 0.0350 0.0817 0.0583
0.8 0.0595 0.0648 0.0621 0.0227 0.0910 0.0568
0.9 0.0545 0.0679 0.0612 0.0110 0.0998 0.0554
8
0.1 0.1380 0.0991 0.1185 0.1896 0.0199 0.1048
0.2 0.1350 0.0992 0.1171 0.1684 0.0391 0.1037
0.3 0.1318 0.1005 0.1162 0.1490 0.0575 0.1032
0.4 0.1284 0.1025 0.1155 0.1289 0.0751 0.1020
0.5 0.1249 0.1039 0.1144 0.1082 0.0920 0.1001
0.6 0.1211 0.1046 0.1128 0.0870 0.1082 0.0976
0.7 0.1172 0.1047 0.1109 0.0655 0.1237 0.0946
0.8 0.1130 0.1043 0.1087 0.0438 0.1386 0.0912
0.9 0.1087 0.1034 0.1060 0.0219 0.1547 0.0883
12
0.1 0.2070 0.1093 0.1581 0.2544 0.0222 0.1383
0.2 0.2057 0.1100 0.1579 0.2290 0.0442 0.1366
0.3 0.2037 0.1118 0.1578 0.2046 0.0657 0.1352
0.4 0.2010 0.1141 0.1575 0.1788 0.0874 0.1331
0.5 0.1917 0.1150 0.1562 0.1516 0.1092 0.1304
0.6 0.1931 0.1149 0.1540 0.1231 0.1310 0.1271
0.7 0.1880 0.1142 0.1511 0.0936 0.1529 0.1233
0.8 0.1821 0.1126 0.1474 0.0632 0.1749 0.1191
0.9 0.1755 0.1103 0.1429 0.0319 0.1988 0.1154
Both show in a quite clear manner the advantages of the country-specific inflation
targeting strategy, and especially of the endogenization of the instrument interest rate
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Fig. 4.6: Price Inflation Responses under Flexibly-Weighted, Country-Specific Inflation Tar-
geting (Cumulated Absolute Deviations from Optimal Country-Specific Paths)
as a function of the country weighting parameter λfwa compared to the average inflation
targeting strategy. So it can be clearly observed in Figure 4.6 in the first place that while
in the average inflation targeting case the control of inflation and output developments
of the individual member countries by the choice of the weighting parameter λa is
not possible anymore, alternative II provides the MUCB enough flexibility to focus
eventually on individual price inflation and output developments, taking however the
trade-off of such a handling into account (namely the increase in the welfare loss of the
other country). In the second place, both Table 4.2 and Figure 4.6 show that at all
analyzed horizons the proxy for welfare loss concerning the whole monetary union –
represented by the average of the cumulated absolute deviations of price inflation from
the respective optimal country-specific paths in the two member economies – under
alternative II is strictly lower than under alternative I, primarily due to the explicit
incorporation of the relative competitiveness between the two member economies in
the optimal nominal interest rate expression. And finally, they also highlight the fact
that a value of λa close to one (a higher weight of the more flexible country a in the
MUCB loss function) seems to dominate all other weighting schemes in the respective
alternatives at all horizons.
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4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter the conduction of monetary policy in a monetary union with asymmetric
labor markets such as the euro area was analyzed. Using the strict inflation targeting
approach introduced by Svensson (1997), it was possible to derive an analytical solu-
tion for the optimal instrument interest rate which was intended to stabilize the price
inflation dynamics at both the country-specific and the monetary union-level under two
different specifications of the loss function of the MUCB. While in the first specifica-
tion the MUCB focused on the average developments of the monetary union (not only
concerning inflation but also all other macroeconomic variables), in the second specifi-
cation the MUCB responded to the individual developments of the member economies,
with inflation rates and all other variables entering explicitly in its loss function.
The simulated dynamic responses to a symmetric aggregate demand shock highlighted
the advantages of an explicit endogenization of the instrument interest rate as a func-
tion of the country-weight λfwa and therefore of the country-specific developments in the
MUCB loss function. Under such a specification, the MUCB would be capable of even-
tually addressing country-specific developments by the adequate choice of the country
weight in a more efficient manner than in the simple average case. Additionally, it
could be shown that the first strategy was able to attain a lower welfare loss precisely
due to the explicit accounting of the individual country developments and specially of
the relative competitiveness between the union member countries.
The implications of this analysis are quite relevant for actual policy-making. They
open up the question whether an alternative, time-varying accounting of the individual
member countries of a currency union such as the EMU would indeed be more welfare
enhancing that the targeting of the simple average inflation in the monetary union as
long as not only of the national labor markets, as it was the case here, but also of
macroeconomic characteristics in the member economies significantly differ from each
other. Indeed, if the main goal of the MUCB is to stabilize (minimize) price inflation
at the monetary union level, an exclusive focussing on the developments of the most
flexible country (where inflation reacts more strongly to shocks) would be the optimal
strategy to follow in the limit. However, whether the exclusive focussing on price
inflation (and not on employment) at the monetary union level is the strategy which
would indeed maximize welfare is still a question to be answered.
Appendix A
The Baseline Impulse-Response Functions under Optimal
Monetary Policy
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Fig. 4.7: Individual Inflation and Output Responses under Individual Inflation Targeting (De-
viations from Responses under Union-Wide Optimal Monetary Policy)
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Part II
Gradual Wage-Price Adjustments and Exchange Rate
Fluctuations in Open Economies

5. Heterogenous Expectations, FX Fluctuations and
Macroeconomic Stability
5.1 Introduction
During the last decade and especially after the prominent contribution by Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995), an important paradigm change concerning the theoretical modeling
approach of open-economy issues has taken place. After the long-lasting predomi-
nance of Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch type of models in the academic as well as in the
more policy-oriented literature, the so-called “New Open Economy Macroeconomics”
approach has become the workhorse for open-economy issues in recent years.
As in their closed-economy DSGE counterparts, such as the ones discussed in Blan-
chard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Erceg et al. (2000), a central feature in these type of
models is the assumption of rational expectations. However, even though theoretically
appealing, the notion of fully rational agents is still quite controversial in the academic
literature, and especially in the literature on nominal exchange rate dynamics. As
pointed out e.g. by De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005), efficient markets rational expec-
tations models are unable to match empirical data on foreign exchange (hereafter FX)
rate fluctuations as well as the occurrence of speculative bubbles, herding behavior and
runs. “Non-rational” models, that is models which feature economic agents with het-
erogenous beliefs, attitudes or trading schemes, seem much more successful in this task.
Such models, however, often constrain themselves on the analysis of the FX markets
and do not analyze the effects of such non-rational behavior by FX market participants
for the dynamics stability at the macroeconomic level.
In this chapter an attempt is made to fill in this gap by setting up a two-country
semi-structural macroeconomic model with a foreign exchange market consisting of
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two types of traders with different beliefs concerning the future development of the
nominal exchange rate: fundamentalists and chartists. As the model is formulated, it
reacts to disequilibrium situations in both goods and labor markets in a sluggish manner
primarily due to the gradual adjustment of nominal wages and prices to such situations.
This is the first logical step for the understanding of real effects of monetary and fiscal
policy in economies which are highly interrelated with each other through a variety
of markets and channels, when the general equilibrium requirement is abandoned and
instead the view is accepted that markets rather adjust to disequilibrium situations in
a gradual manner.
To do so the theoretical disequilibrium model of AS-AD growth investigated in Chen,
Chiarella, Flaschel and Semmler (2006) and Proan˜o, Flaschel, Ernst and Semmler
(2006) is reformulated for the case of two large open economies, first each in isola-
tion and then in their interaction as two subsystems within a large closed dynamical
system. The proposed model structure is similar in spirit to the two-country KMG
model considered in Asada, Chiarella, Flaschel and Franke (2006), but is appropriately
simplified in order to have a framework more suitable for empirical estimation and also
for the study of the role of contemporary interest rate policy rules.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as following: In section 5.2 the theoretical
two-country semi-structural framework for the case of an open economy is described.
Section 5.3 integrates two open economies and discusses in more detail the linking
channels between both economies, as well as the dynamics of the nominal exchange
rate (the financial link) and the steady state conditions. In that section the model
is also estimated and the resulting dynamic adjustments of the variables from the
calibrated model are compared with some stylized facts from previous VAR studies
on open economies. In section 5.4 the consequences of wage and price flexibility, of
monetary policy as well as of the structure in the foreign exchange markets for the
stability of the dynamical system are investigated by means of eigen-value analysis.
Section 5.5 draws some concluding remarks from this chapter.
5.2 The Baseline Open-Economy Framework
In this section the closed economy, semi-structural macroeconomic model discussed
in Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel and Semmler (2006) is extended to a macroeconomic two-
country framework through the incorporation of trade, price and financial links between
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two similar economies with imperfectly flexible nominal wages and prices. Hereby
it is assumed that both economies have the same macroeconomic structure and are
additionally conducted with the same type of monetary policy. Therefore only the
structure of the domestic economy will be discussed in this section, denoting with the
superscript f foreign economy variables and assuming equivalent formulations for the
foreign economy (with the effect of the log real exchange rate η = s + ln(pf ) − ln(p)
adequately adjusted).
5.2.1 The Goods and Labor Markets
Concerning the real part of the economy, a semi-structural approach is pursued assum-
ing that the dynamics of output and employment can be summarized by the following
laws of motion:
uˆ = −αuu(u− uo)− αur(i− pˆ− (io − pio))− αuv(v − vo) + αuηη + αuuf uˆf (5.1)
eˆ = αeuˆuˆ− αev(v − vo) (5.2)
The first law of motion is of the type of a dynamic backward-looking open economy
IS-equation, here represented by the growth rate of the capacity utilization rate of
firms. Concerning the closed economy dimension, it has three important domestic
characteristics: (i) it reflects the dependence of output changes on aggregate income
and thus on the rate of capacity utilization by assuming a negative, i.e., stable dynamic
multiplier relationship in this respect; (ii) it shows the joint dependence of consumption
and investment on the domestic income distribution, which in the aggregate in principle
allows for positive or negative signs before the parameter αuv, depending on whether
consumption, investment or the next exports are more responsive to relative real wage
and wage share changes;1 and (iii) it incorporates the negative influence of the real rate
of interest on the evolution of economic activity. Additionally, in contrast to the closed
economy model discussed investigated in Proan˜o, Flaschel, Ernst and Semmler (2006)
(and also in Chapter 2 of this dissertation), we incorporate (iv) the positive effect of
foreign goods demand (proxied by the growth rate of capacity utilization in the foreign
economy) and (v) the positive influence of the deviation of the log real exchange rate
η = s+ ln(pf )− ln(p) (s being the log nominal exchange rate, which law of motion will
be defined below) from its PPP consistent steady state level ηo = 0.
1 We will, however, not engage into this debate here but rather adopt the most traditional view
according to which ∂uˆ/∂v is unambiguously negative.
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In the second law of motion, which describes the growth rate of the rate of employment,
we assume that the employment policy of firms follows – in the form of a generalized
Okun’s Law – the growth rate of capacity utilization (with a weight αeuˆ).2 Moreover,
we additionally assume that an increasing wage share has a negative influence on the
employment policy of firms. Employment is thus in particular assumed to adjust to the
level of current activity since this dependence can be shown to be equivalent to the use
of a term (u/u¯)αeuˆ when integrated, i.e., the form of Okun’s law in which this law was
originally specified by Okun (1970) himself.
5.2.2 The Wage-Price Dynamics
As for example Barro (1994) observes, perhaps the most important feature that theo-
retical Keynesian models should comprise is the existence of imperfectly flexible wages
as well as prices. This is a common characteristic between the approach pursued here
and advanced New Keynesian models such as Erceg et al. (2000) and Woodford (2003).
However, even though the resulting structural wage and price Phillips Curves equa-
tions of our approach resemble to a significant extent those included in those theoreti-
cal models, their theoretical foundations are completely different. Despite of assuming
monopolistic power in the price and wage ( ! ) setting of forward-looking, purely ra-
tional firms and households under a Calvo (1983) pricing scheme,3 our wage and price
inflation adjustment equations are based on the more descriptive structural approach
proposed by Chiarella and Flaschel (2000) and Chiarella et al. (2005). As previously
pointed out, this alternative framework of aggregate demand fluctuations, which allows
for under- (or over-)utilized labor as well as capital, is based on gradual adjustments
to disequilibrium situations of all real variables of the economy. By allowing for dis-
equilibria in both goods and labor markets, the dynamics of wages and prices can be
discussed separately from each other in their structural forms, assuming that both react
to their own measure of demand pressure, namely e− eo and u− uo, in the market for
2 Despite of being largely criticized due to its “lack of microfoundations”, in a large number of mi-
crofounded, “rational expectations”models such as Taylor(1994), Okun’s law is used to link production
with employment.
3 Recently, the overly unrealistic assumption in DSGE models as Erceg et al. (2000) of wages set by
the households in a monopolistic manner has been replaced through more realistic wage setting schemes
based on job search wage bargaining considerations by Trigari (2004) and Gertler and Trigari (2006).
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labor and for goods, respectively.4 Hereby e represents the rate of employment on the
labor market and by eo the NAIRU-equivalent level of this rate, and similarly by u the
rate of capacity utilization of the capital stock and by uo the normal rate of capacity
utilization of firms are denoted.
As in the previous chapters, the expectations in both wage and price Phillips curve are
modeled in a hybrid way, with crossover myopic perfect foresight (model-consistent)
expectations with respect to short-run wage and domestic price inflation on the one
hand and an adaptive updating inflation climate expression (symbolized by pic) con-
cerning the evolution of the CPI inflation (pˆc), on the other hand. Note that though
the specification our model features may not be rational, it nevertheless has model
consistent expectations concerning the evolution of the wage and price inflation and
also incorporates a similar degree of inertia obtained in New Keynesian models only
through also ad-hoc “rules-of-thumb” or price indexation assumptions.5
More specifically, concerning the wage Phillips curve it is assumed that the short-run
price level considered by workers in their wage negotiations is set by the producer,
so that producer price inflation gives the rate of inflation that is perfectly foreseen by
workers as their short-run cost-push term. Additionally, in order to incorporate the role
of import price inflation in the dynamics of the economy, we assume that the measure
that is taken by workers to judge the medium-run evolution of prices in their respective
economies is the Consumer Price Index, defined as
pc = pξ(Spf )1−ξ,
the geometric average of domestic and import prices – with pf being foreign price level
and S the nominal exchange rate.
Consequently, the CPI inflation pˆc includes both domestic inflation (with a specific
weight ξ) and imported goods price inflation (with weight 1− ξ), so that
pˆc = ξpˆ+ (1− ξ)(s˙+ pˆf ), (5.3)
with s = ln(S). Because of the uncertainty linked with nominal exchange rate move-
ments, we assume for both workers and firms’ decision taking processes, that CPI
4 As pointed out by Sims (1987), such strategy allows to circumvent the identification problem which
arises when both wage and price inflation equations have the same explanatory variables.
5 See e.g. Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) and Gal´ı et al. (2001).
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inflation is updated in an adaptive manner according to6
p˙ic = βpic(pˆc − pic) = βpicξ(pˆ− pic) + βpic(1− ξ)(pˆf + s˙− pic) (5.4)
We thereby arrive at the following two Phillips Curves for wage and price inflation,
which in this core version of Keynesian AS-AD dynamics are – from a qualitative
perspective – formulated in a fairly symmetric way.
The structural form of the wage-price dynamics is:
wˆ = βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo) + κwppˆ+ (1− κwp)pic + κwz zˆ, (5.5)
pˆ = βpu(u− uo) + βpv ln(v/vo) + κpw(wˆ − zˆ) + (1− κpw)pic, (5.6)
where zˆ denotes the growth rate of labor productivity (which we assume here just to
be equal to gz = zˆ = const. (gz denoting the trend labor productivity growth).
Note that as the wage-price mechanisms are formulated, the development of the CPI
inflation does not matter for the evolution of the domestic wage share v = (w/p)/z,
measured in terms of producer prices, the law of motion of which is given by (with
κ = 1/(1− κwpκpw)):
vˆ = κ [(1− κpw)fw(e, v)− (1− κwp)fp(u, v) + (κwz − 1)(1− κpw)gz] . (5.7)
with
fw(e, v) = βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo) and
fp(y, v) = βpu(u− uo) + βuv ln(v/vo)
which follows easily from the following obviously equivalent representation of the above
two Phillips Curves:
wˆ − pic = βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo) + κwp(pˆ− pic),
pˆ− pic = βpu(u− uo) + βpv ln(v/vo)) + κpw(wˆ − pic)
by solving for the variables wˆ− pic and pˆ− pic. It also implies the following two across-
6 In the empirical applications of this adaptive revision of the CPI inflation we will simply use a
moving average of the CPI inflation with linearly declining weights.
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markets or reduced form Phillips Curves:
wˆ = κ [βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo) + κwp(βpu(u− uo) + βpv ln(v/vo))
+(κwz − κwpκpw)gz] + pic,
pˆ = κ [βpu(u− uo) + βpv ln(v/vo) + κpw(βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo))
+κpw(κwz − 1)gz] + pic,
which represent a considerable generalization of the conventional view of a single-market
price PC with only one measure of demand pressure, that is the one in the labor market,
as used in the majority of New Keynesian models.
Eq.(5.7) shows the ambiguity of the stabilizing role of the real wage channel, already
discussed by Rose (1967) which arises – despite the incorporation of specific measures of
demand and cost pressure on both the labor and the goods markets – if the dynamics of
the employment rate and the workforce utilization are linked to the fluctuations of the
firms’ capacity utilization rate via Okun’s law. As already discussed in various places
throughout this dissertation, a real wage increase taken by itself can act in a stabilizing
or destabilizing manner. Its final effect will depend among others on whether the
dynamic of the capacity utilization rate depends positively or negatively on the real
wage (i.e. on whether consumption reacts more strongly to real wage changes than
investment and, in an open economy, net exports, or viceversa) and whether price
flexibility is greater than nominal wage flexibility with respect to their own demand
pressure measures.
5.2.3 Monetary Policy
As standard in modern macroeconomic models, we assume that money supply accom-
modates the interest rate policy pursued by the central bank and thus does not feedback
into the core laws of motion of the model. As interest rate policy we assume a classical
Taylor rule:
iT = io + φpi(pˆ− pio) + φy(u− uo). (5.8)
The target rate of the central bank iT is thus assumed to depend on the steady state
real rate of interest – augmented by actual inflation back to a nominal rate –, on the
inflation gap and on the capacity utilization gap (as a measure of the output gap). We
assume furthermore that the monetary authorities, when pursuing this target rate, do
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not react automatically but rather adjust to it in a smooth manner according to
i˙ = αii(iT − i), (5.9)
with αii determining the adjustment speed of the nominal interest rate.7 Inserting iT
in and rearranging terms we obtain from this expression the following dynamic law of
motion for the nominal interest rate
i˙ = −γii(i− io) + γip(pˆ− pio) + γiu(u− uo) (5.10)
where we have γii = αii, γip = αiiφpi, i.e., φpi = γip/αii and γiu = αiiφy.
5.2.4 The Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
As stated before, despite of the empirical inability of rational expectations models to
explain the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate, the majority of theoretical macroe-
conomic frameworks (and especially in the nowadays quite popular DSGE models) still
assume the rational expectations and a rational behavior of economic agents concerning
the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate. A common procedure in these types of
models is to assume that the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate are driven by the
validity of the purchasing power parity (PPP) postulate, see e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995). Through a log-linearization around the general equilibrium “rational expecta-
tions” steady state of the system, the – correctly – expected depreciation rate of the
nominal exchange rate between two economies is simply determined by
Et[st+1 − st] = pit − pift ,
with st denoting the log of the nominal exchange rate and pit and pi
f
t the domestic and
foreign price inflation rates, respectively. Under the assumption that the price inflation
rate is determined by the difference between money- and consumption growth differ-
entials, the actual nominal exchange rate can be expressed (applying the no-bubbles
condition) as (see Walsh (2003b, p.277))
st =
1
1 + δ
∞∑
i=0
(
1
1 + δ
)i
[(mt+i −m∗t+i)− (ct+i − c∗t+i)]
7 In the academic literature there is an ongoing and still unsolved debate about whether there is
an interest smoothing parameter in the monetary policy reaction rule of the central banks or whether
the observed high autocorrelation in the nominal interest rate is simply the result of highly correlated
shocks or only slowly available information, see e.g. Rudebusch (2002) and Rudebusch (2006) for a
throughout discussion.
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with δ as the intertemporal discount rate; m and m∗ as the money supplies; and c
and c∗ as the consumption levels in the domestic and foreign economies. Thus, in the
New Keynesian framework, the actual nominal exchange rate between two countries
depends on the current and future paths of the nominal money supply- and consumption
differentials between both economies.
Though straightforward in a theoretical rational expectations general equilibrium, this
solution implies nevertheless the existence of (solely) purely rationally handling agents
in the financial markets, an assumption that has been proven to be unable to explain
major stylized facts of the nominal exchange rate dynamics. As shown for example in
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005), the volatility of fundamentals (modeled in that study
through an index of interest rate and output growth differentials and current account
deficits) is by far not as large as the dynamics of the corresponding nominal exchange
rates.
Due to the empirical failure of rational expectations models, a large literature based on
the assumption of heterogenous expectations or beliefs among the traders in the foreign
exchange market has arisen in the last decade. The inclusion of such heterogeneity, and
therefore of a somewhat“nonrational”behavior by the economic agents has proven quite
valuable in providing insights and explanations concerning some of the “puzzles” which
arise when “rationality” is assumed.8
In the most basic heterogenous expectations framework, see e.g. Frankel and Froot
(1990), two basic types of traders with different belief patterns (or expectations) con-
cerning the future behavior of the nominal exchange rate are modeled: the funda-
mentalists and the chartists. The fundamentalists typically believe that the nominal
exchange rate is driven by macroeconomic fundamentals such as interest rate differ-
entials, different developments of production and employment and/or the validity of
the PPP postulate and consequently trade conforming to this belief. In contrast, the
chartists are assumed to follow the market tendencies, acting thus in principle in a
destabilizing manner. The dynamics and stability of the resulting nominal exchange
rate, therefore, depend on the relative strength and proportion of these two groups in
the foreign exchange market.
8 See De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006, ch.1) for an extensive discussion of the advantages of the
heterogenous agents-approach with respect to the rational-expectations approach in the explanation of
empirical financial market data.
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In more advanced theoretical frameworks about heterogenous beliefs a wide variety of
extensions concerning the endogenous determination of the trader groups composition
can be found: in Kirman (1993) for example the determination of the two groups is
determined by a purely stochastic factor; in Lux (1995) the “contagion” effect, that is,
the change in the trading strategy, depends on the overall “mood” of the market and on
the observed realized returns. De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005), in a similar manner,
assume the group change probability as a function of the relative probability of the
forecasting rules of the two groups and the risk associated with their use.9
However, in the actual theoretical framework, these possible model extensions are left
for future research, assuming for simplicity that the composition of the two groups
of traders in the FX markets, the chartists and the fundamentalists, is given. The
fundamentalists will primarily orient their nominal exchange rate expectations towards
levels which would be consistent with the equilibrium real exchange rate. In contrast,
the chartists will act in a rather destabilizing manner, paying attention solely to the
past patterns of the nominal exchange rate.
Using the notation of Manzan and Westerhoff (2007), we assume that the log of the
nominal exchange expected by the fundamentalists is determined by
Eft (st+1) = st + β
f
s (ft − st) (5.11)
where ft represents the value of the macroeconomic fundamentals at time t. By rear-
ranging this equation we obtain for the nominal exchange depreciation rate expected
by the fundamentalists
Eft (st+1 − st) = βfs (ft − st). (5.12)
Now, as usually done in the literature, we assume that the macroeconomic variables
which serve as reference for the fundamentalists is the PPP postulate, that is
ft = ln(pt)− ln(pft ) (5.13)
with pt and p
f
t denoting the price levels in the domestic and foreign economies, respec-
tively. Inserting this expression in eq. (5.12) delivers
Eft (st+1 − st) = βfs (ln(pt)− ln(pft )− st) (5.14)
= βfs (−ηt) (5.15)
9 See Samanidou, Zschischang, Stauffer and Lux (2007) for a comprehensive survey article on this
strain of research.
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with ηt as the log of the real exchange rate at time t.
Concerning the second group of traders, the chartists, I assume that their expected
nominal exchange rate depreciation for t+ 1 is simply determined by
Ect (st+1 − st) = βcs(st − st−1). (5.16)
Assuming that the factual nominal exchange rate depreciation rate is determined by
st+1 − st = if − i+ λβfs (−ηt) + (1− λ)βcs(st − st−1) (5.17)
where the relative influence of both groups is represented by the factor λ, and taking
the continuous time aproximation for st+1 − st, we obtain
s˙ = if − i− λβfs η + (1− λ)βcs s˙t, (5.18)
which, after some manipulation, delivers
s˙ =
if − i− λβfs η
1− (1− λ)βcs
. (5.19)
Eq.(5.19) clearly shows that for
βcs >
1
1− λ
we have explosive nominal exchange rate dynamics, while otherwise they are intrinsi-
cally stable as a reverting process towards the steady state, PPP consistent nominal
exchange rate level.
This law of motion, together with the price inflation adjustment equations for the
domestic and the foreign economies deliver
η˙ = s˙+ pˆf − pˆ
=
if − i− λβfs η
1− (1− λ)βcs
+ pˆf − pˆ. (5.20)
Note that in this formulation the real exchange rate dynamics are determined by a wide
variety of macroeconomic factors, as well as by the composition of fundamentalists and
traders in the foreign exchange markets. Note that through the effect of η on u, the
real exchange rate acts intrinsically in a stabilizing manner. This nevertheless might,
at the end, not hold if the influence of the chartists in the foreign exchange markets is
predominant.
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Altogether the model of this section consists of the following six laws of motion (with
the derived reduced form expressions as far as the wage-price spiral is concerned):10
The One-Country Sub-Module
uˆ
Dynamic IS
= −αuu(u− uo)− αur(i− pˆ− (io − pio))
−αuv(v − vo) + αuηη + αuuf uˆf (5.21)
eˆ
Okun′s Law= αeuˆuˆ− αev(v − vo) (5.22)
vˆ
Wage Share
= κ[(1− κpw)(βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo))
−(1− κwp)(βpu(u− uo) + βpv ln(v/vo)) + δgz], (5.23)
with δ = (κwz − 1)(1− κpw)
p˙ic
CPIClimate= βpic(pˆc − pic), pˆc = γpˆ+ (1− γ)(s˙+ pˆf ) (5.24)
i˙
Taylor Rule
= −γii(i− io) + γip(pˆ− pio) + γiu(u− uo) (5.25)
η˙
Real Exchange
=
if − i− λβfs η
1− (1− λ)βcs
+ pˆf − pˆ. (5.26)
The above equations represent, in comparison to the baseline model of New Keynesian
macroeconomics, the IS goods market dynamics, here augmented by Okun’s Law as
link between the goods and the labor market, the Taylor Rule, a law of motion for the
wage share v that makes use of the same explaining variables as in the New Keynesian
model with both staggered prices and wages,11 and the law of motion that describes
the updating of the inflationary climate expression. In addition, we have to make use
of the reduced form expression for the price inflation rate or the price PC,
pˆ = κ[βpu(u− uo) + βpv ln(v/vo) + κpw(βwe(e− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo))] + pic (5.27)
which has to be inserted into the above laws of motion in various places in order to
get an autonomous nonlinear system of differential equations in the state variables:
capacity utilization u, the rate of employment e, the nominal rate of interest i, the
wage share v, and the inflationary climate expression pic. Eq.(5.27) could be considered
as a sixth law of motion of the considered dynamics which however – when added –
10 As the model is formulated we have no real anchor for the steady state rate of interest and thus
have to assume here that it is the monetary authority that enforces a certain steady state values for
the nominal rate of interest.
11 but with inflation rates pˆ, wˆ in place of their time rates of change and with no accompanying sign
reversal concerning the influence of output and wage gaps.
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leads a system determinant which is zero, allowing therefore for zero-root hysteresis for
certain variables of the model. The laws of motion have been written in an order that
first presents the dynamic equations also present in the baseline New Keynesian model
of inflation dynamics, and then our formulation of the dynamics of income distribution
and of the inflationary climate in which the economy is operating.
In sum, therefore, our dynamic AS-AD growth model exhibits a variety of features that
are much more in line with a Keynesian understanding of the characteristics of the
trade cycle than is the case for the conventional modeling of AS-AD growth dynamics
or its radical reformulation by the New Keynesians.
5.2.5 Local Stability Analysis: The Small-Open Economy Case
We start our analysis of the stability properties of the system with the small-open
economy case, assuming that the foreign economy is and remains at its steady state
level (uf = ufo , ef = e
f
o , vf = v
f
o ). Since we assume the same structure for both
economies, the local stability of one subsystem would imply the same for the other
subsystem, assuming that similar parameter dimensions. Due to its specific formulation,
the steady state of the 5D subdynamics can be supplied exogenously. It exhibits five
gaps, to be closed in the steady state and has five laws of motion, which when set equal
to zero, exactly imply this result.
As discussed in Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel and Semmler (2006), the steady state of the
dynamics of the closed-economy version of this model is asymptotically stable under
certain sluggishness conditions that are reasonable from a Keynesian perspective, loses
its asymptotic stability cyclically (by way of so-called Hopf-bifurcations) if the system
becomes too flexible, and becomes sooner or later globally unstable if (generally speak-
ing) adjustment speeds become too high. If the model is subject to explosive forces,
it requires extrinsic nonlinearities in economic behavior – like downward money wage
rigidity – to manifest themselves at least far off the steady state in order to bound
the dynamics to an economically meaningful domain in the considered 5D state space.
Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel and Hung (2006) provide a variety of numerical studies for
such an approach with extrinsically motivated nonlinearities through detailed numerical
investigation.
In order to investigate the role of heterogenous expectations in the foreign exchange
market and the main international transmission channels for the stability of the whole
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macroeconomic system analytically, the dimensions of our theoretical framework are
reduced through the following simplifying assumptions:
• The monetary authorities do not pursue an interest rate smoothing strategy, so
that i = iT always holds. This is the case when αii →∞.
• βpic = 0. In this case the inflationary climate is constant (pic = 0 is assumed).
• We can replace e through αeuu in the wage and price inflation adjustment equa-
tions without loss of generality.
Under the simplifying assumptions, the initial 5D dynamical system can be reduced to
the following 3D subsystem
uˆ = −αuu(u− uo)− αur((io − pio)− pˆ+ φpi(pˆ− pio) + φy(u− uo))
−αuv(v − vo) + αuηη (5.28)
vˆ = κ[(1− κpw)(βwe(αeuu− eo)− βwv ln(v/vo))
−(1− κwp)(βpu(u− uo) + βpv ln(v/vo)) + δgz], (5.29)
η˙ =
ifo − (io + φpi(pˆ− pio) + φy(u− uo))− λβfs η
1− (1− λ)βcs
− pˆ. (5.30)
with
pˆ = κ[βpu(u− uo) + βpv ln(v/vo) + κpw(βwe(αeuu− uo)− βwv ln(v/vo))] (5.31)
to be inserted in several places.
The corresponding Jacobian of this reduced 3D subsystem
J3D =
 J11 J12 J13J21 J22 J23
J31 J32 J33
 .
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with
J11 =
∂uˆ
∂u
= −αuu − αur (φy + φpiκ (βpu + κpwβweαeu)) < 0 (5.32)
J12 =
∂uˆ
∂v
= −αuv − φpiκ
(
βpv − κpwβwv
vo
)
< 0 (5.33)
J13 =
∂uˆ
∂η
= αuη > 0 (5.34)
J21 =
∂vˆ
∂u
= κ((1− κpw)βweαeu − (1− κwp)βpu) (5.35)
J22 =
∂vˆ
∂v
= −κ
(
(1− κpw)βwv + (1− κwp)βpv
vo
)
< 0 (5.36)
J23 =
∂vˆ
∂η
= 0 (5.37)
J31 =
∂η˙
∂u
=
λβsf (αur + φpiκ(βpu + κpwβweαeu))
1− βsc (1− λ)
(5.38)
J32 =
∂η˙
∂v
=
βsfφpiκλ
(
βpv−βwvκpw
vo
)
1− βsc (1− λ)
− κ
(
βpv − βwvκpw
vo
)
(5.39)
J33 =
∂η˙
∂η
= − β
s
fλ
1− βsc (1− λ)
< 0 (5.40)
has the following sign structure
J3D =
 − ? +? − 0
? ? ?
 .
According to the Routh-Hurwitz stability conditions for a 3D dynamical system, asymp-
totic local stability of a steady state is fulfilled when
ai > 0, i = 1, 2, 3 and a1a2 − a3 > 0,
where a1 = −trace(J), a2 =
∑3
k=1 Jk with
J1 =
∣∣∣∣∣ J22 J23J32 J33
∣∣∣∣∣ , J2 =
∣∣∣∣∣ J11 J13J31 J33
∣∣∣∣∣ , J3 =
∣∣∣∣∣ J11 J12J21 J22
∣∣∣∣∣ .
and a3 = −det(J).
Our reduced 3D dynamical system is stable around its interior steady state, if the
following proposition is fulfilled:
154 5. Heterogenous Expectations, FX Fluctuations and Macroeconomic Stability
Proposition 1:
Assume that the influence of the chartists in the foreign exchange market is
not predominant, i.e., that (i) βsc (1−λ) < 1 holds. Additionally, assume that
(ii) (λβfs φpi)/(1− βsc (1− λ) < 1. Furthermore, assume that (iii) βweαeu >
βpu, that is, that wage inflation reacts more strongly to changes in capacity
utilization than price inflation. And finally, assume that (iv) κpw is of a
sufficiently small dimension, so that ∂uˆ/∂v < 0 and ∂η˙/∂v < 0 hold.
Then: The Routh-Hurwitz conditions are fulfilled and the unique steady state
of the reduced 3D dynamical system is locally asymptotic stable.
Sketch of Proof:
As already state, as long as the influence of the chartists in the foreign exchange
market is not predominant, the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate are asymptoti-
cally stable. In this case ∂η˙/∂η < 0, and the trace of J is unambiguously negative (and
a1 > 0 holds), since
tr(J) = J11 + J22 + J33 < 0. (5.41)
if condition (i) in Proposition 1 is fulfilled.
Condition (ii) ensures the partial derivative of η˙ with respect to u to be negative and,
together with condition (iv), that ∂η˙/∂v < 0. Condition (iii) ensures that ∂vˆ/∂u. In
this case, J1, J2 and J3, the second-order minors of J are given by
J1 = J22 · J33 − J32 · J23
=
βsfλκ (βwv(1− κpw) + βpv(1− κwp))
v(1− βsc (1− λ))
> 0 (5.42)
J2 = J11 · J33 − J31 · J13
=
λβsf [αuu + (αur + αuη) (φy + φpiκ (βpu + κpwβweαeu))]
(1− βsc (1− λ))
+αuηκ (βpu + αeuβweκpw) (5.43)
J3 = J11 · J22 − J21 · J12
=
κ
v
[αuv + αurφpiκ(βpv − βwvκpw)] (αeuβwe(1− κpw)− βpu(1− κwp))
+
κ
v
[αuu + αur(αur + φpiκ(βpu + αeuβweκpw))]
·(βwv(1− κpw) + βpv(1− κwp)). (5.44)
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If conditions (i)-(iv) hold, the sign structure of the Jacobian matrix is given by
J3D =
 − − ++ − 0
− − −
 .
It can be easily confirmed that under such a sign structure, a2 =
∑3
k=1 Jk > 0 and a3 =
−det(J) > 0, as well as the critical condition a1a2−a3 > 0 for local asymptotic stability
of the steady state of the system hold under the assumed parameter dimensions.
Concerning the determinant of J, from the sign structure of the 3D Jacobian it can be
easily seen that it is negative, so that a3 = −det(J) > 0.
Concerning the local asymptotic stability properties of the 6D subsystem, we can infer
without an analytical proof that it will lose stability if a) the conditions (i)-(iv) in
Proposition 1 are no longer fulfilled, b) the adjustment speed of the inflationary climate
βpic approaches infinity or c) the nominal interest rate does not adjust sufficiently fast
to the target rate pursued by the monetary authorities, that is, when the interest rate
smoothing parameter αii is insufficiently low.
5.3 The Two-Country Framework: Estimation and Analysis
After having set up the basic structure of an open-economy framework of Keynesian
nature, in this section we integrate two economies (and therefore, two small-open-
economy dynamic models if considered separately) with similar characteristics (as the
U.S. and the euro area) into a consistent two country framework.
Considering both economies as a single macroeconomic framework, the resulting 11D
dynamical system comprises 11 dynamic variables with the gaps
u− uo, e− eo, v − vo, i− io, pˆ− pio, η − ηo,
plus the five ones for the foreign economy that correspond to the first (domestic) five
of the list shown above.
For the unique determination of the steady state position we set uˆ, eˆ, vˆ, i˙ equal to zero
(and of course have the same situation for the foreign economy). This holds only when
all gaps are zero simultaneously, what additionally delivers (for η = ηo = 0) s˙ = 0.
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Assuming a constant steady state log nominal exchange rate s, we obtain from the
reduced form price Phillips curves
pˆo = pico = ξpico + (1− ξ)pifco
pˆfo = pi
f
co = ξ
fpifco + (1− ξf )pico ⇐⇒
pic = pifc .
By inserting again eq.(5.3) and its foreign economy counterpart, we obtain
ξpˆo + (1− ξ)pˆfo = ξf pˆo + (1− ξf )pˆfo
which only holds true for pˆ = pˆf . At the steady state, thus, both countries share the
same inflationary climate and equilibrium inflation rate, independently of the actual
composition of the CPI index in both economies. Under this condition, the nominal
exchange rate equation (5.19) delivers indeed a constant nominal exchange rate at the
steady state, and therefore also a constant real exchange rate, since η = ηo.
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The Two-Country Model
uˆ = −αuu(u− uo)− αur(i− pˆ− (io − pio))− αuv(v − vo) + αuηη + αuuf uˆf
eˆ = αeuˆuˆ− αev(v − vo)
vˆ = κ[(1− κpw)fw(e, v)− (1− κwp)fp(u, v) + δgz],
p˙ic = βpic(pˆc − pic), pˆc = ξpˆ+ (1− ξ)(s˙+ pˆf )
i˙ = −γii(i− io) + γip(pˆ− pio) + γiu(u− uo)
η˙ =
if − i− λβfs η
1− (1− λ)βcs
+ pˆf − pˆ
uˆf = −αuu(uf − uo)− αur(i− pˆ− (io − pio))− αuv(v − vo) + αuηη + αuuf uˆf
eˆf = αeuˆuˆf − αev(vf − vo)
vˆf = κ[(1− κpw)fw(ef , vf )− (1− κwp)fp(uf , vf ) + δgfz ]
p˙ifc = βpic(pˆ
f
c − pifc ), pˆfc = ξpˆf + (1− ξ)(−s˙+ pˆ)
i˙f = −γii(if − io) + γip(pˆf − pio) + γiu(uf − uo)
The 11D dynamical system described above has the following Jacobian Matrix
J =

J1,1 J1,2 J1,3 J1,4 J1,5 J1,6 J1,7 0 J1,9 0 0
J2,1 J2,2 J2,3 J2,4 J2,5 J2,6 J2,7 0 J2,9 0 0
J3,1 J3,2 J3,3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
J4,1 J4,2 J4,3 J4,4 J4,5 0 0 0 0 0 0
J5,1 J5,2 J5,3 0 J5,5 J5,6 J5,7 J5,8 J5,9 0 J5,11
J6,1 J6,2 J6,3 J6,4 J6,5 J6,6 J6,7 J6,8 J6,9 J6,10 J6,11
J7,1 0 J7,3 0 0 J7,6 J7,7 J7,8 J7,9 J7,10 J7,11
J8,1 0 J8,3 0 0 J8,6 J8,7 J8,8 J8,9 J8,10 J8,11
0 0 0 0 0 0 J9,7 J9,8 J9,9 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 J10,7 J10,8 J10,9 J10,10 J10,11
J11,1 J11,2 J11,3 0 J11,5 J11,6 J11,7 J11,8 J11,9 0 J11,11

The structure of the model is summarized in Figure 5.1. This figure shows at its top
the interaction of the foreign exchange market with the two economies and towards the
bottom the interaction of both economies through their goods markets.
As this diagrammatic exposition of quantity and price trade channels linking the two
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Fig. 5.1: The real and financial links of the two country model
economies shows, the macroeconomic interaction between them seems intrinsically sta-
ble with the sole obvious source of instability (or even chaos) is from the foreign ex-
change markets. Indeed, in the absence of predominant unstable nominal exchange rate
dynamics (which would occur if the FX market would be governed by the chartists), the
dynamics of the two-country framework seem to be of a self-regulating nature through
the interaction of quantity and price trade linkages. This, however, is not necessarily
the case: So for example leads an exogenous increase in the foreign demand (uf ↑) on
the one hand to an increase of price and (through the related increase in foreign em-
ployment) wage inflation abroad, which in turn leads to a loss of competitiveness (η ↑)
and to a cooling down of the foreign economy. On the other hand, an increase in uf
leads (through the “locomotive” effect) to an increase in the domestic level of economic
activity, to an increase in domestic wage and price inflation and subsequently to a fall
of η, which, in turn, is likely to boost furthermore the economic activity abroad. The
net effect of these two opposite effects – and therefore the stability of the system –
depends thus to an important degree on the degree of wage and price flexibility in both
economies. However, since a throughout analytical calculation of the Routh-Hurwitz lo-
cal stability conditions for a 11D system would be an extremely complicated and, more
importantly, nontransparent task, the stability of the 11D system concerning variations
of the structural parameters will be investigated in a numerical manner by means of
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eigen-value analysis in section 5.4.
5.3.1 Stylized Facts of Monetary Policy
Since the seminal contribution by Sims (1980), vector autoregressive (VAR) models
have become a standard tool for the study of the transmission of monetary policy in
industrialized economics.
In the majority of existing studies the VAR analysis is performed under the implicit
assumption that the studied economies have “closed” or “small open economy” charac-
teristics due to the possible collinearity and identification problems which can arise if
a large number of variables is incorporated in the VAR model. From the econometric
perspective, this means that foreign variables, if included in the estimated VAR model,
are assumed to be exogenously determined. Indeed, most of the prominent studies on
monetary policy transmission such as Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mi-
hov (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) for the U.S. economy, Kim
(1999) for the G-7 countries and Peersman and Smets (2003) for the euro area are based
on a “small open economy” assumption.
Under such a specification the main stylized facts concerning the monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism can be summarized as follows:
• An unexpected increase in the U.S. nominal interest rate (a contractionary mon-
etary policy shock) leads to a slowdown of economy activity, which reaches its
peak after five quarters, approximately.
• The response of employment resembles the output reaction, though in a somewhat
delayed manner.
• Price inflation initially increases (the price puzzle discussed, e.g., by Sims (1992)),
but, after some quarters, an unambiguously negative effect can be observed.
• The domestic currency appreciates due to, among other things, the interest rate
parity.
Concerning the international transmission of monetary policy, Kim (2001) discusses two
main findings from his VAR estimations: First, that monetary policy in the non-US G-6
countries follows U.S. monetary policy shocks (a result which corroborates the findings
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of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) concerning the dynamic behavior of spread between
foreign and U.S. interest rates after such types of shocks). Second, that U.S. monetary
expansions have a positive spill-over effect on the remaining G-7 countries primarily
due to the resulting reduction in the world interest interest. This result is also found
by Bluedorn and Bowdler (2006) and Eickmeier (2007), the latter concerning the effect
of U.S. monetary shocks on Germany.
The empirical evidence on the reaction of nominal exchange rates to monetary policy
shocks is, on the contrary, not as undisputed. While Eichenbaum and Evans (1995,
p.976) for example find that “the maximal effect of a contractionary monetary policy
shock on U.S. exchange rates is not contemporaneous; instead the dollar continues to
appreciate for a substantial period of time [a finding which] is inconsistent with simple
rational expectations overshooting models of the sort considered by Dornbusch (1976)”,
Kim and Roubini (2000), Kalyvitis and Michaelides (2001) and Bluedorn and Bowdler
(2006) find little evidence on such a behavior for the G-7 nominal exchange rates after
the inclusion of alternative measures of monetary policy shocks as well as of relative
output and prices in their specifications.
Next the strength of international transmission channels between the U.S. and the euro
area, two large economies which are likely to indeed influence each other by a variety
of macroeconomic channels are investigated by means of econometric methods.
5.3.2 Structural Estimation Results
The empirical data of the corresponding time series stem from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis data set (see http:/www.stls.frb.org/fred) and the OECD database
for the U.S. and the euro area, respectively. The data is quarterly, seasonally adjusted
and concern the period from 1980:1 to 2004:4.
The logarithms of wages and prices are denoted ln(wt) and ln(pt), respectively. Their
first differences (backwardly dated), i.e. the current rate of wage and price inflation, are
denoted wˆt and pˆt as in the theoretical framework. The inflationary climate pic of the
theoretical part of this paper is approximated here in a very simple way, by a linearly
declining moving average of price inflation rates with linearly decreasing weights over
the past twelve quarters, denoted pi12t .
12 Figure 5.2 shows the time series of both the
12 We also estimated the structural model shown in Table 5.4 with other proxies for the inflationary
climate which also covered the four, six and eighteen last quarters. These estimates could be rejected
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Tab. 5.1: Data Set
Variable Description of the original series
e U.S. : Employment rate
Euro area : Employment Rate (HP cyclical component, λ = 640000)
u U.S. : Capacity utilization: Manufacturing, percent of capacity
Euro area : Output Gap
w U.S. : Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation per hour, 1992=100
Euro area : Business sector: Wage Rate Per Hour,
p U.S. : Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator, 1996=100
Euro area : Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator, 2000=100
z U.S. : Nonfarm Business Sector; Output per hour of all persons, 1992=100
Euro area : Labor Productivity of the business economy,
v U.S. : Nonfarm Business Sector: Real compensation per output unit, 1992=100
Euro area : Business Sector: Real compensation per output unit
(HP cyclical component, λ = 640000)
i U.S. : Federal Funds rate
Euro Area : Short-term interest rate
s EUR/USD Nominal exchange rate
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Fig. 5.2: U.S. and Euro Area Aggregate Time Series
U.S. and the Euro Area described in Table 5.1. As it can be observed there, the U.S. and
the Euro Area have featured in the last two decades a remarkable similarity in their
even at the 10% significance level.
162 5. Heterogenous Expectations, FX Fluctuations and Macroeconomic Stability
respective wage and price inflation developments, as well as – to a somewhat lesser
extent – in the dynamics of the capacity utilization and the output gap, respectively.
This, however, does not hold for the dynamics of the employment rate and the wage
share of both economies. As it can be observed in Figure 5.2, while the U.S. unem-
ployment rate has fluctuated, roughly speaking, around a constant level over the last
two decades, the European employment (unemployment) rate displayed a persistent
downwards (upwards) trend over the same time period. This particular European de-
velopment has been explained by Layard et al. (1991) and Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998) by an over-proportional increase in the number of long-term unemployed (i.e.
workers with an unemployment duration over 12 months) with respect to short term
unemployed (workers with an unemployment duration of less than 12 months) and the
phenomenon of hysteresis especially in the first group. Because the long-term unem-
ployed become less relevant in the determination of nominal wages (since primarily the
short-term unemployed are taken into account), the potential downward pressure on
wages resulting from the unemployment of the former diminishes, with the result of a
higher NAIRU level, see Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). When long-term unemploy-
ment is high, the aggregate unemployment rate of an economy thus, “becomes a poor
indicator of effective labor supply, and the macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms –
such as downward pressure on wages and inflation when unemployment is high – will
then not operate effectively” (OECD (2002, p.189)).
In order to take into account the lower influence of the long-term unemployed in the
determination of wage and price inflation, we proceed as in Chapter 2 of this disserta-
tion and use, for the euro area, the adjusted cyclical component of the unemployment
rate as a proxy for the short-term unemployment, since time series data for long-term
unemployment in the euro area are not available for the analyzed sample period.
In order to check the stationarity of the analyzed time series, Phillips-Perron unit root
tests were carried out in order to account for residual autocorrelation (as done by the
standard ADF Tests), and also for possible residual heteroskedasticity. The Phillips-
Perron test specifications and results are shown in Table 5.2.
The applied unit root tests reject the hypothesis of a unit root for all series with
exception of the euro area nominal interest rate i. Although the test cannot reject
the null of a unit root, there is no reason to expect this time series to possess a unit
root. We reasonably expect these rates to be constrained to certain limited ranges
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Tab. 5.2: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test Results. Sample: 1980:1-2004:4
Country Variable Lag Length Determ. Adj. Test Stat. Prob.*
wˆ - const. -6.7769 0.0000
U.S. pˆ - const. -2.7647 0.0671
uˆ - - -7.0655 0.0000
eˆ - - -4.8206 0.0000
i - - -1.8553 0.0608
wˆ - const. -3.4982 0.0100
euro area pˆ - none -2.3617 0.0183
uˆ - const. -8.0891 0.0000
eˆ - - -3.1516 0.0019
i - - -1.4810 0.1290
*McKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
in the euro area. Due to the general low power of the unit root tests, these results
can be interpreted as only providing a hint that the nominal interest exhibit a strong
autocorrelation.
As discussed in the previous section, the law of motion for the real wage rate, given by
eq.(5.7), represents a reduced form expression of the two structural equations for wˆt and
pˆt. Noting again that the inflation climate variable is defined in the estimated model
as a linearly declining function of the past twelve price inflation rates, the dynamics of
the system (5.21)–(5.24) can be reformulated as
wˆjt = βwe(e
j
t−1 − ejo)− βwv ln(vjt−1/vjo) + κwppˆjt + κwpi12pi12,jt + κwz zˆjt + ²wt
pˆjt = βpu(u
j
t−1 − ujo) + βpv ln(vjt−1/vjo) + κpw(wˆjt − zˆjt ) + κppi12pi12,jt + ²pt
lnujt = lnu
j
t−1 + γu(u
j
t−1 − ujo)− αur(ijt−1 − pˆjt )± αuv(vjt − vjo) + αuηηt−4 + ²ut
eˆjt = αeu−1uˆ
j
t−1 + αeu−2uˆ
j
t−2 + αeu−3uˆ
j
t−3 + ²et
ijt = φii
j
t−1 + (1− φi)φpipˆjt + (1− φi)φyujt−1 + ²it, with j = us, ez.
st = iust−1 − iezt−1 + αssst−1 − λβfs ηt + (1− λ)βcs sˆt−1.
with γuu = 1− αu and sample means denoted by a subscript o.
In order to investigate the differences between a single-country system estimation and
a two-country system estimation for the values of the parameters of the model for
the U.S. and euro area, the structural equations are estimated by means of Three-
Stage-Least-Squares (3SLS) in order to account for a possible regressor endogeneity
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and heteroskedasticity.
Tab. 5.3: 3SLS Parameter Estimates: One-Country Specification
Estimation Sample: 1980 : 1-2004 : 4
wˆt βwe βwv κwp κwpi12 κwz R¯
2 DW
Euro Area 0.499 -0.454 0.844 0.287 0.245 0.706 1.593
[2.763] [-3.883] [3.438] [1.233] [2.908]
U.S. 0.726 -0.372 0.692 0.629 0.369 0.317 1.805
[3.644] [-2.897] [2.649] [2.447] [5.239]
pˆt βpu βpv κpw κppi12 R¯
2 DW
Euro Area 0.269 0.133 0.079 0.873 0.898 1.516
[4.626] [2.453] [1.996] [23.813]
U.S. 0.250 0.103 0.087 0.831 0.774 1.352
[4.608] [1.872] [2.357] [18.034]
lnut γuu−1 αur αuv αuη αuuf R¯
2 DW
Euro Area -0.137 -0.061 -0.206 0.012 0.066 0.927 1.838
[-3.935] [-2.942] [-3.338] [2.212] [0.934]
U.S. -0.067 -0.042 -0.044 -0.001 0.177 0.904 1.485
[-2.366] [-1.426] [-1.426] [-1.332] [1.768]
eˆ αeu−1 αeu−2 αeu−3 R¯2 DW
Euro Area 0.137 0.128 0.069 0.614 1.104
[7.246] [6.761] [3.780]
U.S. 0.137 0.093 0.045 0.357 1.369
[4.679] [3.152] [1.565]
i φi φpi φy R¯
2 DW
Euro Area 0.930 1.540 1.500 0.981 1.369
[44.084] [10.378] [2.413]
U.S. 0.820 2.222 0.622 0.927 1.886
[29.684] [15.718] [2.622]
s αss λ β
c
s R¯
2 DW
Euro Area 0.839 0.108 0.209 0.917 1.575
[18.609] [1.812] [2.410]
U.S. 0.831 0.117 0.218 0.917 1.579
[18.214] [1.945] [2.493]
As it can be observed in Table 5.3, we find a wide support for the theoretical formulation
discussed in the previous section. In the first place we find similar and statistically
significant coefficients for ln(v/vo), the Blanchard-Katz error correction terms, in both
the wage and price adjustment equations of both the U.S. and the euro area.
In the second place, our cross-over formulation of the inflationary expectations cannot
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be statistically rejected in the wage inflation equation of both economies and the U.S.
price inflation equation. For the euro area, the cross over term of actual wage inflation
determining the actual price inflation seems not to be significant.13
Furthermore, the influence of the market specific demand pressure terms (the capacity
utilization in the price- and the employment rate in the wage Phillips curve equations)
is also corroborated by our estimations, as well as the fact that wage flexibility is higher
than price flexibility (concerning their respective demand pressure measures) in both
the U.S. and the Euro Area, a result in line with the findings of Chen and Flaschel
(2006), Flaschel et al. (2007) and Proan˜o, Flaschel, Ernst and Semmler (2006).
Concerning the estimated open economy IS equation, our 3SLS estimations show, as
expected, the negative influence of the expected real interest rate on the dynamics of
capacity utilization in both economies. The same holds true for the effect of v − vo
the deviation of the labor share from its steady state level, in both U.S. and Euro
Area, showing that a relatively high labor share (or real average unit labor costs) has a
negative impact on the domestic rate of capacity utilization, something that holds for
a profit led economy. The coefficient αuuf , which represents the effect of foreign goods
demand on the dynamics of the domestic capacity utilization rate, are both positive and
significant (with the U.S. coefficient of an unexpectedly high value) for both economies.
The parameter estimates in the dynamic Okun’s law and Taylor rule equations of
both economies are positive, statistically significant and of reasonable dimension, with
nevertheless a higher reaction coefficient to the inflation in the U.S. than in the euro
area for the analyzed sample period. Concerning the law of motion of the log nominal
exchange rate, both the log real exchange rate and the interest rate differential influence
the level of the log nominal exchange rate, the former in a negative and the latter in a
positive manner.
Besides the one-country 3SLS estimations just discussed, we estimated both countries
as a single system by means of 3SLS.14 Compared with the single-country 3SLS esti-
13 In Proan˜o, Flaschel, Ernst and Semmler (2006), where we investigated only the closed economy
dimension of our theoretical model, almost identical results concerning both economies are reported.
The only exception was the cross-over term (specified there not as wˆt− zˆt – with zˆt as the actual labor
productivity growth rate, but only as wˆ) in the price inflation equation for the Euro Area, which there,
turned out to be statistically significant.
14 The set of instrumental variables in the 3SLS estimation consisted on the same lagged values of
the two countries used in the previous estimations.
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Tab. 5.4: 3SLS Parameter Estimates: Two-Country Specification
Estimation Sample: 1980 : 1-2004 : 4
wˆt βwe βwv κwp κwpi12 κwz R¯
2 DW
Euro Area 0.475 -0.437 0.862 0.270 0.239 0.706 1.603
[2.664] [-3.794] [3.560] [1.173] [2.896]
U.S. 0.689 -0.399 0.490 0.574 0.348 0.341 1.815
[4.341] [-3.033] [1.827] [3.072] [5.059]
pˆt βpu βpv κpw κppi12 R¯
2 DW
Euro Area 0.252 0.114 0.073 0.877 0.898 1.520
[4.391] [2.138] [1.897] [24.356]
U.S. 0.130 0.144 0.109 0.579 0.788 1.389
[2.748] [2.550] [3.243] [19.274]
lnut γuu−1 αur αuv αuη αuuf R¯
2 DW
Euro Area -0.109 -0.062 -0.163 0.012 0.101 0.927 1.753
[-3.416] [-3.184] [-2.724] [2.353] [1.531]
U.S. -0.091 -0.038 -0.112 -0.008 0.152 0.904 1.520
[-3.387] [-1.829] [-2.088] [-1.308] [1.545]
eˆ αeu−1 αeu−2 αeu−3 R¯2 DW
Euro Area 0.135 0.128 0.074 0.615 1.114
[7.176] [6.864] [4.110]
U.S. 0.151 0.101 0.045 0.369 1.436
[5.250] [3.439] [1.575]
i φi φpi φy R¯
2 DW
Euro Area 0.931 1.562 1.925 0.981 1.366
[49.645] [10.653] [2.915]
U.S. 0.823 2.168 0.404 0.928 1.892
[31.659] [15.328] [1.892]
s αss λ αssˆ R¯
2 DW
0.834 0.115 0.232 0.917 1.608
[19.110] [1.978] [2.771]
mations just described, Table 5.4 delivers quite similar values concerning all estimated
parameters, corroborating the robustness of our results. There is nevertheless one re-
markable difference: While in the 3SLS estimations we obtained a quite high coefficient
for αuuf in the U.S. equation (representing the role of the growth rate of capacity uti-
lization in the Euro Area for the dynamics of the same variable in the U.S.), in Table
5.4 we obtained a parameter estimate of more reasonable dimension (though still too
high if compared with the coefficient in the euro area lnu equation, if one takes into
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account that the U.S. influence is probably higher for the euro area in this respect than
otherwise).15
5.3.3 Dynamic Adjustments
In order to evaluate the empirical plausibility of our theoretical framework, we simulate
an approximate discrete time version of the semi-structural model discussed in section
5.2 based on the estimated 3SLS structural model parameters discussed in the last
section.16 Additionally, the parameters concerning the theoretical CPI inflationary
climate for both countries were calibrated with the following values:
βpic = 0.5 κpic = 0.5 ξ = 0.85.
Both countries have thus the same degree of inflation climate inertia (represented by
βpic , the adjustment coefficient of the CPI inflationary climate), whereafter each new
(monthly) CPI inflation rate observation updates with only a 0.5 weight the inflationary
climate. Both countries have also the same degree of credibility in the monetary policy
target (κpic) as well as the same composition of domestic and foreign goods in the CPI
index.17
A U.S. monetary policy shock
In Figure 5.3 the dynamic adjustments of two artificial economies based on the struc-
tural parameters estimates of both the U.S. and the euro area depicted in table 5.4 to
a one percent (100 basis points) U.S. monetary policy shock are shown.
As Figure 5.3 shows, the numerical simulations of the calibrated theoretical discrete
time model deliver, to a large extent, the stylized facts on monetary policy shocks dis-
cussed in the last section (the time axis shows themonths after the shock). As expected,
a positive monetary policy shock in the U.S. leads to an increase in the EUR/USD
nominal exchange rate primarily via the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition
15 In the dynamic adjustments simulations of the next section we will calibrate this coefficient to be
if not lower, at least equal to that of the euro area.
16 The numerical simulations of this section were performed using MATLAB. The simulation code is
available upon request.
17 This specific value is taken from Rabanal and Tuesta (2006).
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Fig. 5.3: Simulated Impulse-Responses to a One Std. Dev. U.S. Monetary Policy Shock
comprised in the law of motion of the log nominal exchange rate. This nominal appre-
ciation of the US Dollar, together with the effect of the interest rate increase, leads to
an economic slowdown, observable in the decrease in the capacity utilization rate (the
output gap). Following the downturn of this variable, employment also falls, followed
by wage and price inflation. These variables return back to baseline in approximately
40 months, or nearly four years. Concerning the reaction of the euro area variables to a
U.S. monetary policy shocks, Figure 5.3 shows that the euro area is affected by the con-
tractionary U.S. monetary policy shock through two macroeconomic channels: Firstly,
by the drop in foreign aggregate demand and secondly, by the gain of relative com-
petitiveness resulting from the nominal (and real, due to the sluggishness in the wage
an price adjustment) depreciation of the euro. As figure 5.3 shows, in the calibrated
two-country model underlying these simulations the increase in relative competitive-
ness of the euro area clearly dominates the fall in the U.S. foreign goods demand, with
economic activity in the euro area increasing after a contractionary monetary shock in
the U.S. economy.18
Concerning the dynamic reaction of the nominal exchange rate, in the model discussed
here, there is indeed a somewhat delayed reaction of this variable, with the maximum
effect taking place not instantaneously but after one or two periods.
18 This result contradicts the findings of Kim (2001) discussed in the previous section, whereafter a
contractionary monetary policy shock in the U.S. leads to an economic downturn in the G-7 countries
due to the increase in the world interest rate. This channel, though, is not incorporated in the simple
semi-structural two-country model discussed here.
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A Euro Area monetary policy shock
Concerning the effects of euro area monetary shocks (depicted in Figure 5.4), the dy-
namic responses of both the euro area and the U.S. economy resemble, by and large,
the dynamic adjustments to a U.S. monetary shock previously discussed, with both
output and employment, as well as wage and price inflation (with some delay) falling
after such a shock in the euro area and increasing in the U.S. economy. However, an
20 40 60 80−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Interest Rate
Euro Area
U.S.
20 40 60 80−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
Output Gap
Euro Area
U.S.
20 40 60 80−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
Employment Rate
Euro Area
U.S.
20 40 60 80−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Wage Inflation
Euro Area
U.S.
20 40 60 80−0.12
−0.1
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
Price Inflation
Euro Area
U.S.
20 40 60 80−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Labor Share
Euro Area
U.S.
20 40 60 80−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
Nominal Exchange Rate EUR/USD
20 40 60 80−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
Real Exchange Rate
Fig. 5.4: Simulated Impulse-Responses to a One Std. Dev. Euro Area Monetary Policy Shock
interesting and important difference can be observed in Figure 5.4, namely the fact that
while the Euro Area was largely affected by the contractionary U.S. monetary policy
shock, the extent of opposite influence is largely not that important primarily due to
the lower real exchange rate αuη in the estimated U.S. goods markets equation.
Next we focus on the stability properties of this two-country macrodynamic system
concerning variations in the parameter values.
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5.4 Eigen-Value-Based Stability Analysis
As previously mentioned, if the stability of a macrodynamic system is not simply im-
posed through the rational expectations assumption, the relative strength of the differ-
ent macroeconomic channels interacting in an economy (and in this case, between two
economies) become central for the local and global stability properties of the system
analyzed.
The main purpose of this section is to highlight this issue within the semi-structural
two-country macro-framework discussed and estimated in the previous section. For
this an eigen-value stability analysis is used taking as the benchmark parameters the
estimated values presented in the previous section. After calibrating the 11D continuous
time system, the eigen-values of the system are calculated ceteris paribus for different
parameter of the models (mostly in the 0-1 interval) using the SND package discussed
by Chiarella et al. (2002).
In Figure 5.5 the maximal eigen-values of the system for varying values of the respective
parameters are sketched. For comparison, in Figure 5.6 the analogous sketches for the
closed economy model (the one-country submodule under αuuf , αη, ξ = 1) – calculated
with the parameter estimates of the U.S. economy discussed in chapter 2 are depicted
–.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
alpha_u
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
alpha_ur
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1−0.02
−0.015
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
alpha_uv
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
alpha_uuf
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
alpha_n
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1−0.02
−0.015
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
beta_we
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1−0.02
−0.015
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
beta_wv
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
kappa_wp
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
beta_pu
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1−0.02
−0.015
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
beta_pv
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
kappa_wp
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
beta_pi
Fig. 5.5: Eigen-Value-based Stability Analysis: The Real Economy
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Fig. 5.6: Eigen-Value-based Stability Analysis: The Real Economy (The Closed Economy
Case, using the U.S. parameter values discussed in chapter 2)
The comparison between Figures 5.5 and 5.6 reveals by and large the same qualitative
implications of a variation of the analyzed coefficients for the stability of the system (in
the two- and the one-country case): So, while the stability properties of the respective
systems seem to be invariant for different parameters of αuv (the reaction strength of
capacity utilization to an increase in the wage share), βwe (the wage inflation reac-
tiveness parameter with respect to labor marker disequilibrium situations), as well as
βwv and βpv (the Blanchard-Katz error correction terms in both wage and price infla-
tion adjustment equations), the same does not hold for the remaining real economy
parameters. Indeed, high coefficients of αur (the real interest rate reactiveness of the
capacity utilization), both κwp and κpw (the cross-over inflation terms in the wage and
price Phillips Curve equations), a high price flexibility with respect to goods market
disequilibrium situations (represented by the parameter βpu) as well as as a high ad-
justment of the inflationary climate pic, determined by βpic seem to induce instability in
the system. Concerning the open-economy dimension of the model, Figure 5.5 shows
that both a high reactiveness of capacity utilization towards the real exchange rate and
the dynamics of the foreign economy (determined by αη and αuuf , respectively), are
likely to induce instability of the system due to an eventual over-synchronization of
both economies which might feature reinforcing properties.
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Figure 5.7 shows the eigen-value diagrams resulting from variations in the monetary
policy parameters. As expected, while an increase in the αii (the adjustment speed
of the actual nominal interest rate with respect to iT) induces stability into both the
closed and the open economy systems, the steady state stability properties seem to be
invariant to changes in φy (the reaction coefficient of the monetary policy instrument
with respect to the output gap).
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Fig. 5.7: Eigen-Value-based Stability Analysis: Monetary Policy
This, however, does not hold for φpi, the reaction coefficient with respect to the inflation
gap. Indeed, in line with the academic literature on monetary policy, we find in the
closed economy case that the steady state of the economic system is be stable only
if φpi > 1, that is, only if monetary policy reacts in a sufficiently active manner with
respect to inflationary developments. The eigen-value diagram of φpi, however, shows
that the threshold value for stability in the open economy case lies much lower than in
the closed-economy case, relativizing up to a certain extent the validity of the prominent
Taylor Principle, at least for large economies such as the U.S. and the euro area.
This result, though somewhat surprising at first sight, is actually quite reasonable: In
contrast to the closed economy case, in an open economy the monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism is enriched by other transmission channels such as the nominal
exchange rate and the competitiveness channels. So for example an interest rate in-
crease leads not only to higher borrowing costs and therefore to a lower consumption
and investment demand, but also, in an open economy, to a nominal (and real) appre-
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ciation of the domestic currency. This in turn leads to a decrease in the net exports. In
an open economy, thus, monetary policy can rely on the activation of more transmission
channels and therefore needs not to be as aggressive as in the closed-economy case in
order to stabilize the economy.
In Figure 5.8 we can observe the eigen-value diagrams concerning the parameters of
the nominal exchange rate dynamics. As it can be observed, an increase in βfs , the
“fundamentalists” parameter (which was restricted to one in the estimations of the
previous section) induces stability into the system. This is also the case for λ, the
relative share of fundamentalists in the foreign exchange market, which ceteris paribus
seems not needing to be particularly high in order to stabilize the system.
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Fig. 5.8: Eigen-Value-based Stability Analysis: FX Dynamics
Last but not least, the middle graph in Figure 5.8 shows the eigen-value diagram for
βcs, the parameter denoting the “trend-chasing” degree by the chartists. As expected,
an increase in βcs brings about instability into the system. The switch from stability
to instability, however, does not happen in a smooth manner but is rather of a quite
nonlinear nature. This is due to the fact that an increase in βcs does not affect the
stability of the system as long as the inequality 1 > (1− λ)βcs (the denominator in the
nominal FX dynamics given by eq. (5.19)) is fulfilled. As it can be observed, there
exists a threshold value of βcs for which this inequality is not fulfilled anymore and which
causes a sign reversal in the nominal FX dynamics which leads to a total instability of
the system.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter a basic two-country theoretical framework in the line of the disequilib-
rium approach by Chiarella and Flaschel (2000) and Chiarella et al. (2005) was modeled
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where two large open economies interacted with each other and indeed influenced each
other through trade, price and financial channels. The discrete time version of this
theoretical framework (which was calibrated with estimated parameters of the U.S.
and the euro area), while still quite basic in its structure, was nevertheless able to
deliver dynamic responses in line with other empirical studies on the dynamics of open
economies such as Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Kim (1999) and Kim and Roubini
(2000). Furthermore, through the calculation of the eigen-values of the 11D system,
the effects of variations in the parameter values were investigated. Particularly with
regard to the modeling of nominal exchange rate dynamics, this eigen-value analysis
delivered three main results which are indeed of significant importance:
First, it corroborated the standard notion concerning the influence of the chartists for
the stability not only of the FX dynamics, but also of the macroeconomic as a whole.
Second, it confirmed the findings of previous studies such as Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel
and Semmler (2006) as well as chapter 2 of this dissertation concerning the role of wage
and price flexibility for the stability of the economy.
And third, the maximum-eigenvalue-diagram concerning the inflation gap coefficient φpi
in the monetary policy rule showed that in an open economy the threshold value for the
effectiveness of monetary policy is not one as discussed for example in Woodford (2003),
but rather less than one, due to the functioning of other stabilizing macroeconomic
channels such as the real exchange rate channel in an open economy. This last result,
however, should indeed be further investigated in a more elaborated framework. This
is though left for further research.
6. Currency Crises, Credit Rationing and Macroeconomic
Dynamics in Economies with Dollarized Liabilities
6.1 Introduction
Since the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods exchange rate system and the subsequent
liberalization of the international capital markets, a striking proliferation of currency
and financial crises throughout the world has been observed, the majority of them
though taking place in the so called “emerging market economies”. Among these
episodes of financial turmoil, the 1994-95 Mexican and the 1997-98 East Asian crises
are quite important chapters not only due to the suddenness and extent of the resulting
nominal exchange rate depreciations but also because of the severity by which the real
side of the economy was affected in the concerned countries.
A variety of studies such as Krugman (2000a), Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001),
Ce´spedes, Chang and Velasco (2003) and Flaschel and Semmler (2006), for example,
have elaborated on the mechanisms of how a currency crisis can trigger a financial crisis
that may lead to a severe economic slowdown in such type of economies. This research
has focused on the credit market problems that arise for firms after a strong currency
devaluation in a country where credit market frictions exist and where a significant
fraction of domestic banks and firms possesses unhedged foreign currency denominated
liabilities. Yet, in those models the wage and the price levels have usually been assumed
to remain constant over time.
The main contribution of this chapter to the currency crises literature is to introduce a
macroeconomic framework with gradually adjusting domestic wages and prices which
shows how not only nominal, but also (through domestic wages and price level changes)
real exchange rate adjustments affect the dynamics of the macroeconomic activity after
the occurrence of a currency crisis in the medium run. In our view wage and price
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dynamics are the missing link to explain the medium run dynamics of a country that
has experienced — through a currency and financial crisis — a severe slowdown in its
economic activity.
Our study is organized as follows: In section 6.2 we present a general version of the
currency crises theoretical framework discussed in Flaschel and Semmler (2006) and
Proan˜o, Flaschel and Semmler (2005). We discuss the dynamics of output and the
nominal exchange rate after a currency crisis first, in section 6.3, under the assumption
of fixed domestic wages and goods prices and then, in section 6.4, under the assumption
of a gradual adjustment of these variables. Furthermore, in section 6.5, we discuss the
more general case where nominal exchange rates as well as domestic prices adjust to
the state of the economy, showing the different mechanisms that allow the economy
to recover after a sharp credit tightening due to the occurrence of a sudden currency
mismatch. The empirical results of a VARX analysis are presented and discussed in
section 6.6. Section 6.7 draws some concluding remarks.
6.2 The General Framework
In order to analyze the effects of sharp currency devaluations in economies with un-
hedged dollarized liabilities in graphical though analytically nontrivial manner, we build
on a modified version of the Mundell-Fleming-Tobin developed by Rødseth (2000) as
the one discussed in Flaschel and Semmler (2006) and Proan˜o et al. (2005). We thus
analyze a small open economy where output is basically demand-driven and, in the
most general case, wages/prices as well as nominal exchange rates adjust gradually to
disequilibrium situations in the labor and the financial markets, respectively. For now
we abstract from international capital inflows as well as significant changes in the cap-
ital stock of the domestic economy K, in the domestic households’ financial wealth Wh
as well as in the foreign and domestic currency debt of the domestic entrepreneurial
sector, assuming thus that the analyzed time span is short enough to allow considering
these variables as basically unchanging despite the presence of positive or negative net
investment and households’ savings. Furthermore we assume a constant foreign price
level p∗, which we normalize to one (p∗ = 1) for simplicity. The real exchange rate is
defined as η = ep∗/p = e/p, with e as the nominal exchange rate and p as the domestic
price level.
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6.2.1 The Goods Markets
As in Proan˜o, Flaschel and Semmler (2006), we assume that the domestic entrepreneurial
sector can finance its investment projects through the issuance of bonds denominated
in domestic (with capital costs i) as well as in foreign currency (with capital costs i∗)
Bf and Ff , respectively (where Ff < 0 and Bf < 0, indicating a negative foreign and
domestic currency bond stock held by domestic firms, or in other words, that firms are
indebted). We assume that the domestic firms cannot hedge their exchange rate expo-
sure, so that the domestic currency value of their dollarized liabilities eFf evolves in a
one-to-one manner with the evolution of the exchange rate. For simplicity we assume
that each firm chooses just one investment financing option, so that in the aggregate
the domestic entrepreneurial sector can be divided into two fractions: The one fraction,
denominated by υ, finances its investment projects solely through foreign currency de-
nominated credits, while the other fraction of domestic firms (1 − υ) borrows only in
domestic currency.
As usually done in similar currency crises models which analyze the observed output
decline after the 1997-98 East Asian currency and financial crisis such as Aghion et al.
(2001), Ce´spedes et al. (2003), Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2004) and Flaschel
and Semmler (2006), we assume the existence of asymmetric information between the
domestic firms (the potential borrowers) and the lending institutions which forces the
latter to determine the level of credit awarding on the basis of some notion about the
creditworthiness of the domestic firms, such as their net worth. In our theoretical
framework the net worth of a firm is defined as the difference between its assets –
which we assume to consist only of fixed capital K – and its liabilities Bf + eFf (both
expressed here in domestic currency). Note that while the exchange rate influences the
net worth of the firms with foreign currency liabilities, it does not affect the net worth
of the firms indebted in domestic currency (1− υ).
Tab. 6.1: Business Sector’s Balance Sheets
Business Sector’s Balance Sheets
Firms’ Fraction Assets Liabilities
υ pKυ eFf
1− υ pK1−υ Bf
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A glance at the balance sheet of the fraction of domestic firms υ can clarify why this
holds: A rise of the nominal exchange rate (or an decrease of the domestic price level)
leads to an increase in the nominal (and here also real) value of the liabilities of this
group and therefore to a decrease in its net worth, without affecting the net worth of
the other group of firms.1
Note that despite the fact that the share υ of domestic firms borrowing in foreign cur-
rency is kept constant here, one could think of it as being a function of the risk premium
ξ. For now, though, we just assume that due to financial technology differences or firm
size factors not the totality but only a constant fraction of the domestic entrepreneurial
sector can actually obtain loans denominated in foreign currency.
We assuming that the lending institutions evaluate the creditworthiness of the domestic
firms based on their respective debt-to-capital ratio
q˜υ =
eFf
pK¯υ
= q˜υ(η) and q˜1−υ =
Bf
pK¯1−υ
.
Note that even though both groups might be subject to the imposition of credit con-
straints by the financial sector, only the debt-to-capital ratio of the fraction of firms
indebted in foreign currency is affected by nominal exchange rate fluctuations.
Under the assumption that K¯ = K¯υ + K¯1−υ = const., together with Bf = const. and
Ff = const., we can represent the nonlinear relationship between the real exchange rate
level and the extent of credit rationing in the economy through2
µF = f(η) =
1
1 + (η − 1)2 − 1 = −
(η − 1)2
1 + (η − 1)2 . (6.1)
According to eq.(6.1), the extent of credit rationing by the lending institutions depends
on the actual deviation of the real exchange rate from its PPP consistent level: For
η ≈ 1, q˜υ = eFf/pKυ ≈ Ff/Kυ, and µF ≈ 0. In the contrary case, as η increases,
1 Again, we assume that the totality of the foreign currency debt is unhedged: As discussed e.g.
in Ro¨thig, Flaschel and Semmler (2007), with increasing currency hedging by the domestic firms, the
fragility of the real side of the economy to unexpected exchange rate depreciation decreases.
2 In our previously cited works we followed Krugman (2000a) by assuming that the elasticity of
the investment function with respect to e (η) was high for “intermediate values” and low for extreme
“low” and “high” exchange rate values. This specification, though maybe not completely theoretically
founded, allowed us to analyze the consequences of a currency breakdown for the dynamics of output
in a graphical manner. The nonlinear specification of the financial accelerator of this paper allows us
to still do so, with the advantage of being more theoretically grounded and computationally feasible.
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the measure of creditworthiness of the domestic firms q˜υ = eFf/pK becomes more
and more relevant for the credit awarding decisions by the lending institutions, and
consequently for the level of aggregate investment in the economy, because
lim
η→∞µF = −1.
A sharp currency devaluation (and therefore an increase in the debt-to-capital ratio of
the domestic firms indebted in foreign currency) leads to the activation of credit con-
straints by the lending institutions (the“balance sheet channel”introduced by Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996)) and thus to a decrease in the aggregate investment, since
µ′F (η) = −
2(η − 1)
(2− 2η + η2)2 < 0 for η > 1.
This effect, nevertheless, is not unbounded, as the second partial derivative of I with
respect to η shows:
µ′′F (η) =
2(2− 6η + 3η2)
(2− 2η + η2)3 .
since
lim
η→∞µ
′′
F (η) = 0.
As µF (η) is specified, it allows us to model the nonlinear nature of the credit rationing
by the financial institutions as a reaction to a decline of the firms’ net worth caused by
a sudden sharp devaluation of the domestic currency. We sketch the dependence of the
aggregate investment on the nonlinear financial accelerator term µF in Figure 6.1.
Note that even though the theory behind Figure 6.1 is of a very simple nature, it allows
us to incorporate the basic implications of the theory of imperfect capital markets
developed by Akerlof (1970) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and to discuss manner the
operation of the Bernanke et al. (1996) financial accelerator effect in a graphical in our
framework.
Furthermore, such a specification opens up the possibility of multiple equilibria and,
therefore, to the existence of “normal”and“crisis” steady states, respectively. Note that
the magnitude of the balance sheet effect depends in a great manner on υ, that is on
the degree of liability dollarization of the economy: For υ = 1, i.e. in the case of total
liability dollarization (as in Flaschel and Semmler (2006)), the balance sheet effect
alone (except changes in the foreign interest rate) determines the level of aggregate
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Fig. 6.1: A Real Exchange Rate State-Dependent Financial Accelerator Term
investment. For υ = 0, on the contrary, changes in the real exchange rate do not
directly affect the financial state of the domestic firms.
In the aggregate, the investment function is thus determined by
I = io − (1− υ)i1(r) + υµF
= I((1− υ)r−, υµF− ) (6.2)
with r = i − pˆ as the real domestic interest rate and i1 as the interest rate sensitivity
of aggregate investment.
Concerning the rest of the economy, we assume quite standard consumption and net
exports functions, so that the goods market equilibrium in the small open economy can
be expressed as
Y = C(Y − T¯ − δK¯) + I((1− υ)r, υµF ) + δK¯ + G¯+NX(Y ∗, η, Y ). (6.3)
with Y − T¯ −δK¯ denoting the disposable income, T¯ lump sum taxes, G¯ the government
consumption and δK¯ the capital depreciation. Net exports NX depend in a standard
way positively on the foreign output level (assumed for simplicity to be at its natural
level) and on the real exchange rate η = e/p (the foreign goods price still set equal to
one), and negatively on Y , the domestic output level.
As for example in Blanchard and Fischer (1989), we assume the following dynamic
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adjustment process in the goods markets:
Y˙ = βy(Y d − Y )
= βy
[
C(Y − δK¯ − T¯ ) + I((1− υ)r, υµF ) + δK¯ + G¯+NX(Y ∗, η, Y )− Y
]
.(6.4)
with Y d as the aggregate goods demand and βy as a parameter representing the speed
of adjustment in the goods markets.
Using the Implicit Function Theorem, it follows for the displacement of the DD-Curve
with respect to nominal and real exchange rate increases
∂Y
∂η
∣∣∣∣
Y˙=0
= −∂ηI(·)υµ
′
F (η) + ∂ηNX(·)
C ′(Y ) + ∂YNX(·)− 1
≥
< 0.
Here we can observe one of the essential points of our model. The effect of a devaluation
of the domestic currency on economic activity depends on the relative strength of the
exports reaction as compared to the reaction of aggregate investment.3 In the “normal
case”, where firms are not wealth constrained, the exchange rate effect on investment
is supposed to be very weak and thus dominated by the exports effect. Then we have
∂ηNX(·) >
∣∣∂ηI(·)υµ′F (η)∣∣ =⇒ ∂Y∂η
∣∣∣∣
Y˙=0
> 0.
In the“fragile case”, i.e. in a middle range for the exchange rate, the balance-sheet effect
of a devaluation of the domestic currency is assumed to be large so that it overcomes
the positive exports effect:
∣∣∂ηI(·)υµ′F (η)∣∣ > ∂ηNX(·) =⇒ ∂Y (·)∂η
∣∣∣∣
Y˙=0
< 0.
The resulting DD-curve is depicted in Figure 6.2.
3 The denominator is assumed to be unambiguously negative, so that the sign of the numerator is
decisive for the slope of the DD-Curve.
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Fig. 6.2: The DD-Curve under State-Dependent Credit Awarding
6.2.2 The Financial Markets
Following Rødseth (2000), we follow a portfolio approach of Tobin type when modeling
the financial markets in our framework. The defining financial market equations are:
Households’ Financial Wealth Wh =
M +Bh + eFh
p
(6.5)
Risk Premium ξ = i(Y, M¯/p)− i¯∗ − ² (6.6)
Foreign Currency Bond Market eFh = pf(ξ
−
,Wh
+
, κ
+
), (6.7)
Money Market Equilibrium M¯/p = kY + ho − h1i = m(Y
+
, i−), (6.8)
Domestic Currency Bond Market Bh/p = Wh − f (ξ,Wh, κ) (6.9)
Equilibrium Condition Fh + Fc + F¯∗ = 0 or Fh + Fc = −F¯∗. (6.10)
Equation (6.5) describes the financial wealth of the private sector consisting of domes-
tic money M , bonds in domestic currency Bh and bonds in foreign currency Fh, all
expressed in domestic currency. Domestic and foreign currency denominated bonds are
allowed to deliver different rates of return, meaning that the Uncovered Interest Rate
Parity does not hold, at least in the short run.
The resulting risk premium of holding domestic currency bonds, i.e. the expected rate
of return differential between the two interest bearing financial assets, is represented by
eq.(6.6), with ² denoting the expected rate of currency depreciation, which is assumed
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to be determined by
² = eˆe = β²(1− η).
The agents in the financial markets are assumed to form their expectations concerning
the future depreciation rate of the nominal exchange rate based on the long run validity
of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) postulate: If η, the real exchange rate is below
one (is overvalued), the long run PPP consistent level, the agents will expect a nominal
depreciation of the domestic currency. In the contrary case, where η > 1, that is, when
the domestic currency is undervalued, the economic agents will expect an appreciation
of the nominal exchange rate. For the steady state real exchange rate level η = 1,
²(ηo) = 0 obviously holds. This expectation formation mechanism can be considered as
purely forward looking and in this respect asymptotically rational, since the economic
agents, having perfect knowledge of the long run steady state real exchange rate level
ηo, expect the actual exchange rate to converge monotonically to it after each shock
that affects the economy.
Eq.(6.7) represents the market equilibrium for foreign currency denominated bonds.
Hereby the demand for this type of financial assets is assumed to depend negatively
on the risk premium, positively on the private financial wealth and positively on the
parameter κ, which acts as a catch-all variable of foreign market pressures like political
instability or speculative herding behavior. Eq.(6.8) represents the domestic money
market equilibrium with the usual reactions of the money demand to changes in interest
rates and output. The domestic bond market given by eq.(6.9) is then in equilibrium
via Walras’ Law of Stocks, if this holds for the bonds denominated in foreign currency.
The last equation describes the equilibrium condition for the foreign exchange market.
It states that the aggregate demands of the three sectors — domestic private sector,
the monetary authority and foreign sector — sum up to zero, see Rødseth (2000, p.18).
Following the assumption that the supply of foreign-currency bonds from the foreign
sector is constant (−F¯∗), the additional amount of foreign-currency bonds available
to the private sector (besides his own stocks) is solely controlled by the monetary
authorities (This assumption can be justified by assuming as in Rødseth (2000) that
domestic bonds cannot be traded internationally). The prevailing exchange rate regime
thus depends on the disposition of the central bank to supply the private sector with
foreign-currency bonds.
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By inserting the money market equilibrium interest rate (the inverse function of eq.(6.8))
i(Y, M¯/p) =
kY + ho − M¯/p
h1
in eq.(6.7) the Financial Markets Equilibrium- or AA-Curve is derived
eFh/p = f
(
i(Y, M¯/p)− i¯∗ − βε (1− η) , M +Bh + eFh
p
)
. (6.11)
This equilibrium equation can be interpreted as a representation of the e˙=0−isocline.
Under the assumption that the exchange rate does not adjust automatically to foreign
exchange market disequilibria, one may postulate as exchange rate dynamics:
e˙ = βe
[
f
(
i(Y, M¯/p)− i¯∗ − βε (1− η) , M +Bh + eFh
p
, κ
)
− eFh
p
]
. (6.12)
The slope of the e˙=0−isocline is determined by the Implicit Function Theorem in the
following way:
∂e
∂Y
∣∣∣∣
e˙=0
= − ∂ξf(· ) ∂Y i(· )
∂ξf(· ) ²′(η) + (∂Whf(· )− 1)Fh/p
< 0.
6.3 Dynamics under Fixed Prices and Flexible Exchange Rates
As a starting point we analyze the case where domestic (and foreign) goods prices are
fixed (p = p∗ = 1), and the nominal exchange rate, once set to float, adjusts according
to eq.(6.12).
6.3.1 Local Stability Analysis
The case of fixed domestic goods prices (p = 1), where η˙ = e˙ holds, was analyzed in
Flaschel and Semmler (2006). In this case the differential equations of the currency
crisis model are:
Y˙ = βy
[
C(Y − δK¯ − T¯ ) + I((1− υ)r, υµF ) + δK¯ + G¯+NX(Y ∗, e, Y )− Y
]
e˙ = βe
[
f
(
i(Y, M¯)− i¯∗ − βε (1− e) ,M +Bh + eFh, κ
)− eFh] .
The Jacobian of this system is
J =
 βy [C
′(Y ) + ∂YNX( · )− 1] βy [∂eI( · )µ′F + ∂eNX( · )]
βe(∂ξf( · ) ∂Y i( · )) βe(−∂ξf( · ) ²′(e) + (∂Wpf(·)− 1)Fh)
 .
6.3. Dynamics under Fixed Prices and Flexible Exchange Rates 185
Because of the nonlinearity of the Y˙=0−isocline there exist three economically mean-
ingful steady states in the considered situation, whose local stability properties can
easily be calculated:
JE1 =
 − +
− −
 =⇒ tr(JE1) < 0, det(JE1) > 0 =⇒ stable steady state
JE2 =
 − −
− −
 =⇒ tr(JE2) < 0, det(JE2) < 0 =⇒ saddle point
JE3 =
 − +
− −
 =⇒ tr(JE3) < 0, det(JE3) > 0 =⇒ stable steady state.
Steady state E1 represents the “normal” steady state, where the economy’s output is
high as well as the domestic investment activity. In this steady state, the standard
case |∂eI( · )υµ′F | < ∂eNX( · ) holds. Steady State E2 represents the fragile case with
|∂eI( · )υµ′F | > ∂eNX( · ): Because a slight deviation of the output level from this steady
state level can lead the economy to a short-run investment boom or to a decline in
the economic activity, this equilibrium point is unstable. Steady State E3 constitutes
the “crisis equilibrium”. At this equilibrium point the investment activity is highly
depressed due to the high value of e. Nevertheless, the slope of the Y˙−isocline is again
positive because of |∂eI( · )υµ′F | < ∂eNX( · ) describing the dominance of exports over
(the remaining) investment demand in the considered situation.
Figure 6.3 shows the phase diagram of the complete DD-AA system for a floating
nominal exchange rate regime.
Note that the AA-curve becomes only binding if the monetary authorities choose a
flexible exchange rate regime. In a pegged exchange rate system the output level de-
fined by the Y˙=0−isocline at the given exchange rate level fully defines the unique
equilibrium of the system. In such a currency system the e˙=0−isocline can be in-
terpreted as a “shadow curve” which represents the exchange rate level which would
prevail if the currency was left to float freely. Because the monetary authorities are
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Fig. 6.3: The DD-AA Model
committed to remove any foreign exchange market disequilibria by buying or selling
any amount of foreign currency bonds needed to defend the prevailing exchange rate
level, the e˙=0−isocline represents the over-demand or over-supply with which the cen-
tral bank is confronted. Consequently, the larger the difference between the exchange
rate level given by the “shadow curve” and the currency peg level, the higher is the
demand for foreign currency bonds that the domestic central bank has to satisfy, and
vice versa.
6.3.2 The Baseline Currency Crisis Scenario
In this section the macroeconomic dynamics resulting from a currency and financial
crisis in economies with the totality of liabilities denominated in foreign currency under
an initial fixed exchange rate regime and constant wages and prices (as it was assumed
in the simple theoretical model by Flaschel and Semmler (2006)) will be discussed in
order to give a first intuition in the way the model works. The results presented here
will be useful to highlight the results of the different model extensions to be discussed
below.
Assume the economy is initially at steady state E1 in Figure 6.4 and that The prevailing
exchange rate system is a currency peg which is fully backed by the domestic central
bank. Now suppose that the demand for foreign-currency bonds increases due to a rise
in the“capital flight”parameter κ. As long as the central bank is disposed to defend the
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prevailing currency peg by selling foreign currency bonds there are no real effects on the
domestic economic activity. In the case that the domestic monetary authorities decide
AA-Curve
e
Y
1E
2E
e
κ
0=Y DD-Curve
Fig. 6.4: The Macroeconomic Effects of a Currency and Financial Crisis under Fixed Domestic
Goods Prices
to give in to the speculative pressures and to let the exchange rate float, the AA-Curve
becomes the binding curve in the model. The exchange rate then jumps from the initial
equilibrium E1 to the corresponding point at the AA-Curve (with a still unchanged
output level). From this point on, two different scenarios which depend on the actual
extent of the nominal exchange rate depreciation (or, in other words, the position of
the AA-Curve by the time of the currency peg breakdown) are possible. In the first
scenario, the corresponding point of the AA-Curve by the time of the depreciation lies
below the backwards-sloped section of the DD-Curve. In this case, the depreciation
and the resulting tightening of the credit conditions by the financial sector will not
be of significant proportions so that the economy will, due to the temporary gain in
competitiveness resulting from the depreciation, return to the equilibrium point E1.
In the second scenario, on the other hand, an increase in κ leads to a significant shift
to the right of the AA-Curve, so that when the abandonment of the currency peg
takes place, the corresponding point on the AA-Curve lies above the backwards-sloped
section of the DD-Curve. As the trajectories sketched in Figure 6.3 show, if this shift
is large enough, the equilibrium point E2 will be the attractor of the dynamics and the
economy will converge to it. As it can be clearly observed in figure 6.4, this convergence,
which will take place along the AA-Curve, will imply further nominal exchange rate
depreciations as long as E2 lies left to E1. Indeed, location of the new steady state
188 Currency Crises, Credit Rationing and Macroeconomic Dynamics
E2 is central for the resulting dynamics not only of the nominal exchange rate but
also of aggregate investment and output. If the new E2 lies left from the initial E1,
the sharp nominal exchange rate depreciation will indeed lead to a breakdown of the
economy due to the predominant effect of the depreciation on the credit awarding
by banks and therefore on aggregate investment (and further nominal depreciations).
But if on the contrary the new equilibrium point lies right from the old one, the gain
in competitiveness and the resulting increase in the net exports will predominate the
negative investment reaction. In this case the initial sharp depreciation of the currency
will be followed by a revaluation of the currency and an increase in investment and
output.
6.4 Dynamics under Gradually Adjusting Prices in Fixed Currency
Regimes
Although the basic model just discussed is capable of describing the main sequence of
events observed in the 1994-95 Mexican and 1997-98 East Asian currency and financial
crises, it still neglects two central factors: the role of the price adjustments and the
role of the domestic nominal interest rate. Indeed, because the domestic interest rate
does not influence the level of domestic investment in a direct manner because the
totality of domestic firms was assumed to borrow in foreign currency, the domestic
monetary authorities are not confronted with an exchange-rate policy dilemma during
a currency crisis. Theoretically, they are capable to increase the domestic interest
rates indefinitely in order to defend the currency peg without producing any negative
effects on the domestic economy. The decision to give in to a speculative attack on the
domestic currency here relies more on the level of the foreign exchange reserves that
the country has at the time of the currency run which may of course, dissipate during
the currency run.
Despite the fact that during a currency and financial crisis price fluctuations probably
do not play an important role because of the short time span in which such a twin crisis
takes place, they surely are of great importance for the economic recovery process of
such an economy. Real as well as nominal exchange rate fluctuations determine the
international competitiveness of the domestic goods and the volume of the exports of
the economy.
The assumption of constant domestic commodity prices in the context of sharp exchange
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rate fluctuations is also problematic because the exchange rate can affect the domestic
price level through the following channels (see Svensson (2000)):
• The exchange rate level affects the domestic currency prices of imported goods,
and therefore the CPI inflation rate.
• The exchange rate affects domestic currency prices of intermediate inputs.
• The exchange rate can also influence the nominal wage determination through
CPI inflation and thus again the domestic inflation.
Given the above shortcomings of the basic model, we discuss now a first variant of the
baseline currency crisis model of the previous section. The purpose of this extended
model is to show how besides the exchange rate- also domestic price level fluctuations
can influence the macroeconomic performance of a small open economy with dollarized
liabilities and credit market constraints.
The core of this extended model still is the balance-sheet state-dependent investment
function. Since domestic price fluctuations are now included, besides the role of the
exchange rate, changes in the domestic price level p now also influence the aggregate
investment level of the small open economy (while K,Ff are still kept constant). The
inclusion of price fluctuations into the considered dynamics through a standard Phillips-
Curve, coupled with the price level dependent investment function indeed brings con-
siderable complexity into the system.
The aggregate consumption and export functions remain unchanged, with the only
difference that the real exchange rate η = e/p (the foreign goods price still set equal to
one for simplicity) is now mainly driven by domestic price and not nominal exchange
rate changes. The same holds also for the reaction of aggregate investment to changes
in η.
On the assumption that a fixed exchange rate system prevails (e¯ = 1), the slope of
the Y˙= 0−isocline is described in the extended phase space (Y, p) (for output and the
domestic price level now) by:
∂Y
∂p
∣∣∣∣
Y˙=0
= −∂pI( · )((1− υ)i
′ + υµ′F ) + ∂ηNX(·)
C ′(Y )∂YNX(·)− 1
It can easily be seen that the slope of the Y˙=0−isocline depends on which of the
two opposite effects is the dominant one: the balance-sheet-effect ∂ηI( · ) > 0 or the
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competitiveness effect ∂ηNX( · ) < 0:
∂ηI( · )((1− υ)i′ + υµ′F ) > |∂ηNX( · )| =⇒
∂Y
∂p
∣∣∣∣
Y˙=0
> 0
and
∂ηI( · )((1− υ)i′ + υµ′F ) < |∂ηNX( · )| =⇒
∂Y
∂p
∣∣∣∣
Y˙=0
< 0.
From the shape of the assumed investment function there results (if its interior part is
sufficiently steeper than its counterpart in the export function) that for intermediate
values of q˜ the creditworthiness (the balance-sheet) effect is stronger than the “normal”
competitiveness effect, changing the slope of the Y˙=0−isocline and therefore opening
up the possibility of multiple equilibria now in the (Y, p) phase space. The structure of
the financial markets is as described in the baseline model.
Concerning the domestic price dynamics, we use a simple expectations augmented,
open-economy wage-price Phillips-curve (on the assumption of a constant productivity
production function and mark-up pricing) which can be written as
pˆ = βp(Y − Y n) + pˆec with pc = pθ(ep∗)1−θ, θ ∈ (0, 1). (6.13)
We now use pc for the consumer price level, based on a geometric mean of the domestic
and the foreign price level, both expressed in the domestic currency. Superscript e
denotes expectations, implying that marked up domestic wage inflation is explained in
this Phillips Curve by the output gap and the expected consumer price inflation rate.
By keeping the foreign price level constant and assuming perfect foresight concern-
ing domestic price level inflation and asymptotically rational nominal exchange rate
depreciation expectations (implying thus that the domestic agents incorporate their
expected exchange rate changes in their price setting behavior) we can reformulate the
open-economy wage-price Phillips-curve as
pˆ = βp(Y − Y n) + θpˆ+ (1− θ)β²(1− η)
or, after rearranging,
pˆ =
1
1− θβp(Y − Y
n) +
(1− θ)
(1− θ)β²(1− η)
Defining β˜p = βp/(1− θ), we thus obtain
pˆ = β˜p(Y − Y n) + β²(1− η) or p˙ =
(
β˜p(Y − Y n) + β² (1− η)
)
p, (6.14)
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what turns to
pˆ =
(
β˜p(Y − Y n)
)
p, (6.15)
if the nominal exchange rate as well as the foreign price level are believed to remain
constant by the economic agents. More generally, one may simply assume for this case
that inflationary expectations are still ignored by this model type in order to save one
law of motion and to leave the discussion of destabilizing Mundell type effects for later
extensions of the model, see our discussion of kinked Phillips curves below.
The implied p˙=0−isocline turns out to consist of two parts: for p > 0 the p˙=0−isocline
is the straight vertical line Y = Y n. Along the horizontal axis (p = 0), additionally,
p˙=0 also holds: As discussed in the next section, a further — though economically
not meaningful — steady state exists at the intersection of the Y˙=0−isocline and the
horizontal axis.
6.4.1 Local Stability Analysis
The extended currency crisis model (under a fixed exchange rate regime) is fully de-
scribed by the following differential equations:
Y˙ = βy
[
C(Y − δK¯ − T¯ ) + I((1− υ)r, υµF ) + δK¯ + G¯+NX(Y ∗, 1/p, Y )− Y
]
p˙ =
[
β˜p(Y − Y n)
]
p.
with the nominal exchange rate depreciation expectations still ignored.
The Jacobian of this system at the steady state is given by:
J =
 βy (C
′(Y ) + ∂YNX( · )− 1) βy (∂ηI( · )((1− υ)i′ + υµ′F ) + ∂ηNX( · ))
β˜pp0 0
 .
Because of the nonlinear shape of the Y˙=0−isocline there exist three possible economi-
cally meaningful steady states,4 whose local stability properties can easily be calculated:
JE1 =
 − −
+ 0
 =⇒ tr(JE1) < 0, det(JE1) > 0 =⇒ a stable steady state
4 Due to the nonlinearity of the second law of motion there exists a fourth steady state at the point
where the Y˙=0−isocline cuts the horizontal axis. This fourth steady state is not relevant however,
since it cannot be approached by the trajectories in the presently considered dynamics.
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JE2 =
 − +
+ 0
 =⇒ tr(JE2) < 0, det(JE2) < 0 =⇒ a saddle point
JE3 =
 − −
+ 0
 =⇒ tr(JE3) < 0, det(JE3) > 0 =⇒ a stable steady state.
The resulting dynamics of our extended currency crisis model (still a fixed exchange
rate) are described in Figure 6.5.
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Fig. 6.5: Phase Space Representation of the DD-PC Dynamics with a Normal and a Bad
Equilibrium, E1 and E3, respectively.
Steady state E1 represents the“normal”situation, where the domestic price level is high
and therefore (under the assumption of a fixed exchange rate) η is low. In this steady
state the economy’s output is at its full employment level, the investment activity is
high (due to the low q˜υ) and the exports are low due to a strong currency — relative
to the high domestic price level — and thus low competitiveness.5 In this steady state
the standard situation ∂ηI( · )((1− υ)i′ + υµ′F ) < |∂pNX( · )| holds.
Steady State E2 represents the fragile case where ∂ηI( · )((1−υ)i′+υµ′F ) > |∂ηNX( · )|
holds: A slight deviation of the output level from this steady state level can lead the
economy to a short-run investment boom (and to an over-employment situation) or to
5 Such a situation could be observed in the years preceding the East Asian Crisis, see Corsetti,
Pesenti and Roubini (1999).
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an economic slowdown or a recession, since this equilibrium point is unstable up to the
two stable arms that are shown as dotted lines.
Steady State E3 constitutes the “crisis equilibrium”. At this equilibrium point the
investment activity is severely depressed due to the high value of η (q˜υ). The economy,
though, is situated at its full-employment level because of the strong export of goods
production induced by the very low level of domestic prices, and thus by the implied
competitiveness of the economy.6
6.4.2 Dynamics with a Standard Phillips-Curve
Next, by employing a standard Phillips-Curve we discuss a situation where, after a
one-time devaluation of the domestic currency as a result of a speculative attack, the
economy experiences a financial crisis and can, eventually, shift from a “normal” equi-
librium with high investment and low exports to a “crisis” equilibrium with depressed
investment activity and high exports due to the included domestic price level adjust-
ments. Assuming again a constant exchange rate after the devaluation, the model
dynamics will be sketched in the (p − Y ) space instead of the (e − Y ) space as in the
Flaschel and Semmler (2006) model.
Assume the economy is initially situated at its upper full employment level E1 in Figure
6.6. A significant flight into foreign currency can take place in the model through an
increase of the κ parameter in the foreign currency bond demand. As long as the
monetary authorities can defend the old currency peg, the flight into foreign currency
does not have any effects besides the reduction of the foreign exchange reserves of
the central bank (because a constant money supply is assumed, a full sterilization of
money base changes by the central bank is also implicitly assumed). Now suppose that
the central bank gives in to the foreign market pressure after a while, because of the
dangerous lowering of foreign reserves. In order to release the pressure from the foreign
exchange market, see eq.(6.11), it carries out a one-time devaluation (for simplicity we
assume in this section that the new exchange rate is then considered by the economic
agents as “sustainable”). The effect of the currency devaluation on the Y˙=0−isocline,
i.e. the direction of the shift of the Y˙=0−isocline depends on the strength of the
balance-sheet and the competitiveness effects. To understand this point, consider the
original model of section 6.3 where prices were held constant: There too the output
6 For proofs for the global stability of the system, see Proan˜o et al. (2005).
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reaction to the exchange rate change depended on the strength of the exchange rate
effect on investment and exports.
The direction of the shift of the Y˙=0−isocline in the extended 2D model (in the (p−Y )
space) is analogous to the exchange rate effect on output in the original model (in
the (e − Y ) space): If ∂ηI( · )υµF > |∂ηNX(·)| holds, the nominal devaluation of the
domestic currency will shift the Y˙=0−isocline to the left and vice-versa.
The resulting system dynamics after a severe nominal devaluation of the currency under
the first situation are sketched in Figure 6.6.
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Fig. 6.6: The Macroeconomic Effects of a Currency and Financial Crisis under Gradually
Adjusting Domestic Goods Prices
Directly after the currency crash, the banks take into account the sharp deterioration of
the balance sheets of the business sector due to the strong devaluation of the domestic
currency. As a means of hedging themselves against ”bad creditors”, they implement
credit constraints and cut the volume of the granted loans. The industrial sector,
put now in a dramatic financial situation, must cancel the majority of the investment
projects either voluntarily or due to the credit constraints, leading to a reduction of
aggregate demand, employment and, due to the Phillips-curve, also of the domestic
price level.
We consider now as an example the case where the DD-curve – with the exception
of the zero price level situation – unambiguously shifts to the left as a result of the
currency devaluation. The steady state E3 is assumed, due the size of the shift of the
DD-curve, to be the only economically meaningful steady state. Falling prices are then
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at first accompanied by falling output levels. They lead to a further real depreciation,
in addition to the initially caused nominal exchange rate shock. Thus in turn leads to
further gains in competitiveness on the international goods market. Sooner or later, the
increased foreign demand for domestic goods leads to such an increase in exports and
that aggregate demand starts rising again, when the DD-curve is crossed from above
by the initiated temporary deflationary process. The deflationary spiral, since output
cannot rise by so much that the NAIRU level is reached again. Instead output will
start falling once again – when the DD-curve is crossed again on the way down to the
bad equilibrium – which still further down leads again to increasing output and then
either to monotonic adjustment to the steady state E3 or to damped cycles around it
(shown in Figure 6.6). We thus in sum observe a deflationary process with fluctuating
economic activity below the NAIRU output level until the economy is back to normal
output levels and smaller cycles around them.
Falling prices have negative effects as well as positive effects on aggregate demand.
The latter because of an export increase and the former because they reduce the nom-
inal value of the firms’ capital, deteriorating even more their financial situation. We
thus have both counteracting forces operating simultaneously, with a stronger invest-
ment effect initially (implying decreasing output levels), and an over time increasingly
stronger competitiveness effect, which will lead to improvements in the trade balance
and therefore to higher economic activity, which however will still be lower than at
its normal level and thus will still be accompanied by further deflationary pressures.
The graphical analysis here shows that the economy will fluctuate around a somewhat
persistent underemployment situation (with still falling prices) until the competitive-
ness effect finally dominates (maybe because the investment level has come close to
its “floor” level) and the economy returns to its “full”-employment level. This must
happen by assumption since it was assumed that the intersection of the DD-curve with
the horizontal axis lies to the left of the NAIRU output level. Deflation therefore must
come to an end and – maybe also with temporarily increasing price levels – approach
the steady state price level at E3 finally.
Note that the crucial mechanism in this dynamics that allows the economy to return
to the full-employment situation is the variation of the domestic price level. Because
in basic model sketched in section 6.3.2 there are assumed prices to be constant, one
cannot consider the (medium-run) possibility for the economy to return to a “full”-
employment situation. In the basic model the country which suffered from a currency
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and financial crisis is “thrown back” to a lower steady state output level where it re-
mained because the model did not produce any endogenous mechanism that would
allow the economy to recover from the twin crisis. In this extended version where we
allow prices to be sufficiently flexible the economic performance of the economy can
sufficiently improve through a real depreciation of the domestic goods, leading it back
to the full-employment level if the ceilings and floors in the investment and the export
function are chosen appropriately.
However, in contrast to our basic model discussed in section 6.3, where we could have
large output loss in the crisis equilibrium, this extended model may raise the ques-
tion to what extent the lower equilibrium represents a bad equilibrium. We have full
employment in the sense of the NAIRU theory, coupled with high exports, but very
low investment activity. The growth rate of the capital stock is thus very depressed
or even negative. This, of course, is bad for the future evolution of the economy with
respect to income growth and employment growth. Furthermore, if economic activity
is moving towards the lower equilibrium, the evolution may be subject to long periods
of deflation, in particular if there are downward rigidities in money wage adjustments
(a nonlinear PC) as we will consider them briefly below. In the present model, the
dangers of deflation are not fully included, and thus do not call for particular attention
by the monetary authority – with the exception that monetary policy may be used
to speed up the process of convergence to the good equilibrium and to avoid the bad
equilibrium. This will be discussed in the next section.
6.4.3 Dynamics with a “Kinked” Phillips Curve
Yet, already Keynes (1936, ch.2) had recognized that an economy-wide wage deflation
with a simultaneous deflation in money wages is rare to be observed. Taking downward
money wage rigidity into account the wage-price Phillips-Curve can be modified as
follows:
pˆ = max
{
β˜p(Y − Y n), 0
}
. (6.16)
This modified Phillips-Curve implies that in under-employment situations prices do not
fall but instead remain constant. Price changes can only take place in over-employment
situations, where the price level is assumed to rise as before. Adding such a kink in
money wage behavior modifies the considered dynamics as follows:
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Fig. 6.7: The Consequences of Downward Money Wage Rigidity
The empirical observation of downwardly rigid wages has important consequences for
the dynamics of the extended model. Assume the country finds itself in the same situ-
ation as discussed above: After a run on the foreign currency the monetary authorities
are forced to devaluate, so that – under the assumption that ∂ηI(·)υµ′F > |∂ηNX(·)|
holds – aggregate demand declines and the Y˙=0−isocline shifts again to the left. Be-
cause in the entire economic domain to the left of the p˙=0−isocline we have that pˆ=0
holds true, the Y˙=0−isocline is in this domain an attracting curve representing stable
depressions. All points on the Y˙=0−isocline to the left of the p˙=0−isocline are thus
now equilibrium points. For each of these steady states, there is no longer a mechanism
that allows the economy to return to its “full”-employment level. The “crisis” equilib-
rium in the basic model of sections 6.3.2, derived from Flaschel and Semmler (2006), is
now just one of these under-employment equilibria.
One may argue therefore that the assumed wage rigidity is bad for the working of the
economy. However, at present deflation is still a too tranquil process in order to allow for
any other conclusion. Advocates of downward wage flexibility should therefore not yet
interpret the present framework as an developed argument that supports their view.
Adding real rate of interest effects (Mundell-effects) to the formulation of aggregate
demand, or adding a Fisher debt effect to investment behavior, can easily remove
the lower turning point in deflation dynamics from the model. This would therefore
imply an economic breakdown, in case the kink in the money wage PC was not there.
The kinked wage Phillips Curve prevents or at least delays deflationary processes from
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working their way. Though stable depressions may be considered a big problem, the
remedy to allow for a significant degree of wage flexibility would in such situations not
revive the economy, but make things only worse, in particular in situations where a
liquidity trap has become established.
In the present form of the model the kink in wage behavior however implies that a
stable depression becomes established to the left of the good equilibrium E1 with no
effect on the price level, as it was already considered in Flaschel and Semmler (2006).
6.5 Dynamics under Gradually Adjusting Prices and Nominal
Exchange Rates
After having investigated the role of nominal exchange rate and domestic price level
adjustments for the medium run dynamics of our model separately, we analyze in
this section the dynamics of the model when both the nominal exchange rate and the
domestic price level are allowed to adjust to disequilibrium situations in both the goods
and the financial markets. Note that the strength of the balance-sheet effect on the
aggregate demand depends on the degree of dollarization of liabilities in the economy
υ: For υ = 1, the balance-sheet effect operates with full strength, while for 0 < υ < 1
this effect operates only partially.
In the flexible exchange rate regime the model consists of the following differential
equations:
Y˙ = βy
[
C1(Y − T¯ ) + I((1− υ)r, υµF ) + δK¯ + G¯+X(Y¯ ∗, η, Y )− Y
]
η˙ =
βe
p
[
f
(
i(Y, M¯/p)− i¯∗ − βε(1− η),Wh, κ
)− ηFh]
−
(
β˜p(Y − Y n) + β²(1− η)
)
η
The first differential equation is the standard goods markets adjustment mechanism
described by eq.(6.4) in section 6.2. The second equation gathers eq.(6.12) and eq.(6.14)
and represents the adjustment of the real exchange rate to changes in Y . As it can
easily be observed, for Y > Y n the real exchange rate appreciates, i.e. η˙ < 0. This
development results from two effects: on the one hand, a rise in Y above Y n leads
to a nominal interest rate increase due to the Taylor rule and therefore to a nominal
exchange rate appreciation , i.e. e˙ < 0. On the other hand, for Y > Y n follows that
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p˙ > 0. The additional term of exchange rate expectations only strengthens this effect
(but it is not its main determinant). For Y < Y n, the opposite holds.
The Jacobian of this system is
J =
 J11 J12
J21 J22

with
J11 = βy
[
C ′(Y ) + ∂rI( · )(1− υ)∂Y i( · ) + ∂YNX( · )− 1
]
J12 = βy
[
∂ηI( · )υµ′F + ∂ηNX( · )
]
J21 =
βe
p
∂ξf( · )∂Y i( · )− β˜pη
J22 =
βe
p
(∂Wpf( · )− 1)Fpo).
Because of the nonlinearity of the Y˙=0−isocline there exist three economically mean-
ingful steady states in the considered situation, whose local stability properties can be
calculated easily:
JE1, E3 =
 − +
− −
 =⇒ tr(JE1) < 0, det(JE1) > 0 =⇒ stable steady state
JE2 =
 − −
− −
 =⇒ tr(JE2) < 0, det(JE2) < 0 =⇒ saddle point
under the assumption of a stable interaction between goods markets, price dynamics
and monetary policy, implying that
C ′(Y ) < |∂rI(·)(1− υ)∂Y i(·) + ∂YNX(·)− 1|
holds for J11. The resulting phase diagram of this currency crisis model is sketched in
Figure 6.8.
Steady state E1 represents the “normal” steady state, where the economy’s output is
high as well as the domestic investment activity. In this steady state, the standard
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Fig. 6.8: The DD-PCFM Model
case |∂ηI( · )υµ′F | < ∂ηNX( · ) holds. Steady State E2 represents the fragile case with
|∂ηI( · )υµ′F | > ∂ηNX( · ): Because a slight deviation of the output level from this
steady state level can lead the economy to a short-run investment boom or to a decline
in the economic activity, this equilibrium point is unstable. Steady State E3 consti-
tutes the“crisis equilibrium”. At this equilibrium point the investment activity is highly
depressed due to the high value of e. Nevertheless, the slope of the Y˙ = 0−isocline is
again positive because of |∂ηI( · )υµ′F | < ∂ηNX( · ) describing the dominance of exports
over (the remaining) investment demand in the considered situation.
6.5.1 The Case of Total Liability Dollarization υ = 1
In order to highlight the implications of the incorporation of the domestic interest
rate in the aggregate investment function of our model, we discuss first the resulting
dynamics for the complete liability dollarization case (υ = 1), as it was the case in
Flaschel and Semmler (2006) and Proan˜o et al. (2005). Assume the economy is initially
situated at its NAIRU employment level in steady state E1. A speculative attack on
the domestic currency can be represented in our model by an increase of the parameter
κ in the foreign currency bond demand. In such a situation, the domestic monetary
authorities can choose between two strategies: Increasing the nominal interest rates
or serve the excess demand by the reduction of their foreign exchange reserves. In
both cases, the flight into foreign currency does not have any real effects as long as
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the monetary authorities can defend the old currency peg besides the reduction in the
money supply – resulting from the operations in the foreign exchange market – and
the reduction of the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank. Since domestic
investment is solely financed through foreign currency credit, as long as the nominal
exchange rate remains unchanged, the speculative attack on the domestic currency
does not affect the creditworthiness of - and therefore the credit awarding to domestic
firms. Now suppose that the central bank gives in to the foreign market pressure due
to, say, a dangerous approaching of the international reserves to a critical level. As
a result of a speculative attack on the domestic currency, the nominal exchange rate
devaluates sharply, triggering the activation of credit constraints by the financial sector
and depressing the level of aggregate investment and therefore of the entire economic
activity. Now, while in the model discussed in the previous section the new exchange
rate level after the one-time devaluation was assumed for simplicity to be considered by
the economic agents as “sustainable”, here, on the contrary, this must not necessarily
be the case, as we will discuss below.
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Fig. 6.9: The Consequences of a Breakdown of the Currency Peg in the Case of Total Liability
Dollarization
In the (η, Y ) - space, the short run sharp nominal exchange rate devaluation is repre-
sented by a “jump” of the value of η along the η˙ = 0−isocline up to point B.7 Now,
due to the dynamic adjustment mechanism in the goods markets, Y declines so that
Y < Y n. This development has two effects, as already discussed in the previous sec-
7 We assume that the nominal depreciation is of such magnitude that B lies above the unstable
steady state E2. We will discuss the case where B lies below E2 below.
202 Currency Crises, Credit Rationing and Macroeconomic Dynamics
p
t
'eqp
eqp
t
e
eqe
Fig. 6.10: Price Level and Exchange Rate Adjustments after a Breakdown of the Currency
Peg in the DD-PF Model
tion. On the one hand (assuming now a post-crisis flexible exchange rate regime), a
decrease in Y leads to a fall in the domestic interest rates and to a higher demand for
foreign bonds and to a further rise in e. On the other hand, the underemployment situ-
ation leads to a fall in the domestic price level, i.e. p˙ < 0. Both effects lead to a strong
depreciation of real exchange rate, helping the economy to return to its NAIRU employ-
ment level through the expansion of the domestic exports. Obviously, in a post-crisis
fixed exchange rate regime, a much more severe deflationary process than in a flexible
exchange rate regime is required for the domestic economy to return to its pre-crisis
NAIRU level of employment, as discussed in Proan˜o et al. (2005). These dynamics are
sketched in Figure 6.9.
Since now the nominal exchange rate is allowed to float after the occurrence of the
currency crisis, there is no necessity for a severe deflationary process in order to reach
the NAIRU consistent output again. Further nominal exchange rate adjustments (in
this case depreciations) can also contribute to further real exchange rate devaluations.
As stated before, in the case of total liability dollarization, a defense of the prevailing
exchange rate level by the domestic monetary authorities would not have (at least in the
short run) a direct effect on the aggregate demand because the domestic firms finance
their investment projects completely through foreign currency credit. Theoretically, the
monetary authorities could thus indefinitely increase the domestic interest rates in order
to reduce the pressure on the exchange rate without directly affecting the real sector
of the economy. Such a measure could reduce the magnitude of an eventual nominal
depreciation and might even generate a short run expansion due to the expansion of
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the net exports, if the real exchange rate jumps in the short run only to a point B′
below the steady state E2.
Downward rigidity as discussed by the “kinked” Phillips Curve in section 6.4.3 does
not “condemn” here, in contrast, the economy to remain in such under-employment
equilibria due to the absence of a way to re-gain competitiveness and therefore to
increase the level of exports again. In the presence of downward rigidity the nominal
exchange rate assumes the whole weight of the recovery process so that further nominal
(and also real) exchange rate depreciations are needed to enhance the competitiveness
of the domestic products in the international goods markets and so to return to the
NAIRU-production level.
6.5.2 The Case of Partial Liability Dollarization 0< υ <1
We now analyze the dynamics of the model for the case where a fraction of the domestic
firms does not issue foreign-currency debt but instead finances its investment projects
by domestic currency denominated credit. Despite the fact that the Y˙ = 0−isocline has
basically the same shape as in the previous section, the magnitude of the balance-sheet
effect on the aggregate investment and therefore on the aggregate demand depends on
the degree of dollarization of liabilities in the economy.
In an economy with liabilities denominated only partially in foreign currency, during
a speculative attack on the domestic currency the monetary authorities are confronted
with a lose-lose situation. Exactly this situation is represented when 0 < υ < 1. In
this case an increase of the domestic interest rate has a direct effect on the aggregate
investment due to a subsequent decrease of the investments undertaken by the fraction
(1 − υ) of domestic firms. In our model, such a response to a speculative attack on
the domestic currency does not only influence the dynamics of η˙, but it also shifts
the Y˙ = 0−isocline to the left reducing the aggregate investment and demand, as
sketched in Figures 6.11 and 6.12. In the next sections we show that this potential
counterproductiveness of an increase in the domestic interest rate by the monetary
authorities depends on the elasticity of the aggregate demand with respect to interest
rate changes.
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Dynamics after a Successful Defense of the Currency Peg
Under the assumption that the increase of the domestic nominal interest rate by mon-
etary authorities succeeds in lowering the pressure in the foreign exchange market so
that the prevailing exchange rate (or currency peg in case of a fixed exchange rate
regime) remains at its former level (or just slightly deviates from it), two scenarios are
possible. If the elasticity of the aggregate investment with respect to domestic inter-
est rate changes is low (and/or the degree of liability dollarization in the economy is
particularly high), the Y˙ = 0−isocline will not significantly shift to the left and the
economy will return to an equilibrium point very similar to the pre-crisis equilibrium
situation after a short term period of slight over-production and -employment and a
moderate domestic inflation, as sketched in Figure 6.11a. If, on the contrary, the elas-
ticity of the aggregate demand to interest rate changes is high (and/or the degree of
liability dollarization is low), the DD-Curve will significantly shift to the left and the
E1 equilibrium point might be missed, as sketched in Figure 6.11b.
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Fig. 6.11: Real Exchange Rate and Output Dynamics resulting from a Successful Defense of
the Exchange Rate Level under a) Low and b) High Interest Rate Elasticity of the
Aggregate Investment
In this second case an increase in the domestic interest rate will thus lead to a severe
economic slowdown in the short run due to the fall in the aggregate demand, despite of
the successful defense of the nominal exchange rate. In the medium run, the equilibrium
point E3 is the only steady state to which the economy can converge to. Since Y < Y n,
the domestic price level will fall and η˙ > 0, even though the nominal exchange rate might
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remain fixed. This decrease in the domestic price level will enhance the competitiveness
of the domestic products in the international markets, expanding the export volume
and leading the economy in the medium run to the full-employment level E3, with a
different composition though, namely high exports and depressed investments. Note
nevertheless that this recovery process might only take place if the domestic wages and
prices fall sufficiently to enhance in a significant way the competitiveness of the domestic
goods. If the domestic nominal wages and prices are downwardly rigid as empirically
is the case in the majority of modern economies, then the economy might stay in an
unemployment situation where the nominal exchange rate is constantly under pressure
for a longer period of time. In this case, two alternatives to return to Y n exist: either
the government pursues an expansionary fiscal policy (shifting the DD-Curve back to
the right) or the monetary authorities give in to the foreign exchange market pressure
and devaluate the domestic currency, accelerating so the recovery process to E3.
Dynamics after a Failed Defense of the Currency Peg
The two possible scenarios discussed in the previous section were based on the assump-
tion that an interest rate increase by the domestic monetary authorities is successful in
the defense of the prevailing exchange rate (or currency peg in case of a fixed exchange
rate regime). Nevertheless, as the majority of currency crises in the last decades have
demonstrated, the foreign exchange market pressure can be of such a magnitude that
the monetary authorities might be forced to devalue or let the nominal exchange rate
float. In such a case the currency mismatch between the assets and liabilities of the
fraction of domestic firms which finance their investment projects through foreign cur-
rency credit takes place all in all, leading to the activation of credit constraints by the
financial sector and to a decrease in the investment of the group of domestic firms in-
debted in foreign currency. The investment of the remaining firms, which actually does
not depend on the level of the nominal exchange rate, is also affected by the domestic
interest rate increases undertaken by the monetary authorities in their effort to defend
the currency peg. The aggregate consequences for the economy are then catastrophic,
since not a fraction, but the complete investment by the entrepreneurial sector is de-
pressed. The extent of the investment decrease depends, of course, on the interest rate
elasticity of the aggregate demand, as shown in Figure 6.12.
Figures 6.12a and 6.12b show an important insight: the higher the interest rate elasticity
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Fig. 6.12: Real Exchange Rate and Output Dynamics resulting from a Failed Defense of the
Exchange Rate Level under a) Low and b) High Interest Rate Elasticity of the
Aggregate Investment
of the aggregate demand is, the longer will be the recession period the economy will
experience after the currency breakdown and the higher will be the equilibrium real
exchange rate to which the economy converges in the medium run, as shown in Figure
6.12b. These results are intuitive: the higher the interest rate elasticity of the aggregate
demand, the greater is the investment decrease and therefore the real exchange rate
increase which is needed for the economy to return to its NAIRU level of employment
and production. We see thus that a failed defense of the prevailing exchange rate by
the monetary authorities can have disastrous implications for the short- and medium
run performance of the economy.
6.5.3 Short Term Policy Responses and Medium Term Consequences:
The Rules vs. Discretion Debate
Due to the potential occurrence of the scenarios discussed above, Furman and Stiglitz
(1998), Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Krugman (2000b) have pledged that in certain
situations not an increase, but a decrease in the domestic interest rate might be the
right measure during a speculative attack on the domestic currency. Indeed, since
the exchange rate does not have per se a real meaning for the economic activity, the
monetary authorities might decide to bring the foreign exchange market turmoil behind
them once and for all and to stabilise or even to enhance the economic activity by
lowering the interest rates, irrespective of the exchange rate level. Such a measure will
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induce an even greater nominal exchange rate depreciation, i.e. a jump from E1 to B′
as sketched in Figure 6.13. As shown there, the resulting dynamics depend on whether
the new nominal (and real in the short run) exchange rate lies beneath or above the
unstable new steady state E′′2 .
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Fig. 6.13: Two Possible Consequences of an Interest Rate Decrease as a Response to a Spec-
ulative Attack a in Economy with Dollarized Liabilities
In Figure 6.13a, where the interest rate elasticity of the aggregate demand is low, the
DD−Curve does not significantly shift to the right after the interest rate decrease,
so that B′ lies above E′′2 in the short run. In this case the economy will experience
a period of underemployment, depressed investment of the fraction of domestic firms
indebted in foreign currency (due to the increase of the domestic currency value of
the foreign currency liabilities of that group) and falling prices (since Y < Y n) until
E′3 is reached. Again, the enhancement of the net exports via real depreciation is the
mechanism which enables the economy to return to its NAIRU level of employment.
Nevertheless, the output loss in this case will probably be lower and the duration of
the economic slowdown shorter than in the previous cases where the exchange rate was
successfully defended but the aggregate investment was severely damaged, as sketched
in Figure 6.12.
In Figure 6.13b, where the interest rate elasticity of the aggregate demand is high, the
aggregate investment rises due to the decrease of the domestic interest rate, shifting
the DD−Curve significantly to the right (perhaps even so much that E3 disappears as
sketched above), so that B′ lies below E′′2 in the short run (if E2 still exists). In this
case the positive effect of the domestic interest rate decrease overcomes the negative
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balance sheet effect resulting form the nominal depreciation of the domestic currency.
In this scenario, thus, the final outcome is a period of over-production and -employment
of the economy caused by higher aggregate investment and net exports, despite of the
decline in investment of the fraction of firms indebted in foreign currency. Nevertheless,
due to the resulting increase in the domestic price level (since Y > Y n), over time the
domestic products will loose competitiveness and the net exports will decrease again,
leading the economy to its NAIRU production level at E′1.
In the previous section we showed that while the defense of the currency peg through
interest rate increases is likely to have devastating effects on the real side of economy,
even if it is successful, in determinate situations the alternative strategy of interest rate
decreases, as proposed by Furman and Stiglitz (1998) and Krugman (2000b), among
others, might be a better strategy to follow from a medium-run output-stabilization
point of view.
From the intertemporal point of view and more specifically, in the context of the rules-
vs.-discretion debate, the choice of the “adequate” strategy to follow depends on addi-
tional factors. Indeed, if as for example in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001)
the mere existence of a currency peg regime is considered as dependent on the credi-
bility of the monetary authorities as “peg defenders”, the only available, and from an
intertemporal point of view, sustainable strategy to be implemented would be the de-
fense of the currency peg by means of domestic interest rate increases. Indeed, if the
domestic monetary authorities would not follow such a strategy, the resulting lack of
credibility in the financial markets would enhance and even encourage further attacks
on the domestic currency, due to the (justified) expected capital gains from such a han-
dling. This would make it impossible for the attacked economies to remain in a fixed
exchange rate regime, even if the domestic monetary authorities peg the exchange rate
at a new (higher) level after a successful speculative attack.
On the contrary, if the monetary authorities decide during a speculative attack in a
discretionary manner to abandon the system of currency pegs and let the nominal
exchange rate float indefinitely and therefore to fulfill a radical macroeconomic regime
change, then considerations about their credibility as“peg defenders”will not be of much
importance anymore. In the new flexible exchange rate regime, the domestic monetary
authorities would not be directly accountable for nominal exchange rate fluctuations.
Their commitment to price stability and therefore to a stable purchasing power of the
domestic currency is what would be of much more importance for the determination of
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the nominal exchange rate in such a floating regime.
The decision concerning the response to a speculative attack, and more generally, con-
cerning the old rules-vs.-discretion debate, depends thus not only on the relative impact
of currency mismatches and domestic interest rates effects, but also on the intertem-
poral pros and cons of the abandonment of a fixed exchange rate system for a floating
regime for the domestic economy.
6.6 Econometric Analysis
As stated before, the East Asian as well as the Mexican (1994-95) currency and finan-
cial crises are quite particular episodes in financial history due to the abruptness and
extent to which the real side of the economy was affected by the sharp devaluations
of the domestic currency. As previously discussed, the fact that in the majority of
countries the domestic monetary authorities tried to defend – though unsuccessfully –
the prevailing nominal exchange rate by raising the domestic short term interest rates
(a measure which was backed up by the IMF) raises the question whether that strategy
was not in part responsible for the subsequent sharp decline in the aggregate demand,
and especially in the aggregate investment, as discussed in the model scenario sketched
in Figure 6.12.
In Figure 6.14 we show time series data of Mexico and selected East Asian countries
for the 1990s, the decade when currency and financial crises took place in those coun-
tries. In all cases a sharp nominal exchange rate depreciation, caused by a successful
speculative attack, preceded an abrupt and severe decline in the aggregate investment
activity in the following quarters.
While the collapse of the aggregate investment in nearly all attacked East Asian coun-
tries has been explained by the majority of researchers by means of an open-economy
version of the financial accelerator concept introduced by Bernanke et al. (1996), where-
after the domestic currency value of the foreign currency liabilities soared due to the
sharp nominal depreciation of the domestic currencies, leading to a credit crunch by the
financial intermediaries, the sharp increase in the nominal domestic interest rates might
also have been an important source of the breakdown of investment, as discussed in the
theoretical model in the previous sections. In order to address the relative importance
of these two effects for the behavior of aggregate investment after the currency crisis,
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Fig. 6.14: Real Aggregate Investment, Nominal Exchange Rates and Price Inflation
(normalized data)
in this section we investigate the dynamic interaction of the nominal exchange rate,
the domestic nominal interest rate and the aggregate investment in a sample of East
Asian countries by means of an unrestricted VARX (vector autoregressive model with
exogenous terms) estimation.
For our analysis we use time series data of aggregate investment (in constant 1995
prices, seasonally adjusted), the respective nominal bilateral US-Dollar exchange and
domestic interest rates of Mexico (MX), Malaysia (MA), Thailand (TH), Indonesia
(ND), South Korea (SK) and the Philippines (PH) and the CPI/PGDP (depending on
their availability) inflation stemming from the International Statistical Yearbook 2003.
As endogenous variables in the VARX model we use the logs of these variables, with
the exception of the respective price indices, of which we use the growth rates.
The question whether the analyzed time series were integrated and eventually cointe-
grated was not pursued in the following econometric analysis because of two reasons:
First, no economic interpretation or theory is available (as for as we know) about a
“steady state” relationship between the level of dollarized debt of a country and its
aggregate investment: A possible cointegrating relationship between these variables
would face difficulties to be interpreted in form of economic theory. Second, because
of the small size of the time series samples, the results of unit root and cointegration
tests would not be reliable enough to make a definitive assertion about their order of
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Tab. 6.2: Descriptive Statistics
Country Variable Sample Obs Mean Min Max Std.Dev JB-Prob.
exchrate lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 1.764 0.989 2.022 0.518 0.023
MX tbillrate lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 2.917 1.880 4.100 0.523 0.917
investment lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 5.971 5.613 6.274 0.175 0.269
exchrate lg 1991Q1-2003Q1 49 1.123 0.901 1.400 0.197 0.024
MA lendrate lg 1991Q1-2003Q1 49 2.080 1.854 2.502 0.167 0.367
investment lg 1991Q1-2003Q1 49 9.828 9.498 10.32 0.231 0.135
exchrate lg 1993Q1-2002Q1 37 3.471 3.203 3.852 0.247 0.084
TH lendrate lg 1993Q1-2002Q1 37 2.375 1.945 2.724 0.256 0.180
investment lg 1993Q1-2002Q1 37 5.729 5.286 6.186 0.289 0.158
exchrate lg 1990Q1-2001Q4 48 7.742 7.502 9.413 0.695 0.023
ND moneyrate lg 1990Q1-2001Q4 48 2.566 1.900 4.306 0.577 0.000
investment lg 1990Q1-2001Q4 48 10.282 9.586 10.77 0.208 0.009
exchrate lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 6.861 6.554 7.435 0.248 0.064
SK tbillrate lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 2.259 1.386 3.173 0.524 0.064
investment lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 10.35 10.00 10.54 0.126 0.342
exchrate lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 3.489 3.118 3.990 0.284 0.041
PH lendrate lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 2.505 1.531 2.541 0.396 0.630
investment lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 4.676 4.379 4.676 0.128 0.306
integration and cointegration. Because of these reasons we perform our VARX analysis
in level form.
The restricted data availability does not allow us, unfortunately, to check for a highly
probable nonlinear relationship between investment and sharp nominal exchange in-
creases by means of econometric methods, forcing us to assume a log-linear relation-
ship in our estimations. Concerning the lag order of the VARX models, it was chosen
according to the Schwarz information criterion.
Tab. 6.3: Schwarz Bayesian VAR Lag Length Selection Criteria
Lags MX MA TH ND SK PH
0 1.474 -1.591 -0.848 2.999 -0.700 -0.917
1 -7.739 -7.510* -7.175* -3.373* -7.659 -6.671*
2 -7.905* -7.215 -6.872 -3.240 -8.117* -6.314
3 -7.577 -6.971 -6.905 -3.142 -8.094 -5.896
4 -7.434 -6.921 -6.567 -3.039 -7.583 -5.354
5 -6.856 -6.370 -5.967 -2.836 -7.044 -4.899
6 -6.370 -5.762 -5.725 -2.528 -6.690 -4.544
We analyze the dynamic response of aggregate investment to nominal exchange rate and
interest rate shocks by calculating impulse-response functions based on the estimated
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Tab. 6.4: Residual Serial Correlation LM-Tests
H0: No Serial Correlation at Lag Order h. Probs from Chi-Square with 9 DFs
Lags MX MA TH ND SK PH
1 0.1479 0.0049 0.1349 0.0034 0.0002 0.1346
2 0.8761 0.0070 0.1832 0.3669 0.2340 0.0595
3 0.6915 0.3359 0.0195 0.3207 0.8823 0.8778
4 0.7882 0.2362 0.9898 0.3292 0.8882 0.1344
5 0.7046 0.6483 0.0031 0.0173 0.2753 0.2362
6 0.0283 0.3015 0.0288 0.8298 0.6693 0.0910
7 0.4765 0.5400 0.2478 0.9164 0.8256 0.0066
8 0.2146 0.8300 0.8809 0.6179 0.2686 0.4955
9 0.9168 0.7342 0.5277 0.7469 0.8055 0.1958
10 0.9653 0.3624 0.4262 0.9871 0.6591 0.6801
parameters of the corresponding VARX models. As discussed in Bernanke, Gertler
and Watson (1997), VARs are used to analyze the systematic responses of an economic
system, for example, to unanticipated shocks (like exchange rate shocks). Now, since
large and abrupt nominal exchange and interest rate increases as the ones observed
during the Mexican and East Asian crises are likely to have been unexpected by the
economic agents, we interpret both exchange rate and interest rate impulses as repre-
senting unanticipated shocks, even though the interest rate increases are probably in
line with the reaction function or at least with the preferences of the domestic monetary
authorities.
Figure 6.15 shows the estimated dynamic responses of the real aggregate investment
and price inflation in the analyzed countries to a generalized one standard deviation
shock in the respective nominal exchange rates calculated according to Pesaran and
Shin (1998): As discussed there, the principal advantage of this calculation procedure
is that the resulting impulse response functions (generated by an orthogonal set of
innovations) are independent of the ordering of the endogenous variables in the VARX
model, in contrast to the standard Cholesky orthogonalization procedure. As it can
be observed there, in all economies an important and statistically significant negative
reaction of aggregate investment to a positive shock in the log nominal exchange rate.
Concerning the reaction of price inflation, in nearly all countries an initially positive
reaction (caused probably by a pass-through effect) is followed by a later negative
reaction, which nevertheless is almost insignificant from the statistical point of view,
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Fig. 6.15: Response of the Log of Aggregate Investment and of Price Inflation to a Generalized
One Std. Dev. Innovation in the Logs Nominal Exchange
leading to the presumption that the deflationary pressures discussed previously, though
theoretically possible, probably did not play an important role in the medium run
dynamics in the analyzed economies.
In the following we analyze the dynamic response of aggregate investment to an unex-
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pected one standard deviation shock in the log nominal exchange rate and alternatively,
in the domestic nominal interest rate.
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Fig. 6.16: Response of the Log of Aggregate Investment to a Generalized One Std. Dev.
Innovation in the Log Nominal Exchange and the Nominal Interest Rate
As Figure 6.16 shows, the reaction of aggregate investment to a shock in the nominal
exchange rate and interest rate varies significantly across countries. While in Mexico
the extent and duration of both responses is relatively low (what would explain the
fast recovery of the Mexican economy after the 1994-1995 Tequila crisis), in the other
countries the recovery of aggregate investment has a much longer duration. An ad-
ditional and probably more interesting finding is the heterogeneous relative strength
of the nominal exchange and interest rates across countries. While in Thailand and
South Korea the exchange rate shock affects the respective aggregate investment levels
in a more significant manner, in Indonesia and the Philippines the interest rate effect
seems to have predominated during the estimation period. Now, even if these empirical
findings are not definitive in their implications with respect to the main determinant
(if there was only one) of the investment decline in the East Asian countries, they nev-
ertheless open up the question whether, at least in some countries, the defense of the
currency pegs through interest rate increases might perhaps not have been the most
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adequate response to the speculative attacks on the domestic currencies. This differen-
tiated effect of nominal exchange and interest rate shocks in Mexico and the analyzed
East Asian countries can also be observed by means of the variance decomposition of
aggregate investment, as depicted in Figure 6.17.
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Fig. 6.17: Variance Decomposition of Aggregate Investment
6.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter builds on our previous work on the short run dynamics which are trig-
gered by a sharp depreciation of the domestic currency and the resulting credit rationing
in economies with dollarized liabilities. Going beyond the scope of the Flaschel and
Semmler (2006) framework, where a rather short run perspective disregarding wage
and price dynamics was presumed, we developed and discussed here two variants of the
Mundell-Fleming-Tobin currency crisis model which focused on the medium run recov-
ery processes after the occurrence of such a currency and financial crisis. These two
model variants, which consisted of the incorporation of domestic price level adjustments
and the general formulation of the real exchange rate dynamics, allowed us to highlight
the importance of nominal exchange rate and domestic price level adjustments for the
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medium run recovery process in economies which have suffered from a sharp deprecia-
tion of their domestic currency and the subsequent breakdown of aggregate investment
caused by the activation of credit constraints.
Besides highlighting the fact the net short run effect of a sharp nominal exchange rate
depreciation and the resulting medium run dynamics depend on the relative strength of
the real interest rate and the credit rationing by the financial institutions on aggregate
investment, we showed that in the short run either the defense of the currency peg or
the more unorthodox decrease of the nominal interest rate as proposed by Radelet and
Sachs (1998), Furman and Stiglitz (1998) and Krugman (2000b) can turn out either
successful or unsuccessful, depending on the different macroeconomic characteristics of
the concerned countries. In this line, the empirical evidence on the diversity of the
currency crises transmission mechanisms across the Mexican and East Asian economies
provided by the econometric VARX analysis of section 6.6 supported the differentiated
scenario analysis of section 6.5.
We conclude this chapter by pointing out that models where currency shocks trigger a
financial crisis and a severe economic slowdown need to take into account some spec-
ification of the wage- and price inflation dynamics in order to also study medium run
scenarios where inflation or deflationary pressures may arise and where the effects of
monetary policy are to be considered. The wage and price dynamics have not been
made an issue in the work of the third generation currency crisis models. The research
there has mainly focused on the mechanisms that transmit large currency shocks to the
financial sector and to real economic activity.
Summary and Outlook
This dissertation handled of the role of wage and price inflation dynamics and of mon-
etary policy for the stability of monetary economies from the theoretical and empirical
perspective. On the one hand, it analyzed the case of small open economies within a
monetary union where, by definition, the country-specific nominal exchange rate chan-
nel does not exist anymore and where therefore the degree of macroeconomic flexibility
relies to a much larger extent on the dynamics of domestic wage and price inflation.
On the other hand, the interplay between the nominal exchange rate dynamics and the
behavior of wage and price inflation in open economies was investigated.
In Chapter 1 the dynamic behavior of the inflation rate differentials in the main euro
area countries prior and after the introduction of the euro was analyzed. The conver-
gence and stationarity tests performed there showed that, while there was a process of
relative inflation convergence across the euro area countries which could be observed
during Stage Two of EMU, the dynamic behavior of the national inflation rate differen-
tials among the EMU members has featured significant and persistent deviations from
the EMU average ever since. Given the cumulative effect that persistently biased in-
flation rates that are not supported by accordant labor productivity growth rates have
for the relative competitiveness of the concerned economies, these results support the
concerns of a wide variety of researchers concerning the long-run sustainability of EMU.
Furthermore, the single-equation GMM estimations of the inflation rates and inflation
rate differentials for Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands showed in the
first place the importance of the relative business cycle position of the economy for both
variables in all these countries (with the exception of Germany, where this only holds
for the inflation rate), and in the second place, that the degree of persistence, measured
by the coefficients of the lagged values of inflation, is significant and of similar extent
in all analyzed countries for both inflation and inflation differentials estimations.
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the various estimations of the semi-structural (Disequili-
brium) AS-AD model with aggregate data of the U.S., the euro area, the U.K., Ger-
many and France confirmed the theoretical sign restrictions of the dynamical system.
Furthermore, they delivered a variety of interesting insights into the similarities and
differences of both economies with respect to the analyzed macroeconomic variables.
In the first place, a remarkable similarity in nearly all of the estimated coefficients in
the structural equations was found. For the euro area, this result is rather surprising if
we keep in mind that it became a factual currency union with a unique and centrally
determined monetary policy only eight years ago, on January 1999. For a long interval
within the estimated sample, the estimated coefficients reflect only the theoretical val-
ues of an artificial economy. Nonetheless, all other analyzed economies seem to share
many characteristics concerning the dynamics not only of wage and price inflation, but
also of the capacity utilization rate and the role of monetary policy.
Taken together, the results of Chapter 2 delivered an alternative perspective on the
role of interacting price – wage determination. The nowadays popular DSGE approach
is based on the assumption that primarily future expected values are the determinants
of wage and price inflation. However, the estimation results of Chapter 2 delivered
empirical support for the alternative specification of the wage-price inflation dynam-
ics discussed in Chiarella and Flaschel (1996), where cross over inflation expectation
formation (that is, current price (wage) inflation influencing current wage (price) infla-
tion), as well as lagged price inflation (the inflationary climate) cannot be rejected as
significant explanatory variables in the wage and price Phillips Curves.
Based on the notion that asymmetries in the labor markets are likely to explain to a
quite significant extent differences in the transmission of monetary policy and exogenous
shocks in member economies of a currency union (due to the absence of the country-
specific nominal exchange rate adjustment mechanism), in Chapter 3 the role of labor
market rigidities was explicitly modeled into a simple theoretical model in the line of
Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel and Semmler (2006). This straightforward modification of
the baseline (D)AS-AD framework delivered some interesting results concerning the
dynamic responses of the economy to various exogenous shocks. It was demonstrated
that the degree of rigidity in labor markets has an important effect on the dynamics
of output and inflation. The more rigid the labor markets are, the smaller is the
response of employment, output and inflation to exogenous shocks. Since nowadays
the predominant view is that real marginal costs (the labor share) are the main force
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driving price inflation, this approach represents an interesting alternative to the DSGE
framework, which considers the real marginal costs as being determined primarily by
intertemporal profit maximization under imperfect competition. Concerning the role of
monetary policy, the dynamic simulations of this chapter showed that a flexible inflation
targeting rule in the line of Taylor (1993) (where price inflation as well as output are
targeted), and/or a flexible inflation targeting rule with an additional weight on wage
inflation, have a better performance than flexible inflation targeting rules where the
employment rate or the wage share are also targeted, or a strict inflation targeting
strategy.
On more real-world related grounds, if the significant differences in the characteristics
of the labor markets across the EMU countries are seriously taken into account, the
findings of Chapter 3 might have delivered some interesting insights on the recent
inflation developments in those economies, with countries such as Germany or Austria
with persistently low inflation rates compared to other countries such as Spain and
Ireland, as discussed for example in Honohan and Lane (2003), Fritsche et al. (2005)
and Angeloni and Ehrmann (2007).
In Chapter 4 the implementation as well as the effectiveness of monetary policy in
a monetary union with asymmetric national labor market characteristics such as the
EMU were analyzed within a simplified two-country version of the model introduced
in Chapter 3. Using the strict inflation targeting approach of Svensson (1997), it was
possible to derive an analytical solution for the optimal instrument interest rate which
would stabilize the price inflation dynamics under two different specifications of the
loss function of the MUCB. In the first specification the MUCB focused on the simple,
country-size weighted average of the two member economies (and indeed it was simply
the average inflation rate which was entered in the loss function of the MUCB). In the
second specification the MUCB acted in accordance with the individual developments
of the member economies, which inflation rates entering explicitly in its loss function.
The dynamic simulations performed in Chapter 4 deliver two important findings. First,
that due to the explicit endogenization of the instrument interest rate as a function of
the country-weight λa, under country-specific inflation targeting, the MUCB is capable
to address country-specific developments by the adequate choice of the country weight
in a more efficient manner than in the simple average case. And second, that this strat-
egy is able to attain a lower welfare loss than the average inflation targeting strategy
precisely due to the explicit accounting of the individual country developments and
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specially of the relative competitiveness between the union member countries.
Even though the exact results of the undertaken simulations are valid only in the
calibrated theoretical model discussed in this chapter, the implications of this analysis
are in fact quite relevant for actual policy-making. Indeed, they open up the question
whether an alternative, time-varying accounting of the individual member countries of
a currency union such as the EMU would indeed be more welfare enhancing that the
usual simple average practice as long as not only the national labor markets as it was
the case here but also other macroeconomic characteristics in the member economies
significantly differ from each other, as it is still the case in the EMU.
The main focus of the analysis in Chapter 5 was the role of the nominal exchange rate
dynamics determined in a chartists-fundamentalists framework and its interaction with
the adjustment of wage and price inflation within the (D)AS-AD approach. For this a
two-country version of the baseline DAS-AD model of Chapter 2 was formulated, where
two large open economies interacted with each other and influenced each other through
trade, price and financial channels. As discussed in Chapter 5, despite its relative
basic structure, this theoretical framework was nevertheless able to deliver dynamic
responses in line with other empirical studies on the dynamics of open economies such as
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Kim (1999) and Kim and Roubini (2000). Furthermore,
through the calculation of the eigen-values of the 11D system, the effects of variations
in the parameter values were investigated. Particularly with regard to the modeling
of the nominal exchange rate dynamics, this eigen-value analysis delivered three main
results which are indeed of significant importance. First, it corroborated the standard
notion concerning the chartists’ destabilizing influence not only for the FX dynamics,
but also for the international economy. Second, it confirmed the findings of previous
studies such as Chen, Chiarella, Flaschel and Semmler (2006) (as well as Chapter 2
of this dissertation) concerning the role of wage and price flexibility for the stability
of the economy. And third, the maximum-eigenvalue-diagram concerning the inflation
gap coefficient φpi in the monetary policy rule showed that in an open economy the
threshold value for the effectiveness of monetary policy is not one as discussed for
example in Woodford (2003) for the case of closed economies, but rather less than one,
due to the functioning of other stabilizing macroeconomic channels such as the real
exchange rate channel in an open economy.
Chapter 6 developed and discussed two variants of the Mundell-Fleming-Tobin cur-
rency crisis model. These variants focused on the medium run recovery processes after
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the occurrence of such a currency and financial crisis. These two model extensions,
which consisted of the incorporation of domestic price level adjustments and the gen-
eral formulation of the real exchange rate dynamics, showed the importance of nominal
exchange rate and domestic price level adjustments for the medium run recovery process
in economies which have suffered from a sharp depreciation of their domestic currency
and the subsequent breakdown of aggregate investment caused by the activation of
credit constraints. In addition, they highlighted the fact that the net short run effect
of a sharp nominal exchange rate depreciation and the resulting medium run dynam-
ics depend on the relative strength of the real interest rate reaction and the extent
of credit rationing by the financial institutions on aggregate investment. Furthermore,
these modifications of the baseline model by Flaschel and Semmler (2006) demonstrated
that in the short run either the defense of the currency peg or the more unorthodox
decrease of the nominal interest rate as proposed by Radelet and Sachs (1998), Furman
and Stiglitz (1998) and Krugman (2000b) can turn out to be either successful or un-
successful, depending on the different macroeconomic characteristics of the concerned
countries. In this line, the empirical evidence on the diversity of the currency crises
transmission mechanisms across the Mexican and East Asian economies provided by
the econometric VARX analysis of section 6.6 supported the differentiated scenario
analysis of section 6.5. Since the theoretical and empirical literature on currency crises
has primarily focused on the preceding trends that foreshadow financial crisis episodes
(such as deterioration of balance sheets, deterioration of current accounts, decreasing
external debt to reserve ratio) and the mechanisms of the crisis scenario, the model
variants presented in Chapter 6 provided a useful perspective to trace out the possible
medium run macrodynamics of a country which has suffered from a currency and a
financial crisis. As it was shown in this chapter, multiple equilibria models appear to
be a useful device to study various scenarios of the medium-run after a financial crisis
has been triggered by large exchange rate shocks. Yet, we want to note here that a
study of the effectiveness of monetary policy would have to be undertaken in a more
elaborated framework which would incorporate the effects of monetary policy on the
stock of foreign currency debt and on capital accumulation.
In summary, the empirical and theoretical analysis undertaken in this dissertation
showed the importance of wage and price inflation adjustments for the macroeconomic
stability not only of economies within a monetary union, but also for small and large
open economies where the nominal exchange rate channel is fully operable. This was
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undertaken on the basis of a theoretical framework based on gradual adjustments to
disequilibrium situations in the goods, labor and financial markets based on Chiarella
and Flaschel (2000) and Chiarella et al. (2005).
As pointed out in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, the new alternative
research approaches on behavioral economics and learning support, at least partially,
the modeling approach which was pursued here. Furthermore, they seem indeed to
represent promising research directions which might indeed deliver, as partly done here,
a different, and more realistic understanding of the dynamics of modern economies than
the actual DSGE approach based on the“dogmas”of intertemporal utility maximization
and more importantly, of rational expectations.
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